Narrative:

Aircraft was released with VFR fuel based on the current forecast. The flight departed phx for mci in the XA00 hour. An mci forecast amendment calling for thunderstorms was issued during the XB00 hour. I made numerous attempts to contact the flight en route to request a speed reduction to enable the flight to come in behind a now clearly visible line of WX. All were unsuccessful. I spoke with the flight when he was in the vicinity of mci and we concurred that it appeared he could get in ahead of the storms. We discussed several options in the event the flight was unable to land at mci. All alternates that were within his fuel range were on the wrong side of the WX line or in danger of being impacted themselves. The captain suggested they continue the approach and plan mkc if they missed. Mkc was a viable option WX wise. I have had the opportunity to listen to the audio tapes of my radio xmissions and they were not exactly as I remembered. I thought the captain was telling me he was continuing the approach and would like to plan mkc if he missed. I said 'dispatch copied and concurs.' my concurrence was for continuing the approach. But after hearing the tapes, I can see that my message was not made clear. What I did not understand was that he was not telling me he was continuing on the approach. He was saying he wanted to go to mkc. I made an attempt to call him on the radio a few mins later but learned from the tower he had proceeded to mkc. I talked to the captain on the phone a few mins after that and said he had no problems landing at mkc and he had been there many times before (with another airline). I had runway and obstacle clearance data, generated a new release and faxed the information to the crew. I did not willfully disregard our operations specifications. I did however, misunderstand what the captain was telling me and failed to make myself clear at a critical time. Supplemental information from acn 405840: I was PIC. WX reports and forecast was good for an 'alternate none' flight. WX developed west of the mci airport. We thought we could be at the airport before the WX. On downwind to runway 19L a thunderstorm with a microburst hit the field, and we diverted to the nearest suitable airport, mkc. Lesson learned: 'alternate none' requires close attention.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR B737 FLC AND COMPANY DISPATCHER MISCOM, WITH FLT DIVERTING TO ANOTHER ARPT WITHOUT COMPLETED OPS SPECS DUE TO WX. APPROPRIATE PAPERWORK FAXED TO ALTERNATE ARPT AUTHORIZING USAGE AND RETURN TO INTENDED DEST.

Narrative: ACFT WAS RELEASED WITH VFR FUEL BASED ON THE CURRENT FORECAST. THE FLT DEPARTED PHX FOR MCI IN THE XA00 HR. AN MCI FORECAST AMENDMENT CALLING FOR TSTMS WAS ISSUED DURING THE XB00 HR. I MADE NUMEROUS ATTEMPTS TO CONTACT THE FLT ENRTE TO REQUEST A SPD REDUCTION TO ENABLE THE FLT TO COME IN BEHIND A NOW CLRLY VISIBLE LINE OF WX. ALL WERE UNSUCCESSFUL. I SPOKE WITH THE FLT WHEN HE WAS IN THE VICINITY OF MCI AND WE CONCURRED THAT IT APPEARED HE COULD GET IN AHEAD OF THE STORMS. WE DISCUSSED SEVERAL OPTIONS IN THE EVENT THE FLT WAS UNABLE TO LAND AT MCI. ALL ALTERNATES THAT WERE WITHIN HIS FUEL RANGE WERE ON THE WRONG SIDE OF THE WX LINE OR IN DANGER OF BEING IMPACTED THEMSELVES. THE CAPT SUGGESTED THEY CONTINUE THE APCH AND PLAN MKC IF THEY MISSED. MKC WAS A VIABLE OPTION WX WISE. I HAVE HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO LISTEN TO THE AUDIO TAPES OF MY RADIO XMISSIONS AND THEY WERE NOT EXACTLY AS I REMEMBERED. I THOUGHT THE CAPT WAS TELLING ME HE WAS CONTINUING THE APCH AND WOULD LIKE TO PLAN MKC IF HE MISSED. I SAID 'DISPATCH COPIED AND CONCURS.' MY CONCURRENCE WAS FOR CONTINUING THE APCH. BUT AFTER HEARING THE TAPES, I CAN SEE THAT MY MESSAGE WAS NOT MADE CLR. WHAT I DID NOT UNDERSTAND WAS THAT HE WAS NOT TELLING ME HE WAS CONTINUING ON THE APCH. HE WAS SAYING HE WANTED TO GO TO MKC. I MADE AN ATTEMPT TO CALL HIM ON THE RADIO A FEW MINS LATER BUT LEARNED FROM THE TWR HE HAD PROCEEDED TO MKC. I TALKED TO THE CAPT ON THE PHONE A FEW MINS AFTER THAT AND SAID HE HAD NO PROBS LNDG AT MKC AND HE HAD BEEN THERE MANY TIMES BEFORE (WITH ANOTHER AIRLINE). I HAD RWY AND OBSTACLE CLRNC DATA, GENERATED A NEW RELEASE AND FAXED THE INFO TO THE CREW. I DID NOT WILLFULLY DISREGARD OUR OPS SPECS. I DID HOWEVER, MISUNDERSTAND WHAT THE CAPT WAS TELLING ME AND FAILED TO MAKE MYSELF CLR AT A CRITICAL TIME. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 405840: I WAS PIC. WX RPTS AND FORECAST WAS GOOD FOR AN 'ALTERNATE NONE' FLT. WX DEVELOPED W OF THE MCI ARPT. WE THOUGHT WE COULD BE AT THE ARPT BEFORE THE WX. ON DOWNWIND TO RWY 19L A TSTM WITH A MICROBURST HIT THE FIELD, AND WE DIVERTED TO THE NEAREST SUITABLE ARPT, MKC. LESSON LEARNED: 'ALTERNATE NONE' REQUIRES CLOSE ATTN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.