Narrative:

En route from trenton, nj, to greensboro, nc, the master caution accompanied by the overheat/det light came on intermittently. The engine #1 overheat light flickered on and off. The left throttle was reduced and the overheat light continued to flicker. The captain and I both guessed that it was likely just a problem with the wiring but we were obligated to go ahead and shut the engine down using the engine fire/severe damage/separation procedure. The light continued to be intermittent as both fire bottles were 'shot.' I then asked if we were going to land at the nearest airport. He replied that we were close enough to greensboro that we would be able to glide in. I asked him if he would like for me to review the gom concerning conditions that require landing at the nearest airport. He replied that it was just a wire problem and that we could continue to greensboro. Approaching lynchberg (while the captain was talking with our dispatch), ATC asked me if we were going to overfly lynchberg. I asked the captain if he planned to land at lynchberg. He said no, that we would continue to greensboro. The controller also asked me for fuel and souls on board. From the time the engine was shut down until we landed the captain continued to tell ATC that we had accomplished a 'precautionary shutdown.' I continued to fly the aircraft and made an uneventful single engine landing on runway 23 at greensboro. I felt that CRM was good in accomplishing the single engine procedures but that I should have been more forceful in making known my thoughts about the need to land at the nearest airport. Since ATC knew that we had shut an engine down, I assumed that they knew we had an emergency. I should have asked the captain about declaring an emergency since indeed we were now single engine and had no fire bottles remaining. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter advised the left (#1) engine was effected. Though faulty wiring was determined to be the culprit, he did not know what maintenance repair/replacement was completed. To this knowledge, no other crew member was contacted by any other FAA official.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 CREW HAD AN INTERMITTENT OVERHEAT WARNING FROM THE #1 ENG. WARNING REMAINED WHEN ENG THRUST WAS REDUCED TO IDLE, AND THEN SHUTDOWN. ENG WAS SHUT DOWN PER THE ABNORMAL PROCS CHKLIST AND BOTH FIRE BOTTLES DISCHARGED. AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG WAS MADE.

Narrative: ENRTE FROM TRENTON, NJ, TO GREENSBORO, NC, THE MASTER CAUTION ACCOMPANIED BY THE OVERHEAT/DET LIGHT CAME ON INTERMITTENTLY. THE ENG #1 OVERHEAT LIGHT FLICKERED ON AND OFF. THE L THROTTLE WAS REDUCED AND THE OVERHEAT LIGHT CONTINUED TO FLICKER. THE CAPT AND I BOTH GUESSED THAT IT WAS LIKELY JUST A PROB WITH THE WIRING BUT WE WERE OBLIGATED TO GO AHEAD AND SHUT THE ENG DOWN USING THE ENG FIRE/SEVERE DAMAGE/SEPARATION PROC. THE LIGHT CONTINUED TO BE INTERMITTENT AS BOTH FIRE BOTTLES WERE 'SHOT.' I THEN ASKED IF WE WERE GOING TO LAND AT THE NEAREST ARPT. HE REPLIED THAT WE WERE CLOSE ENOUGH TO GREENSBORO THAT WE WOULD BE ABLE TO GLIDE IN. I ASKED HIM IF HE WOULD LIKE FOR ME TO REVIEW THE GOM CONCERNING CONDITIONS THAT REQUIRE LNDG AT THE NEAREST ARPT. HE REPLIED THAT IT WAS JUST A WIRE PROB AND THAT WE COULD CONTINUE TO GREENSBORO. APCHING LYNCHBERG (WHILE THE CAPT WAS TALKING WITH OUR DISPATCH), ATC ASKED ME IF WE WERE GOING TO OVERFLY LYNCHBERG. I ASKED THE CAPT IF HE PLANNED TO LAND AT LYNCHBERG. HE SAID NO, THAT WE WOULD CONTINUE TO GREENSBORO. THE CTLR ALSO ASKED ME FOR FUEL AND SOULS ON BOARD. FROM THE TIME THE ENG WAS SHUT DOWN UNTIL WE LANDED THE CAPT CONTINUED TO TELL ATC THAT WE HAD ACCOMPLISHED A 'PRECAUTIONARY SHUTDOWN.' I CONTINUED TO FLY THE ACFT AND MADE AN UNEVENTFUL SINGLE ENG LNDG ON RWY 23 AT GREENSBORO. I FELT THAT CRM WAS GOOD IN ACCOMPLISHING THE SINGLE ENG PROCS BUT THAT I SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE FORCEFUL IN MAKING KNOWN MY THOUGHTS ABOUT THE NEED TO LAND AT THE NEAREST ARPT. SINCE ATC KNEW THAT WE HAD SHUT AN ENG DOWN, I ASSUMED THAT THEY KNEW WE HAD AN EMER. I SHOULD HAVE ASKED THE CAPT ABOUT DECLARING AN EMER SINCE INDEED WE WERE NOW SINGLE ENG AND HAD NO FIRE BOTTLES REMAINING. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR ADVISED THE L (#1) ENG WAS EFFECTED. THOUGH FAULTY WIRING WAS DETERMINED TO BE THE CULPRIT, HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT MAINT REPAIR/REPLACEMENT WAS COMPLETED. TO THIS KNOWLEDGE, NO OTHER CREW MEMBER WAS CONTACTED BY ANY OTHER FAA OFFICIAL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.