Narrative:

Departing sju airport, normal departure from sju on runway 8. At 4000 ft we felt a large thump, 5 seconds later at 4500 ft the #1 engine fire indication came on. Captain leveled the aircraft at 5000 ft. I declared an emergency and requested vectors to return to runway 8. I started engine fire checklist. When the #1 fuel lever was cut off all fire indications went out. I decided not to fire bottles as all engine indications were normal prior to shutting engine down. I was thinking that we had a simple bleed leak. I did the rest of the engine fire checklist as the captain returned to land. On short final about 1000 ft the #1 flight attendant called us and told us that a mechanic on board saw some small amount of smoke and a small flame at the tailpipe of the engine. I confirmed with tower that crash fire rescue equipment crews were standing by. Captain landed aircraft and we confirmed with tower that we still had a fire and then we ran the ground evacuate/evacuation checklist. We pulled handle and fired both #1 engine bottles at that time. Supplemental information from acn 407795: shortly after takeoff from runway 8 at sju, passing about 4000 ft, felt and heard a loud bump. The aircraft had been written up for the same thing a few flts ago so didn't get too concerned at that point. My brief for an engine failure on takeoff was to run the first page of ECAM, the plastic checklist and the mechanical checklist. First officer started through the ECAM and reported the fire light was out and that he thought it was best not to fire the bottles. I concurred with him. About 1000 ft, flight attendant #1 called and reported a mechanic on board saying he saw some smoke and possibly flames coming from the engine. By the time I heard it from the first officer, we were about 800 ft so didn't want him to do anything except tell tower we thought we had a real fire. After landing about 13000 pounds overweight, we shut the aircraft down with the evacuate/evacuation checklist and went to the cabin. The checklist says to not continue with the checklist if the fire warning goes out when the throttle is retarded. We didn't continue but were too close to the ground to pull fire handle when we learned of the fire being actual. Supplemental information from acn 408686: shortly after takeoff as the gear was retracting I heard a loud bang to my left. I was seated in the 3L jump seat. I called the captain and told him what I heard and asked if he had heard anything. He said that he was working on it and would call back. A very short time later all flight attendants were called to the fwd galley and briefed by the purser that the captain had informed him that we were returning to sju with an engine problem and would not have time for a planned emergency. We made our cabin checks as we returned to our jump seats. As I walked down the aisle, several passenger asked if anything was wrong and I told them everything was going to be ok, we had a small problem and had to return to sju to have it checked. As I took my jump seat I saw flames trailing behind #3 engine well past the 3L door. The purser called us about the fire and a few mins later we landed. As the aircraft stopped we began our evacuate/evacuation. We had been told not to use the left side exits. I blocked my door and redirected. When the aircraft was empty I exited at the 2 right door.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR A300 RETURNS AND LANDS AT SJU AFTER AN INDICATION OF AN ENG FIRE. ENG WAS SHUT DOWN. A PAX OBSERVED A TAILPIPE FIRE WHICH SPONSORED AN ACFT EVAC WITH CFR IN ATTENDANCE.

Narrative: DEPARTING SJU ARPT, NORMAL DEP FROM SJU ON RWY 8. AT 4000 FT WE FELT A LARGE THUMP, 5 SECONDS LATER AT 4500 FT THE #1 ENG FIRE INDICATION CAME ON. CAPT LEVELED THE ACFT AT 5000 FT. I DECLARED AN EMER AND REQUESTED VECTORS TO RETURN TO RWY 8. I STARTED ENG FIRE CHKLIST. WHEN THE #1 FUEL LEVER WAS CUT OFF ALL FIRE INDICATIONS WENT OUT. I DECIDED NOT TO FIRE BOTTLES AS ALL ENG INDICATIONS WERE NORMAL PRIOR TO SHUTTING ENG DOWN. I WAS THINKING THAT WE HAD A SIMPLE BLEED LEAK. I DID THE REST OF THE ENG FIRE CHKLIST AS THE CAPT RETURNED TO LAND. ON SHORT FINAL ABOUT 1000 FT THE #1 FLT ATTENDANT CALLED US AND TOLD US THAT A MECH ON BOARD SAW SOME SMALL AMOUNT OF SMOKE AND A SMALL FLAME AT THE TAILPIPE OF THE ENG. I CONFIRMED WITH TWR THAT CFR CREWS WERE STANDING BY. CAPT LANDED ACFT AND WE CONFIRMED WITH TWR THAT WE STILL HAD A FIRE AND THEN WE RAN THE GND EVAC CHKLIST. WE PULLED HANDLE AND FIRED BOTH #1 ENG BOTTLES AT THAT TIME. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 407795: SHORTLY AFTER TKOF FROM RWY 8 AT SJU, PASSING ABOUT 4000 FT, FELT AND HEARD A LOUD BUMP. THE ACFT HAD BEEN WRITTEN UP FOR THE SAME THING A FEW FLTS AGO SO DIDN'T GET TOO CONCERNED AT THAT POINT. MY BRIEF FOR AN ENG FAILURE ON TKOF WAS TO RUN THE FIRST PAGE OF ECAM, THE PLASTIC CHKLIST AND THE MECHANICAL CHKLIST. FO STARTED THROUGH THE ECAM AND RPTED THE FIRE LIGHT WAS OUT AND THAT HE THOUGHT IT WAS BEST NOT TO FIRE THE BOTTLES. I CONCURRED WITH HIM. ABOUT 1000 FT, FLT ATTENDANT #1 CALLED AND RPTED A MECH ON BOARD SAYING HE SAW SOME SMOKE AND POSSIBLY FLAMES COMING FROM THE ENG. BY THE TIME I HEARD IT FROM THE FO, WE WERE ABOUT 800 FT SO DIDN'T WANT HIM TO DO ANYTHING EXCEPT TELL TWR WE THOUGHT WE HAD A REAL FIRE. AFTER LNDG ABOUT 13000 LBS OVERWT, WE SHUT THE ACFT DOWN WITH THE EVAC CHKLIST AND WENT TO THE CABIN. THE CHKLIST SAYS TO NOT CONTINUE WITH THE CHKLIST IF THE FIRE WARNING GOES OUT WHEN THE THROTTLE IS RETARDED. WE DIDN'T CONTINUE BUT WERE TOO CLOSE TO THE GND TO PULL FIRE HANDLE WHEN WE LEARNED OF THE FIRE BEING ACTUAL. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 408686: SHORTLY AFTER TKOF AS THE GEAR WAS RETRACTING I HEARD A LOUD BANG TO MY L. I WAS SEATED IN THE 3L JUMP SEAT. I CALLED THE CAPT AND TOLD HIM WHAT I HEARD AND ASKED IF HE HAD HEARD ANYTHING. HE SAID THAT HE WAS WORKING ON IT AND WOULD CALL BACK. A VERY SHORT TIME LATER ALL FLT ATTENDANTS WERE CALLED TO THE FWD GALLEY AND BRIEFED BY THE PURSER THAT THE CAPT HAD INFORMED HIM THAT WE WERE RETURNING TO SJU WITH AN ENG PROB AND WOULD NOT HAVE TIME FOR A PLANNED EMER. WE MADE OUR CABIN CHKS AS WE RETURNED TO OUR JUMP SEATS. AS I WALKED DOWN THE AISLE, SEVERAL PAX ASKED IF ANYTHING WAS WRONG AND I TOLD THEM EVERYTHING WAS GOING TO BE OK, WE HAD A SMALL PROB AND HAD TO RETURN TO SJU TO HAVE IT CHKED. AS I TOOK MY JUMP SEAT I SAW FLAMES TRAILING BEHIND #3 ENG WELL PAST THE 3L DOOR. THE PURSER CALLED US ABOUT THE FIRE AND A FEW MINS LATER WE LANDED. AS THE ACFT STOPPED WE BEGAN OUR EVAC. WE HAD BEEN TOLD NOT TO USE THE L SIDE EXITS. I BLOCKED MY DOOR AND REDIRECTED. WHEN THE ACFT WAS EMPTY I EXITED AT THE 2 R DOOR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.