B777 mechanic performed illegal last min maintenance on passenger oxygen compartment door.

Attributes
ACN	408827
Time
Date	199807
Day	Mon
Local Time Of Day	1201 To 1800
Place
Locale Reference	atc facility : ams
State Reference	FO
Environment
Flight Conditions	VMC
Light	Daylight
Aircraft 1
Controlling Facilities	artcc : zny tower : atl
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Navigation In Use	Other Other
Flight Phase	cruise other
Route In Use	enroute : other oceanic
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : first officer
Qualification	pilot : flight engineer pilot : cfi pilot : atp
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 180 flight time total : 18000 flight time type : 1200
ASRS Report	408827
Person 2
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : first officer
Qualification	pilot : atp
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 200 flight time total : 8000 flight time type : 1800
ASRS Report	408998
Events
Anomaly	aircraft equipment problem : less severe non adherence : published procedure non adherence : far other anomaly other
Independent Detector	other flight crewa other other : unspecified
Resolutory Action	none taken : anomaly accepted
Consequence	Other
Supplementary
Primary Problem	Aircraft
Air Traffic Incident	other

Narrative:

At departure gate in amsterdam, flight attendant notified captain that the overhead oxygen compartment door for seat xx was hanging open with masks extended. Maintenance was called. He told us the latch was broken and that he could tape the door so that it would deploy as needed. About halfway across the atlantic the lead flight attendant informed the captain that the oxygen panel was taped so that it would be impossible to deploy automatically in the event of a rapid cabin depressurization. Our own inspection confirmed this. The result was 2 passenger would be unable to use any oxygen in an emergency decompression. Even in a busy and rushed situation as ours at departure time, time must still be taken to verify that items as important as this one was fixed in the right way. In addition better crew communication was needed. The flight attendant notified the captain of the bad fix situation of the oxygen door before takeoff. The captain never informed his 2 first officer's of the situation (we later learned of the problem halfway across the atlantic). Supplemental information from acn 408998: about 5 mins prior to pushback in ams, the chief purser came to the flight deck and informed us that an oxygen panel in coach had opened and needed repair. The mechanic inspected it and told us an interim repair would be made. As I was busy on communication #1, the captain was talking on the cabin interphone with a flight attendant. We departed. About 1 hour 30 mins into the flight the chief purser informed us that the 'interim repair' was, in fact completely taped closed. It would not open in the event of an emergency. Approximately 5 hours into the flight, after my crew rest period, I learned from the other first officer the contents of the pre-departure interphone call to the captain. The captain had received the call from the back informing him of the oxygen panel tape situation. We were busy in the pushback procedure and were not told of the conversation at the time.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B777 MECH PERFORMED ILLEGAL LAST MIN MAINT ON PAX OXYGEN COMPARTMENT DOOR.

Narrative: AT DEP GATE IN AMSTERDAM, FLT ATTENDANT NOTIFIED CAPT THAT THE OVERHEAD OXYGEN COMPARTMENT DOOR FOR SEAT XX WAS HANGING OPEN WITH MASKS EXTENDED. MAINT WAS CALLED. HE TOLD US THE LATCH WAS BROKEN AND THAT HE COULD TAPE THE DOOR SO THAT IT WOULD DEPLOY AS NEEDED. ABOUT HALFWAY ACROSS THE ATLANTIC THE LEAD FLT ATTENDANT INFORMED THE CAPT THAT THE OXYGEN PANEL WAS TAPED SO THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO DEPLOY AUTOMATICALLY IN THE EVENT OF A RAPID CABIN DEPRESSURIZATION. OUR OWN INSPECTION CONFIRMED THIS. THE RESULT WAS 2 PAX WOULD BE UNABLE TO USE ANY OXYGEN IN AN EMER DECOMPRESSION. EVEN IN A BUSY AND RUSHED SIT AS OURS AT DEP TIME, TIME MUST STILL BE TAKEN TO VERIFY THAT ITEMS AS IMPORTANT AS THIS ONE WAS FIXED IN THE RIGHT WAY. IN ADDITION BETTER CREW COM WAS NEEDED. THE FLT ATTENDANT NOTIFIED THE CAPT OF THE BAD FIX SIT OF THE OXYGEN DOOR BEFORE TKOF. THE CAPT NEVER INFORMED HIS 2 FO'S OF THE SIT (WE LATER LEARNED OF THE PROB HALFWAY ACROSS THE ATLANTIC). SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 408998: ABOUT 5 MINS PRIOR TO PUSHBACK IN AMS, THE CHIEF PURSER CAME TO THE FLT DECK AND INFORMED US THAT AN OXYGEN PANEL IN COACH HAD OPENED AND NEEDED REPAIR. THE MECH INSPECTED IT AND TOLD US AN INTERIM REPAIR WOULD BE MADE. AS I WAS BUSY ON COM #1, THE CAPT WAS TALKING ON THE CABIN INTERPHONE WITH A FLT ATTENDANT. WE DEPARTED. ABOUT 1 HR 30 MINS INTO THE FLT THE CHIEF PURSER INFORMED US THAT THE 'INTERIM REPAIR' WAS, IN FACT COMPLETELY TAPED CLOSED. IT WOULD NOT OPEN IN THE EVENT OF AN EMER. APPROX 5 HRS INTO THE FLT, AFTER MY CREW REST PERIOD, I LEARNED FROM THE OTHER FO THE CONTENTS OF THE PRE-DEP INTERPHONE CALL TO THE CAPT. THE CAPT HAD RECEIVED THE CALL FROM THE BACK INFORMING HIM OF THE OXYGEN PANEL TAPE SIT. WE WERE BUSY IN THE PUSHBACK PROC AND WERE NOT TOLD OF THE CONVERSATION AT THE TIME.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.