Narrative:

Flight from memphis to atlanta. Flight number was 'xab' and a 'following flight' was 'abab.' I heard flight abab throughout arrival into atlanta. There was severe WX in atlanta: centered north, east, and south of the airport. Airport, on arrival, was VFR, however, we had to transit through the WX south of the airport to land west at atl. Due to traffic and WX, our flight xab was routed to mgm, then lgc-8 arrival. Holding over mgm, then cleared via radar vectors to the airport. Upon arrival, WX blew into arrival (lgc) corridor and close to the airport's runway 27L downwind, base, and final approach areas. When flight was handed off to atl approach, controller advised our flight xab he would 'turn us east prior to severe WX,' which he did. In intermittent IMC conditions on high downwind (runway 27L), controller allowed deviation south for the WX, and instructed us to 'turn left 060 degrees when able,' and advise. We complied and on a heading of 060 degrees, he instructed our flight xab to turn left heading 330 degrees when able, descend to 5000 ft and contact approach on 118.3. (Note: WX radar was painting primarily red in region of base and final on the 25M scale at this point, but we could intermittently see the ground and believed bases to be high.) as we were turning left through 030 degrees and descending to 5000 ft, we contacted the 118.3 approach controller and checked in. He said 'change back to prior frequency and make an immediate left turn heading 310 degrees, traffic just off your right wing.' we did this in heavy rain and before we switched back, as (I suspect) supervisor came on the frequency and said 'xab, can you see the airport.' we said 'not yet,' but after a moment, we said 'we have the airport' and were subsequently cleared for a visual for runway 27L. Our flight landed without further incident and flight abab landed behind us. Thoughts: when there is WX and airspace saturation, it is very undesirable for a controller to issue a change in heading and/or altitude and a frequency change at the same time. In this situation, it is left up to the next controller to observe compliance of the flight with the prior controller's instructions. Flts with similar call numbers leave an opportunity for error on the part of the controller as well as on the part of the crew. In the case above, I believe the 'handoff' was not well communicated, the initial controller or 118.3 perhaps 'unseasoned,' the similarity of the call numbers causing confusion, severe WX and airspace saturation adding to the potentially dangerous environment.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR B727 ON A VECTOR FOR AN APCH TO RWY 27L IN INTERMITTENT IMC CONDITIONS WAS GIVEN A L TURN, A DSCNT AND A FREQ CHANGE. UPON CONTACT WITH THE NEW APCH CTLR THE ACFT WAS TOLD TO RETURN TO PREVIOUS FREQ AND MAKE AN IMMEDIATE L TURN TO A NEW HEADING AND ADVISED OF TFC OFF HIS R WING. SIMILAR CALL SIGN ACFT ALSO ON THE FREQ. NO TFC WAS SIGHTED AND LNDG WAS MADE WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT.

Narrative: FLT FROM MEMPHIS TO ATLANTA. FLT NUMBER WAS 'XAB' AND A 'FOLLOWING FLT' WAS 'ABAB.' I HEARD FLT ABAB THROUGHOUT ARR INTO ATLANTA. THERE WAS SEVERE WX IN ATLANTA: CTRED N, E, AND S OF THE ARPT. ARPT, ON ARR, WAS VFR, HOWEVER, WE HAD TO TRANSIT THROUGH THE WX S OF THE ARPT TO LAND W AT ATL. DUE TO TFC AND WX, OUR FLT XAB WAS ROUTED TO MGM, THEN LGC-8 ARR. HOLDING OVER MGM, THEN CLRED VIA RADAR VECTORS TO THE ARPT. UPON ARR, WX BLEW INTO ARR (LGC) CORRIDOR AND CLOSE TO THE ARPT'S RWY 27L DOWNWIND, BASE, AND FINAL APCH AREAS. WHEN FLT WAS HANDED OFF TO ATL APCH, CTLR ADVISED OUR FLT XAB HE WOULD 'TURN US E PRIOR TO SEVERE WX,' WHICH HE DID. IN INTERMITTENT IMC CONDITIONS ON HIGH DOWNWIND (RWY 27L), CTLR ALLOWED DEV S FOR THE WX, AND INSTRUCTED US TO 'TURN L 060 DEGS WHEN ABLE,' AND ADVISE. WE COMPLIED AND ON A HDG OF 060 DEGS, HE INSTRUCTED OUR FLT XAB TO TURN L HDG 330 DEGS WHEN ABLE, DSND TO 5000 FT AND CONTACT APCH ON 118.3. (NOTE: WX RADAR WAS PAINTING PRIMARILY RED IN REGION OF BASE AND FINAL ON THE 25M SCALE AT THIS POINT, BUT WE COULD INTERMITTENTLY SEE THE GND AND BELIEVED BASES TO BE HIGH.) AS WE WERE TURNING L THROUGH 030 DEGS AND DSNDING TO 5000 FT, WE CONTACTED THE 118.3 APCH CTLR AND CHKED IN. HE SAID 'CHANGE BACK TO PRIOR FREQ AND MAKE AN IMMEDIATE L TURN HDG 310 DEGS, TFC JUST OFF YOUR R WING.' WE DID THIS IN HVY RAIN AND BEFORE WE SWITCHED BACK, AS (I SUSPECT) SUPVR CAME ON THE FREQ AND SAID 'XAB, CAN YOU SEE THE ARPT.' WE SAID 'NOT YET,' BUT AFTER A MOMENT, WE SAID 'WE HAVE THE ARPT' AND WERE SUBSEQUENTLY CLRED FOR A VISUAL FOR RWY 27L. OUR FLT LANDED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT AND FLT ABAB LANDED BEHIND US. THOUGHTS: WHEN THERE IS WX AND AIRSPACE SATURATION, IT IS VERY UNDESIRABLE FOR A CTLR TO ISSUE A CHANGE IN HEADING AND/OR ALT AND A FREQ CHANGE AT THE SAME TIME. IN THIS SIT, IT IS LEFT UP TO THE NEXT CTLR TO OBSERVE COMPLIANCE OF THE FLT WITH THE PRIOR CTLR'S INSTRUCTIONS. FLTS WITH SIMILAR CALL NUMBERS LEAVE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR ERROR ON THE PART OF THE CTLR AS WELL AS ON THE PART OF THE CREW. IN THE CASE ABOVE, I BELIEVE THE 'HDOF' WAS NOT WELL COMMUNICATED, THE INITIAL CTLR OR 118.3 PERHAPS 'UNSEASONED,' THE SIMILARITY OF THE CALL NUMBERS CAUSING CONFUSION, SEVERE WX AND AIRSPACE SATURATION ADDING TO THE POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS ENVIRONMENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.