Narrative:

Routine maintenance on maintenance check aircraft in ZZZ. On job card xyzx. YYY-XXX replaces the captain's and copilot's rudder pedal bracket assembly. On captain's side, a pulley is attached to the bracket that is incorporated in the elevator system, primary cables run 3A and 4A. To accomplish the replacement of the bracket, the pulley is removed, resulting in a basic disconnect of primary flight control cable system without warning tags, without blocking the cable system and without documentation or a safety check of the integrity of the system. This may not result in a safety of flight occurrence, but in my opinion it is possible. No action taken, I have requested. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated the practice of allowing the elevator control cables to hang slack from the control column back to the elevator is an unsafe procedure and not permitted per the general maintenance manual. The reporter said the procedure was called to the attention of the highest management level to at least add to the job card a cable block to maintain tension. The reporter stated the bad part of the procedure is the lack of documentation at least a non routine card written up to rechk the cable run. The reporter stated the situation in this organization is to limit the authority/authorized of the quality control inspectors and increase production. The reporter said the management believes less inspection write-ups mean less work and aircraft returned to service quicker regardless of condition. The reporter stated the aircraft are early aging DC9 aircraft with 30 days planned for refurbishment but have turned into 60 day heavy maintenance visits.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A DC9 ELEVATOR CTL CABLE SYS IS ALLOWED TO HANG SLACK WITH NO BLOCKS TO MAINTAIN TENSION WHILE A BRACKET IS REPLACED. THIS PROC IS IN CONFLICT WITH THE GENERAL MAINT MANUAL FOR FLT CTL CABLE PROCS.

Narrative: ROUTINE MAINT ON MAINT CHK ACFT IN ZZZ. ON JOB CARD XYZX. YYY-XXX REPLACES THE CAPT'S AND COPLT'S RUDDER PEDAL BRACKET ASSEMBLY. ON CAPT'S SIDE, A PULLEY IS ATTACHED TO THE BRACKET THAT IS INCORPORATED IN THE ELEVATOR SYS, PRIMARY CABLES RUN 3A AND 4A. TO ACCOMPLISH THE REPLACEMENT OF THE BRACKET, THE PULLEY IS REMOVED, RESULTING IN A BASIC DISCONNECT OF PRIMARY FLT CTL CABLE SYS WITHOUT WARNING TAGS, WITHOUT BLOCKING THE CABLE SYS AND WITHOUT DOCUMENTATION OR A SAFETY CHK OF THE INTEGRITY OF THE SYS. THIS MAY NOT RESULT IN A SAFETY OF FLT OCCURRENCE, BUT IN MY OPINION IT IS POSSIBLE. NO ACTION TAKEN, I HAVE REQUESTED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE PRACTICE OF ALLOWING THE ELEVATOR CTL CABLES TO HANG SLACK FROM THE CTL COLUMN BACK TO THE ELEVATOR IS AN UNSAFE PROC AND NOT PERMITTED PER THE GENERAL MAINT MANUAL. THE RPTR SAID THE PROC WAS CALLED TO THE ATTN OF THE HIGHEST MGMNT LEVEL TO AT LEAST ADD TO THE JOB CARD A CABLE BLOCK TO MAINTAIN TENSION. THE RPTR STATED THE BAD PART OF THE PROC IS THE LACK OF DOCUMENTATION AT LEAST A NON ROUTINE CARD WRITTEN UP TO RECHK THE CABLE RUN. THE RPTR STATED THE SIT IN THIS ORGANIZATION IS TO LIMIT THE AUTH OF THE QUALITY CTL INSPECTORS AND INCREASE PRODUCTION. THE RPTR SAID THE MGMNT BELIEVES LESS INSPECTION WRITE-UPS MEAN LESS WORK AND ACFT RETURNED TO SVC QUICKER REGARDLESS OF CONDITION. THE RPTR STATED THE ACFT ARE EARLY AGING DC9 ACFT WITH 30 DAYS PLANNED FOR REFURBISHMENT BUT HAVE TURNED INTO 60 DAY HVY MAINT VISITS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.