Narrative:

We had an engine failure in a B737-300 on a flight from san to sfo. At first we thought it was an autothrottle problem. On climb out from san passing through about FL240, the #1 throttle started hunting -- about +/-8% N1 or so. We turned off the autothrottles and left them off for the rest of the climb. At cruise at FL350, we turned them back on to see what would happen. At this time (and for most of the cruise portion of the flight) they both hunted about +/-1% N1 -- not too bad, but still noticeable and not normal. We wanted to leave them engaged to see what would happen at the top of descent. At top of descent, the throttles came back to idle like normal. Sometime around FL260, the airspeed began to decay (280 was programmed) as the airplane pitched to stay on the VNAV path. This is not uncommon if you encounter a headwind component greater than programmed on descent. At around 265 KTS, the autothrottles advanced like normal to re-establish programmed descent speed. Here's the catch -- both throttles advanced, but only the right engine responded. Almost simultaneously the 'low idle' light came on and we noticed the N1, N2, and fuel flow for the left engine decay rapidly. An interesting side note -- since the B737 only has a 2-AXIS autoplt, the yoke turned about 2 units to the right to counteract the asymmetrical thrust. This situation would have been a lot harder to notice in an airbus product with a sidestick controller that doesn't move. There was now absolutely zero response from the left throttle. This is when things started happening quickly. The left generator kicked off as we were starting the APU, the flight attendants called about the loss of galley power and some lighting, we were pulling out the books, calling dispatch, and we got a frequency change to bay approach all at the same time. We checked in with bay, declared an emergency, repwred the left side of the electrical system, and asked the first flight attendant to come up. We told the first flight attendant that we had just lost the #1 engine, that we expected a normal landing in about 10 mins, that we did not want her to prepare the cabin for an evacuate/evacuation, but that this was a 'cabin advisory.' she said ok and left the cockpit. (A 'cabin advisory' means get out your manuals and review the evacuate/evacuation procedures, but do not prepare the cabin unless the situation deteriorates and you are instructed to do so.) since we could have glided all the way to the airport with no engines, since we had experienced earlier problems with the now-dead left engine, and since we were short on time, we opted not to try for a restart and instead to just secure the engine. As we were finishing the checklists and starting to configure for landing (about 6000 ft at this time), the first flight attendant knocked on the door. She entered the cockpit looking like a deer in the headlights. She said that neither she, nor the other working flight attendants, nor the jump seating flight attendant had ever heard of a 'cabin advisory' and couldn't find it in their manuals. She then asked again if we wanted her to prepare the cabin for an evacuate/evacuation. Quite busy and frankly not believing our ears, we had to explain to her what a 'cabin advisory' was at this critical point in the flight. Needless to say, we landed without incident. We still had 1 more leg to go for the day, but the first flight attendant was so shaken that she couldn't continue the trip, and she had to be replaced. By the way, we were met by an in-flight supervisor when we walked off the airplane. Curious, we asked the supervisor if she was familiar with the term 'cabin advisory.' she had also never heard of it and made the comment, 'maybe I'll ask about it when I go to recurrent in a few weeks.' there is obviously a serious training issue here. Either the flight attendants are not paying attention in recurrent training, or some of our company's emergency procedures are not getting enough coverage. I also believe there is an issue with the hiring of our flight attendants. My company is much more interested in hiring flight attendants who can speak a foreign language than the best flight attendants for the job. In fact, one cannot evenget a flight attendant interview without foreign language skills. There were no language problems on this flight, but I have to wonder if we are hiring the best people for the job. By the way, maintenance tried starting the engine at the gate and got a hung start. They ended up replacing the main engine control and the plane was flying again the next day.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A FO RPT ON AN INFLT ENG SHUTDOWN AND THE CONFUSION EXHIBITED BY THE FLT ATTENDANTS WHEN GIVEN A 'CABIN ADVISORY' BY THE FLC.

Narrative: WE HAD AN ENG FAILURE IN A B737-300 ON A FLT FROM SAN TO SFO. AT FIRST WE THOUGHT IT WAS AN AUTOTHROTTLE PROB. ON CLBOUT FROM SAN PASSING THROUGH ABOUT FL240, THE #1 THROTTLE STARTED HUNTING -- ABOUT +/-8% N1 OR SO. WE TURNED OFF THE AUTOTHROTTLES AND LEFT THEM OFF FOR THE REST OF THE CLB. AT CRUISE AT FL350, WE TURNED THEM BACK ON TO SEE WHAT WOULD HAPPEN. AT THIS TIME (AND FOR MOST OF THE CRUISE PORTION OF THE FLT) THEY BOTH HUNTED ABOUT +/-1% N1 -- NOT TOO BAD, BUT STILL NOTICEABLE AND NOT NORMAL. WE WANTED TO LEAVE THEM ENGAGED TO SEE WHAT WOULD HAPPEN AT THE TOP OF DSCNT. AT TOP OF DSCNT, THE THROTTLES CAME BACK TO IDLE LIKE NORMAL. SOMETIME AROUND FL260, THE AIRSPD BEGAN TO DECAY (280 WAS PROGRAMMED) AS THE AIRPLANE PITCHED TO STAY ON THE VNAV PATH. THIS IS NOT UNCOMMON IF YOU ENCOUNTER A HEADWIND COMPONENT GREATER THAN PROGRAMMED ON DSCNT. AT AROUND 265 KTS, THE AUTOTHROTTLES ADVANCED LIKE NORMAL TO RE-ESTABLISH PROGRAMMED DSCNT SPD. HERE'S THE CATCH -- BOTH THROTTLES ADVANCED, BUT ONLY THE R ENG RESPONDED. ALMOST SIMULTANEOUSLY THE 'LOW IDLE' LIGHT CAME ON AND WE NOTICED THE N1, N2, AND FUEL FLOW FOR THE L ENG DECAY RAPIDLY. AN INTERESTING SIDE NOTE -- SINCE THE B737 ONLY HAS A 2-AXIS AUTOPLT, THE YOKE TURNED ABOUT 2 UNITS TO THE R TO COUNTERACT THE ASYMMETRICAL THRUST. THIS SIT WOULD HAVE BEEN A LOT HARDER TO NOTICE IN AN AIRBUS PRODUCT WITH A SIDESTICK CTLR THAT DOESN'T MOVE. THERE WAS NOW ABSOLUTELY ZERO RESPONSE FROM THE L THROTTLE. THIS IS WHEN THINGS STARTED HAPPENING QUICKLY. THE L GENERATOR KICKED OFF AS WE WERE STARTING THE APU, THE FLT ATTENDANTS CALLED ABOUT THE LOSS OF GALLEY PWR AND SOME LIGHTING, WE WERE PULLING OUT THE BOOKS, CALLING DISPATCH, AND WE GOT A FREQ CHANGE TO BAY APCH ALL AT THE SAME TIME. WE CHKED IN WITH BAY, DECLARED AN EMER, REPWRED THE L SIDE OF THE ELECTRICAL SYS, AND ASKED THE FIRST FLT ATTENDANT TO COME UP. WE TOLD THE FIRST FLT ATTENDANT THAT WE HAD JUST LOST THE #1 ENG, THAT WE EXPECTED A NORMAL LNDG IN ABOUT 10 MINS, THAT WE DID NOT WANT HER TO PREPARE THE CABIN FOR AN EVAC, BUT THAT THIS WAS A 'CABIN ADVISORY.' SHE SAID OK AND LEFT THE COCKPIT. (A 'CABIN ADVISORY' MEANS GET OUT YOUR MANUALS AND REVIEW THE EVAC PROCS, BUT DO NOT PREPARE THE CABIN UNLESS THE SIT DETERIORATES AND YOU ARE INSTRUCTED TO DO SO.) SINCE WE COULD HAVE GLIDED ALL THE WAY TO THE ARPT WITH NO ENGS, SINCE WE HAD EXPERIENCED EARLIER PROBS WITH THE NOW-DEAD L ENG, AND SINCE WE WERE SHORT ON TIME, WE OPTED NOT TO TRY FOR A RESTART AND INSTEAD TO JUST SECURE THE ENG. AS WE WERE FINISHING THE CHKLISTS AND STARTING TO CONFIGURE FOR LNDG (ABOUT 6000 FT AT THIS TIME), THE FIRST FLT ATTENDANT KNOCKED ON THE DOOR. SHE ENTERED THE COCKPIT LOOKING LIKE A DEER IN THE HEADLIGHTS. SHE SAID THAT NEITHER SHE, NOR THE OTHER WORKING FLT ATTENDANTS, NOR THE JUMP SEATING FLT ATTENDANT HAD EVER HEARD OF A 'CABIN ADVISORY' AND COULDN'T FIND IT IN THEIR MANUALS. SHE THEN ASKED AGAIN IF WE WANTED HER TO PREPARE THE CABIN FOR AN EVAC. QUITE BUSY AND FRANKLY NOT BELIEVING OUR EARS, WE HAD TO EXPLAIN TO HER WHAT A 'CABIN ADVISORY' WAS AT THIS CRITICAL POINT IN THE FLT. NEEDLESS TO SAY, WE LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. WE STILL HAD 1 MORE LEG TO GO FOR THE DAY, BUT THE FIRST FLT ATTENDANT WAS SO SHAKEN THAT SHE COULDN'T CONTINUE THE TRIP, AND SHE HAD TO BE REPLACED. BY THE WAY, WE WERE MET BY AN INFLT SUPVR WHEN WE WALKED OFF THE AIRPLANE. CURIOUS, WE ASKED THE SUPVR IF SHE WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE TERM 'CABIN ADVISORY.' SHE HAD ALSO NEVER HEARD OF IT AND MADE THE COMMENT, 'MAYBE I'LL ASK ABOUT IT WHEN I GO TO RECURRENT IN A FEW WKS.' THERE IS OBVIOUSLY A SERIOUS TRAINING ISSUE HERE. EITHER THE FLT ATTENDANTS ARE NOT PAYING ATTN IN RECURRENT TRAINING, OR SOME OF OUR COMPANY'S EMER PROCS ARE NOT GETTING ENOUGH COVERAGE. I ALSO BELIEVE THERE IS AN ISSUE WITH THE HIRING OF OUR FLT ATTENDANTS. MY COMPANY IS MUCH MORE INTERESTED IN HIRING FLT ATTENDANTS WHO CAN SPEAK A FOREIGN LANGUAGE THAN THE BEST FLT ATTENDANTS FOR THE JOB. IN FACT, ONE CANNOT EVENGET A FLT ATTENDANT INTERVIEW WITHOUT FOREIGN LANGUAGE SKILLS. THERE WERE NO LANGUAGE PROBS ON THIS FLT, BUT I HAVE TO WONDER IF WE ARE HIRING THE BEST PEOPLE FOR THE JOB. BY THE WAY, MAINT TRIED STARTING THE ENG AT THE GATE AND GOT A HUNG START. THEY ENDED UP REPLACING THE MAIN ENG CTL AND THE PLANE WAS FLYING AGAIN THE NEXT DAY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.