Narrative:

'Tail compartment high temperature' warning annunciation illuminated out of 1000 ft AGL. Complied with checklists and air returned to rno. Light extinguished while returning to airport. Contributing factors: high outside air temperature 95+ degrees day. Over sensitive temperature sensor. High pneumatic bleed load demands. The captain was not satisfied with the maintenance corrective action 'could not duplicate' and refused to take the aircraft part 121 without a test flight. The captain was removed by crew scheduling and replaced with a captain who took the flight. The warning illuminated again but this time the new captain brushed it off as excessive outside air temperature. Human factors: the first captain was a recently deposed director of operations with a chip on his shoulder over new management. Also, little line experience -- especially with nuisance tail compartment lights. The second captain was a line check airman with plenty of line experience. There were no operation management people available to intervene due to contract negotiations. All decisions were made by the non flying management people (dispatchers, mechanics). Corrective actions: the first captain would have air returned a second time. The second captain could have had a bleed leak and never realized it. We should have test flown the airplane with maintenance, found the problem and fixed it.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD80 CREW HAD 'TAIL COMPARTMENT HIGH TEMP' WARNING. AFTER RETURNING TO DEP STATION THE CAPT DISAGREED ABOUT THE SUITABILITY OF THE MAINT CORRECTIVE ACTION 'COULD NOT DUPLICATE,' AND REFUSED THE ACFT.

Narrative: 'TAIL COMPARTMENT HIGH TEMP' WARNING ANNUNCIATION ILLUMINATED OUT OF 1000 FT AGL. COMPLIED WITH CHKLISTS AND AIR RETURNED TO RNO. LIGHT EXTINGUISHED WHILE RETURNING TO ARPT. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: HIGH OUTSIDE AIR TEMP 95+ DEGS DAY. OVER SENSITIVE TEMP SENSOR. HIGH PNEUMATIC BLEED LOAD DEMANDS. THE CAPT WAS NOT SATISFIED WITH THE MAINT CORRECTIVE ACTION 'COULD NOT DUPLICATE' AND REFUSED TO TAKE THE ACFT PART 121 WITHOUT A TEST FLT. THE CAPT WAS REMOVED BY CREW SCHEDULING AND REPLACED WITH A CAPT WHO TOOK THE FLT. THE WARNING ILLUMINATED AGAIN BUT THIS TIME THE NEW CAPT BRUSHED IT OFF AS EXCESSIVE OUTSIDE AIR TEMP. HUMAN FACTORS: THE FIRST CAPT WAS A RECENTLY DEPOSED DIRECTOR OF OPS WITH A CHIP ON HIS SHOULDER OVER NEW MGMNT. ALSO, LITTLE LINE EXPERIENCE -- ESPECIALLY WITH NUISANCE TAIL COMPARTMENT LIGHTS. THE SECOND CAPT WAS A LINE CHK AIRMAN WITH PLENTY OF LINE EXPERIENCE. THERE WERE NO OP MGMNT PEOPLE AVAILABLE TO INTERVENE DUE TO CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS. ALL DECISIONS WERE MADE BY THE NON FLYING MGMNT PEOPLE (DISPATCHERS, MECHS). CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: THE FIRST CAPT WOULD HAVE AIR RETURNED A SECOND TIME. THE SECOND CAPT COULD HAVE HAD A BLEED LEAK AND NEVER REALIZED IT. WE SHOULD HAVE TEST FLOWN THE AIRPLANE WITH MAINT, FOUND THE PROB AND FIXED IT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.