Narrative:

Aircraft xyz, a cessna citation sii serial number zxzx. PIC was a former military pilot with 4950 military and civilian hours with 800 hours and 18 months in type and 1 yr as PIC. First officer has 4875 total civilian hours with 250 hours and 6 months in type. Both pilots were current and qualified. The captain was the pilot at the controls. The captain obtained flight release for a 1.2 hour en route flight to toronto/pearson airport. Dispatch had changed the departure time to XB00Z. Fuel required according to dispatch was 2799 pounds including engine start, taxi, en route and a reserve of 1000 pounds. (The 1000 pound reserve is a standard reserve set as a default in the dispatch computer and is not representative of a 45 min reserve, 800 pounds will meet this requirement.) captain ordered 240 gallons of jet a to bring the fuel to approximately 3000 pounds. PIC and first officer completed preflight duties and waited for the passenger to arrive. Passenger arrived at about XA54Z. The crew started the aircraft without incident and fuel was noted at 2800 pounds (1400 pounds in each tank). During the takeoff run at approximately 90 KIAS and 1500 ft down the runway, the crew initiated an abort when a flock of canadian geese which were immediately adjacent to the runway in tall grass, got airborne. The abort prevented a bird strike. The crew requested and received permission to taxi clear to visually inspect the aircraft. The crew did not hear or see any evidence during the abort that would indicate a bird strike. Visual inspection confirmed this. The aircraft was restarted and taxied for takeoff. Takeoff fuel was now between 2500-2600 pounds. (Still legal using an 800 pound reserve.) at XB24Z the flight finally got airborne. Once airborne, the captain informed the company of the aborted takeoff via telephone. The holding clearance was received at approximately XC25Z. The clearance included a holding 'departure time' of XC39Z. Just prior to the receipt of the clearance the l-hand 'low fuel quantity' light illuminated. The left fuel gauge indicated 750-800 pounds of fuel, the same as the r-hand one. The crew had experienced this light in this aircraft at the same fuel level on 2 previous flts. The captain's experience with this caution light in other sii aircraft illuminating significantly above the advertised 185 pounds coupled with a previous conversation with an sii program manager concerning the validity of these lights (when the captain questioned him about the need for maintenance action he indicated that this was a common occurrence) led him to believe the normally accurate fuel gauges and to have no confidence in this particular caution light. During the holding, the crew was concerned that their fuel was approaching 1000 pounds. The captain instructed the first officer to copy the buf ATIS in case they were going to be further delayed. The captain set 800 pounds as their 'go to buffalo fuel.' at approximately XC39Z, toronto instructed the crew to depart the holding fix on a 160 degree heading. Feeling the approach was soon to follow and with approximately 1100 pounds remaining, the crew prepared for the approach. After several mins on this heading, the crew was instructed to return to the holding fix and execute a left 360 degree turn. Fuel at this time was indication just above 1100 pounds. At the end of this 360 degree turn the crew was instructed to do another 360 degree turn to the left. The captain was attempting to instruct the first officer to call toronto when they were instructed to descend 7000 ft. During the descent the left engine flamed out. The fuel remaining indicated at least 1000 pounds (500 pounds per side). The captain called for the engine failure/precautionary shutdown checklist, instructed the first officer to declare an emergency and request immediate landing. The captain squawked 7700 and turned towards the yyz VOR. After completion of the shutdown checklist the captain called for the single engine approach and landing checklist. Toronto cleared the aircraft for the ILS runway 33L approach and for landing. When the aircraft was within glide distance the captain descended and landed on runway 33L at XD00Z. After shutdown the left fuel gauge indicated 500 pounds and the right fuel gauge indicated 300 pounds. The facts indicate to me, the captain, that the main and equally contributing contributing factors were a mechanical malfunction of the lfuel gauge, supervisory error on the part of the program manager, and pilot error on the part of the captain.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CESSNA CITATION IN A HOLD AT 7500 FT DECLARED AN EMER AND REQUESTED IMMEDIATE LNDG DUE TO A L ENG FLAMEOUT CAUSED BY THE L FUEL QUANTITY INDICATION FAILURE AND POOR FUEL QUANTITY MAINT PRACTICES.

Narrative: ACFT XYZ, A CESSNA CITATION SII SERIAL NUMBER ZXZX. PIC WAS A FORMER MIL PLT WITH 4950 MIL AND CIVILIAN HRS WITH 800 HRS AND 18 MONTHS IN TYPE AND 1 YR AS PIC. FO HAS 4875 TOTAL CIVILIAN HRS WITH 250 HRS AND 6 MONTHS IN TYPE. BOTH PLTS WERE CURRENT AND QUALIFIED. THE CAPT WAS THE PLT AT THE CTLS. THE CAPT OBTAINED FLT RELEASE FOR A 1.2 HR ENRTE FLT TO TORONTO/PEARSON ARPT. DISPATCH HAD CHANGED THE DEP TIME TO XB00Z. FUEL REQUIRED ACCORDING TO DISPATCH WAS 2799 LBS INCLUDING ENG START, TAXI, ENRTE AND A RESERVE OF 1000 LBS. (THE 1000 LB RESERVE IS A STANDARD RESERVE SET AS A DEFAULT IN THE DISPATCH COMPUTER AND IS NOT REPRESENTATIVE OF A 45 MIN RESERVE, 800 LBS WILL MEET THIS REQUIREMENT.) CAPT ORDERED 240 GALLONS OF JET A TO BRING THE FUEL TO APPROX 3000 LBS. PIC AND FO COMPLETED PREFLT DUTIES AND WAITED FOR THE PAX TO ARRIVE. PAX ARRIVED AT ABOUT XA54Z. THE CREW STARTED THE ACFT WITHOUT INCIDENT AND FUEL WAS NOTED AT 2800 LBS (1400 LBS IN EACH TANK). DURING THE TKOF RUN AT APPROX 90 KIAS AND 1500 FT DOWN THE RWY, THE CREW INITIATED AN ABORT WHEN A FLOCK OF CANADIAN GEESE WHICH WERE IMMEDIATELY ADJACENT TO THE RWY IN TALL GRASS, GOT AIRBORNE. THE ABORT PREVENTED A BIRD STRIKE. THE CREW REQUESTED AND RECEIVED PERMISSION TO TAXI CLR TO VISUALLY INSPECT THE ACFT. THE CREW DID NOT HEAR OR SEE ANY EVIDENCE DURING THE ABORT THAT WOULD INDICATE A BIRD STRIKE. VISUAL INSPECTION CONFIRMED THIS. THE ACFT WAS RESTARTED AND TAXIED FOR TKOF. TKOF FUEL WAS NOW BTWN 2500-2600 LBS. (STILL LEGAL USING AN 800 LB RESERVE.) AT XB24Z THE FLT FINALLY GOT AIRBORNE. ONCE AIRBORNE, THE CAPT INFORMED THE COMPANY OF THE ABORTED TKOF VIA TELEPHONE. THE HOLDING CLRNC WAS RECEIVED AT APPROX XC25Z. THE CLRNC INCLUDED A HOLDING 'DEP TIME' OF XC39Z. JUST PRIOR TO THE RECEIPT OF THE CLRNC THE L-HAND 'LOW FUEL QUANTITY' LIGHT ILLUMINATED. THE L FUEL GAUGE INDICATED 750-800 LBS OF FUEL, THE SAME AS THE R-HAND ONE. THE CREW HAD EXPERIENCED THIS LIGHT IN THIS ACFT AT THE SAME FUEL LEVEL ON 2 PREVIOUS FLTS. THE CAPT'S EXPERIENCE WITH THIS CAUTION LIGHT IN OTHER SII ACFT ILLUMINATING SIGNIFICANTLY ABOVE THE ADVERTISED 185 LBS COUPLED WITH A PREVIOUS CONVERSATION WITH AN SII PROGRAM MGR CONCERNING THE VALIDITY OF THESE LIGHTS (WHEN THE CAPT QUESTIONED HIM ABOUT THE NEED FOR MAINT ACTION HE INDICATED THAT THIS WAS A COMMON OCCURRENCE) LED HIM TO BELIEVE THE NORMALLY ACCURATE FUEL GAUGES AND TO HAVE NO CONFIDENCE IN THIS PARTICULAR CAUTION LIGHT. DURING THE HOLDING, THE CREW WAS CONCERNED THAT THEIR FUEL WAS APCHING 1000 LBS. THE CAPT INSTRUCTED THE FO TO COPY THE BUF ATIS IN CASE THEY WERE GOING TO BE FURTHER DELAYED. THE CAPT SET 800 LBS AS THEIR 'GO TO BUFFALO FUEL.' AT APPROX XC39Z, TORONTO INSTRUCTED THE CREW TO DEPART THE HOLDING FIX ON A 160 DEG HDG. FEELING THE APCH WAS SOON TO FOLLOW AND WITH APPROX 1100 LBS REMAINING, THE CREW PREPARED FOR THE APCH. AFTER SEVERAL MINS ON THIS HDG, THE CREW WAS INSTRUCTED TO RETURN TO THE HOLDING FIX AND EXECUTE A L 360 DEG TURN. FUEL AT THIS TIME WAS INDICATION JUST ABOVE 1100 LBS. AT THE END OF THIS 360 DEG TURN THE CREW WAS INSTRUCTED TO DO ANOTHER 360 DEG TURN TO THE L. THE CAPT WAS ATTEMPTING TO INSTRUCT THE FO TO CALL TORONTO WHEN THEY WERE INSTRUCTED TO DSND 7000 FT. DURING THE DSCNT THE L ENG FLAMED OUT. THE FUEL REMAINING INDICATED AT LEAST 1000 LBS (500 LBS PER SIDE). THE CAPT CALLED FOR THE ENG FAILURE/PRECAUTIONARY SHUTDOWN CHKLIST, INSTRUCTED THE FO TO DECLARE AN EMER AND REQUEST IMMEDIATE LNDG. THE CAPT SQUAWKED 7700 AND TURNED TOWARDS THE YYZ VOR. AFTER COMPLETION OF THE SHUTDOWN CHKLIST THE CAPT CALLED FOR THE SINGLE ENG APCH AND LNDG CHKLIST. TORONTO CLRED THE ACFT FOR THE ILS RWY 33L APCH AND FOR LNDG. WHEN THE ACFT WAS WITHIN GLIDE DISTANCE THE CAPT DSNDED AND LANDED ON RWY 33L AT XD00Z. AFTER SHUTDOWN THE L FUEL GAUGE INDICATED 500 LBS AND THE R FUEL GAUGE INDICATED 300 LBS. THE FACTS INDICATE TO ME, THE CAPT, THAT THE MAIN AND EQUALLY CONTRIBUTING CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE A MECHANICAL MALFUNCTION OF THE LFUEL GAUGE, SUPERVISORY ERROR ON THE PART OF THE PROGRAM MGR, AND PLT ERROR ON THE PART OF THE CAPT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.