Narrative:

On approach to runway 14R ord. After switching from approach to tower flight XXX was cleared to land runway 14R hold short of runway 9R, due to traffic. I was the captain and non flying crew member. First officer was the PF. Around 1300 ft I advised ord tower, unable to hold short of runway 9R. We were 2 1/2 mi behind a B757, encountering light chop from wing vortices. First officer elected to slow down and remain 1 DOT above the GS. Approach was flown vref +10-15 KTS. Tower questioned my landing clearance and I restated. Controller then said prepare for go around. Around 500 ft tower said 'air carrier XXX cleared to land, hold short of runway 9R.' I again stated cleared to land, unable to hold short runway 9R. Tower said, 'go around, runway heading, maintain 4000 ft.' normal go around, then switched to ord departure. I was asked the nature of the go around and stated too close to B757, in chop, and did not accept hold short of runway 9R. He said roger and then handled us for a quick visual to runway 9R. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: when the captain informed the tower that he would be unable to hold short, he got no response from them. The reporter stated it was like he was 'being ignored.' this happened twice. When he was given final landing clearance with the hold short, the reporter further stated 'the tower controller seemed very put out when she was told a third time that they would be unable to accept a land, hold short clearance.' the crew said they definitely felt the go around was punitive in nature. The crew was advised by the tower that they were 2 1/2 mi behind a B757. They were able to confirm the spacing on TCASII, set to the 5 mi scale. They were getting moderate turbulence and rolling, up to 30 degree bank angle, from the wake of the B757. This required the crew to fly high on the GS and add 15-20 KTS to vref speed. They also planned to land after the touchdown point of the B757. The captain was unaware of the runway length he had available, but being high, faster than normal, and having a potential touchdown point 3000 ft from the end of the runway, were the reasons he refused the hold short clearance. The captain also stated that there was a distraction caused by the aircraft landing on runway 9R. He was concerned with a missed approach. Where do you go if both aircraft make a missed approach? The captain did not remember the actual wind but was sure it was a slight quartering crosswind. The runway was dry.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B727 CREW WAS FORCED TO GAR AFTER THEY INFORMED TWR THEY WERE UNABLE TO ACCEPT A LAHSO CLRNC.

Narrative: ON APCH TO RWY 14R ORD. AFTER SWITCHING FROM APCH TO TWR FLT XXX WAS CLRED TO LAND RWY 14R HOLD SHORT OF RWY 9R, DUE TO TFC. I WAS THE CAPT AND NON FLYING CREW MEMBER. FO WAS THE PF. AROUND 1300 FT I ADVISED ORD TWR, UNABLE TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 9R. WE WERE 2 1/2 MI BEHIND A B757, ENCOUNTERING LIGHT CHOP FROM WING VORTICES. FO ELECTED TO SLOW DOWN AND REMAIN 1 DOT ABOVE THE GS. APCH WAS FLOWN VREF +10-15 KTS. TWR QUESTIONED MY LNDG CLRNC AND I RESTATED. CTLR THEN SAID PREPARE FOR GAR. AROUND 500 FT TWR SAID 'ACR XXX CLRED TO LAND, HOLD SHORT OF RWY 9R.' I AGAIN STATED CLRED TO LAND, UNABLE TO HOLD SHORT RWY 9R. TWR SAID, 'GO AROUND, RWY HDG, MAINTAIN 4000 FT.' NORMAL GAR, THEN SWITCHED TO ORD DEP. I WAS ASKED THE NATURE OF THE GAR AND STATED TOO CLOSE TO B757, IN CHOP, AND DID NOT ACCEPT HOLD SHORT OF RWY 9R. HE SAID ROGER AND THEN HANDLED US FOR A QUICK VISUAL TO RWY 9R. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: WHEN THE CAPT INFORMED THE TWR THAT HE WOULD BE UNABLE TO HOLD SHORT, HE GOT NO RESPONSE FROM THEM. THE RPTR STATED IT WAS LIKE HE WAS 'BEING IGNORED.' THIS HAPPENED TWICE. WHEN HE WAS GIVEN FINAL LNDG CLRNC WITH THE HOLD SHORT, THE RPTR FURTHER STATED 'THE TWR CTLR SEEMED VERY PUT OUT WHEN SHE WAS TOLD A THIRD TIME THAT THEY WOULD BE UNABLE TO ACCEPT A LAND, HOLD SHORT CLRNC.' THE CREW SAID THEY DEFINITELY FELT THE GAR WAS PUNITIVE IN NATURE. THE CREW WAS ADVISED BY THE TWR THAT THEY WERE 2 1/2 MI BEHIND A B757. THEY WERE ABLE TO CONFIRM THE SPACING ON TCASII, SET TO THE 5 MI SCALE. THEY WERE GETTING MODERATE TURB AND ROLLING, UP TO 30 DEG BANK ANGLE, FROM THE WAKE OF THE B757. THIS REQUIRED THE CREW TO FLY HIGH ON THE GS AND ADD 15-20 KTS TO VREF SPD. THEY ALSO PLANNED TO LAND AFTER THE TOUCHDOWN POINT OF THE B757. THE CAPT WAS UNAWARE OF THE RWY LENGTH HE HAD AVAILABLE, BUT BEING HIGH, FASTER THAN NORMAL, AND HAVING A POTENTIAL TOUCHDOWN POINT 3000 FT FROM THE END OF THE RWY, WERE THE REASONS HE REFUSED THE HOLD SHORT CLRNC. THE CAPT ALSO STATED THAT THERE WAS A DISTR CAUSED BY THE ACFT LNDG ON RWY 9R. HE WAS CONCERNED WITH A MISSED APCH. WHERE DO YOU GO IF BOTH ACFT MAKE A MISSED APCH? THE CAPT DID NOT REMEMBER THE ACTUAL WIND BUT WAS SURE IT WAS A SLIGHT QUARTERING XWIND. THE RWY WAS DRY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.