Narrative:

While operating pdx-atl, approximately 10 mins before block-in on the morning of aug/xa/98, things went awry. This was an all-nighter, with attendant fatigue, etc. Approach had cleared us direct to the OM for runway 8L, keep our speed up, #1 for the airport. We were planning for stabilization by 1000 ft AGL, per the fom. We were directed to slow, turned out to a 130 degree heading, and heard and became aware of another arrival that would be our sequence off the downwind. Our attention was in configuring and slowing as rapidly as possible, while focusing heavily on the aircraft ahead for sequence. It would be tight or unworkable. The controller turned us to a 180 degree heading, while very close to the final approach course for our runway. Nearly simultaneously, approach gave us a turn to final and we received an RA 'traffic, descend' alert. My copilot and I saw the aircraft on runway 9R approach. I grabbed the speed brakes, turned toward our runway, wrapped the turn up to 60 degrees of bank while letting the nose fall through to achieve the required rate of 2500 FPM down -- per the TCASII. My first officer was calling out our progress in missing the other aircraft. We leveled off at 4000 ft MSL, 'clear of conflict.' during the turn, the controller said, 'cleared for the visual.' I told him it was too late, as we were flying an RA. A couple of observations: 1) the aircraft on the downwind had already slowed dramatically. Approach seemed extremely surprised by this. 2) had the controller stuck to the first plan, we would not have impacted on the downwind aircraft's arrival at all. Even had we, it would have been the safest course, would not have led to the near midair collision/TCASII RA, and would have left both the controller and ourselves some rational options. 3) while we were unaware of the aircraft on the south side at this point, it should be noted that the aircraft on the southern runway was not at the normal lower altitude to provide a vertical split in the event of an overshoot by either traffic flow. This was a poor piece of controling. We were doing all we could to comply, and ended up doing all that the aircraft had to avoid a collision. The controller put us in a real box, never advising us of the south side traffic until way too late in the game. We were totally focused on trying to make a poor plan work when he changed things around to let the already slowed aircraft on the downwind go ahead of us. We never were aware of the south side guy until the RA, and there wasn't the usual safety cushion provided by the vertical split. Tower picked up the pieces by allowing us to land on runway 8R. The balance of the approach and landing were normal. No adverse passenger comments were noted. Approach was staffed by 1 controller working both sides of the airport. He seemed really pushed. If we are going to continue to have a pre-dawn arrival push from the all nighters, perhaps atl TRACON needs to consider this in their manning requirement. I know that being up that time of day is rugged, but the market demands it. Let's make it as safe as we can.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR B757 FLC TAKES EVASIVE ACTION RESULTING FROM TCASII RA FROM ANOTHER B757, CONDUCTING A VISUAL APCH, TURNING IN FRONT OF HIM.

Narrative: WHILE OPERATING PDX-ATL, APPROX 10 MINS BEFORE BLOCK-IN ON THE MORNING OF AUG/XA/98, THINGS WENT AWRY. THIS WAS AN ALL-NIGHTER, WITH ATTENDANT FATIGUE, ETC. APCH HAD CLRED US DIRECT TO THE OM FOR RWY 8L, KEEP OUR SPD UP, #1 FOR THE ARPT. WE WERE PLANNING FOR STABILIZATION BY 1000 FT AGL, PER THE FOM. WE WERE DIRECTED TO SLOW, TURNED OUT TO A 130 DEG HDG, AND HEARD AND BECAME AWARE OF ANOTHER ARR THAT WOULD BE OUR SEQUENCE OFF THE DOWNWIND. OUR ATTN WAS IN CONFIGURING AND SLOWING AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE, WHILE FOCUSING HEAVILY ON THE ACFT AHEAD FOR SEQUENCE. IT WOULD BE TIGHT OR UNWORKABLE. THE CTLR TURNED US TO A 180 DEG HDG, WHILE VERY CLOSE TO THE FINAL APCH COURSE FOR OUR RWY. NEARLY SIMULTANEOUSLY, APCH GAVE US A TURN TO FINAL AND WE RECEIVED AN RA 'TFC, DSND' ALERT. MY COPLT AND I SAW THE ACFT ON RWY 9R APCH. I GRABBED THE SPD BRAKES, TURNED TOWARD OUR RWY, WRAPPED THE TURN UP TO 60 DEGS OF BANK WHILE LETTING THE NOSE FALL THROUGH TO ACHIEVE THE REQUIRED RATE OF 2500 FPM DOWN -- PER THE TCASII. MY FO WAS CALLING OUT OUR PROGRESS IN MISSING THE OTHER ACFT. WE LEVELED OFF AT 4000 FT MSL, 'CLR OF CONFLICT.' DURING THE TURN, THE CTLR SAID, 'CLRED FOR THE VISUAL.' I TOLD HIM IT WAS TOO LATE, AS WE WERE FLYING AN RA. A COUPLE OF OBSERVATIONS: 1) THE ACFT ON THE DOWNWIND HAD ALREADY SLOWED DRAMATICALLY. APCH SEEMED EXTREMELY SURPRISED BY THIS. 2) HAD THE CTLR STUCK TO THE FIRST PLAN, WE WOULD NOT HAVE IMPACTED ON THE DOWNWIND ACFT'S ARR AT ALL. EVEN HAD WE, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN THE SAFEST COURSE, WOULD NOT HAVE LED TO THE NMAC/TCASII RA, AND WOULD HAVE LEFT BOTH THE CTLR AND OURSELVES SOME RATIONAL OPTIONS. 3) WHILE WE WERE UNAWARE OF THE ACFT ON THE S SIDE AT THIS POINT, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE ACFT ON THE SOUTHERN RWY WAS NOT AT THE NORMAL LOWER ALT TO PROVIDE A VERT SPLIT IN THE EVENT OF AN OVERSHOOT BY EITHER TFC FLOW. THIS WAS A POOR PIECE OF CTLING. WE WERE DOING ALL WE COULD TO COMPLY, AND ENDED UP DOING ALL THAT THE ACFT HAD TO AVOID A COLLISION. THE CTLR PUT US IN A REAL BOX, NEVER ADVISING US OF THE S SIDE TFC UNTIL WAY TOO LATE IN THE GAME. WE WERE TOTALLY FOCUSED ON TRYING TO MAKE A POOR PLAN WORK WHEN HE CHANGED THINGS AROUND TO LET THE ALREADY SLOWED ACFT ON THE DOWNWIND GO AHEAD OF US. WE NEVER WERE AWARE OF THE S SIDE GUY UNTIL THE RA, AND THERE WASN'T THE USUAL SAFETY CUSHION PROVIDED BY THE VERT SPLIT. TWR PICKED UP THE PIECES BY ALLOWING US TO LAND ON RWY 8R. THE BAL OF THE APCH AND LNDG WERE NORMAL. NO ADVERSE PAX COMMENTS WERE NOTED. APCH WAS STAFFED BY 1 CTLR WORKING BOTH SIDES OF THE ARPT. HE SEEMED REALLY PUSHED. IF WE ARE GOING TO CONTINUE TO HAVE A PRE-DAWN ARR PUSH FROM THE ALL NIGHTERS, PERHAPS ATL TRACON NEEDS TO CONSIDER THIS IN THEIR MANNING REQUIREMENT. I KNOW THAT BEING UP THAT TIME OF DAY IS RUGGED, BUT THE MARKET DEMANDS IT. LET'S MAKE IT AS SAFE AS WE CAN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.