Narrative:

We were on a scheduled flight from lga to atl. Although there was a steady rain, visibility was good. We had been dispatched with an inoperative APU, which had it been working I would have used to provide a backup electrical source on takeoff. Due to WX around lga, we waited on the taxiway nearly 2 hours as departures were alternately stopped and started. Ultimately, we were cleared into position on runway 13. Rain had not let up, but the departure corridor showed nothing more than rain on radar. I advised the first officer we would do a static takeoff, normal (non derated) thrust had been previously briefed and selected. Clearance for takeoff was received, and the first officer applied takeoff thrust and began the takeoff roll. I took the throttles, observed normal acceleration through approximately 85 KTS when I observed a flicker in cockpit lighting and heard the click of an electrical xfer relay. Assuming a generator failure, I called for and executed an abort. All system (electric autoxfer, autospoilers, and autobraking) operated normally. I began manual braking, the first officer advised the tower of our abort and declined the offer of assistance. I cleared the runway at the end, advised the passenger that we were in no danger, and returned to the gate. Left generator had failed. Aside from the obvious contributing factors (rain, short runways, night) the inoperative APU was a big factor. Although legal for dispatch, it would have been nice to have to back up the engine generators on takeoff. Had the automatic xtie feature been locked out for whatever reason, the abort would have been much more challenging. I did become a big believer in automated rejected takeoff system. My bringing the throttles to idle and deploying reversers caused the spoilers to activate, applied maximum autobrakes and began a rapid deceleration more quickly than I could have manually. It was the first day of our trip, second leg, so my first officer and I had not had a lot of experience together, but as a team I consider our performance most effective. There was no confusion, each of us performed our tasks as published and decisively. We had discussed rejected takeoffs prior to the first leg and he had just recently returned from recurrent training, adding to his effectiveness. The cabin crew also performed flawlessly, reassuring our full load of passenger as we made our way back to the gate. Bottom line: I would not change a thing in the way I or my crew performed. The decisions made I consider correct. Backup system worked as advertised, as did crew coordination. There was no damage to the aircraft, no injuries, and an uneventful return to the gate.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD88 CREW ABORTED TKOF WHEN #1 ALTERNATOR FAILED.

Narrative: WE WERE ON A SCHEDULED FLT FROM LGA TO ATL. ALTHOUGH THERE WAS A STEADY RAIN, VISIBILITY WAS GOOD. WE HAD BEEN DISPATCHED WITH AN INOP APU, WHICH HAD IT BEEN WORKING I WOULD HAVE USED TO PROVIDE A BACKUP ELECTRICAL SOURCE ON TKOF. DUE TO WX AROUND LGA, WE WAITED ON THE TXWY NEARLY 2 HRS AS DEPS WERE ALTERNATELY STOPPED AND STARTED. ULTIMATELY, WE WERE CLRED INTO POS ON RWY 13. RAIN HAD NOT LET UP, BUT THE DEP CORRIDOR SHOWED NOTHING MORE THAN RAIN ON RADAR. I ADVISED THE FO WE WOULD DO A STATIC TKOF, NORMAL (NON DERATED) THRUST HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY BRIEFED AND SELECTED. CLRNC FOR TKOF WAS RECEIVED, AND THE FO APPLIED TKOF THRUST AND BEGAN THE TKOF ROLL. I TOOK THE THROTTLES, OBSERVED NORMAL ACCELERATION THROUGH APPROX 85 KTS WHEN I OBSERVED A FLICKER IN COCKPIT LIGHTING AND HEARD THE CLICK OF AN ELECTRICAL XFER RELAY. ASSUMING A GENERATOR FAILURE, I CALLED FOR AND EXECUTED AN ABORT. ALL SYS (ELECTRIC AUTOXFER, AUTOSPOILERS, AND AUTOBRAKING) OPERATED NORMALLY. I BEGAN MANUAL BRAKING, THE FO ADVISED THE TWR OF OUR ABORT AND DECLINED THE OFFER OF ASSISTANCE. I CLRED THE RWY AT THE END, ADVISED THE PAX THAT WE WERE IN NO DANGER, AND RETURNED TO THE GATE. L GENERATOR HAD FAILED. ASIDE FROM THE OBVIOUS CONTRIBUTING FACTORS (RAIN, SHORT RWYS, NIGHT) THE INOP APU WAS A BIG FACTOR. ALTHOUGH LEGAL FOR DISPATCH, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN NICE TO HAVE TO BACK UP THE ENG GENERATORS ON TKOF. HAD THE AUTO XTIE FEATURE BEEN LOCKED OUT FOR WHATEVER REASON, THE ABORT WOULD HAVE BEEN MUCH MORE CHALLENGING. I DID BECOME A BIG BELIEVER IN AUTOMATED REJECTED TKOF SYS. MY BRINGING THE THROTTLES TO IDLE AND DEPLOYING REVERSERS CAUSED THE SPOILERS TO ACTIVATE, APPLIED MAX AUTOBRAKES AND BEGAN A RAPID DECELERATION MORE QUICKLY THAN I COULD HAVE MANUALLY. IT WAS THE FIRST DAY OF OUR TRIP, SECOND LEG, SO MY FO AND I HAD NOT HAD A LOT OF EXPERIENCE TOGETHER, BUT AS A TEAM I CONSIDER OUR PERFORMANCE MOST EFFECTIVE. THERE WAS NO CONFUSION, EACH OF US PERFORMED OUR TASKS AS PUBLISHED AND DECISIVELY. WE HAD DISCUSSED REJECTED TKOFS PRIOR TO THE FIRST LEG AND HE HAD JUST RECENTLY RETURNED FROM RECURRENT TRAINING, ADDING TO HIS EFFECTIVENESS. THE CABIN CREW ALSO PERFORMED FLAWLESSLY, REASSURING OUR FULL LOAD OF PAX AS WE MADE OUR WAY BACK TO THE GATE. BOTTOM LINE: I WOULD NOT CHANGE A THING IN THE WAY I OR MY CREW PERFORMED. THE DECISIONS MADE I CONSIDER CORRECT. BACKUP SYS WORKED AS ADVERTISED, AS DID CREW COORD. THERE WAS NO DAMAGE TO THE ACFT, NO INJURIES, AND AN UNEVENTFUL RETURN TO THE GATE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.