An ARTCC radar controller cites staffing problems and lack of breaks as a compromise to safety.

Attributes
ACN	414100
Time
Date	199809
Day	Sun
Local Time Of Day	0601 To 1200
Place
Locale Reference	atc facility : zfw
State Reference	TX
Environment
Flight Conditions	IMC
Light	Daylight
Aircraft 1
Controlling Facilities	tower : dpa
Person 1
Affiliation	government : faa
Function	controller : radar
Qualification	controller : radar
ASRS Report	414100
Person 2
Affiliation	government : faa
Function	oversight : supervisor
Qualification	controller : radar
Events
Anomaly	other anomaly other
Independent Detector	other controllera
Resolutory Action	none taken : unable
Consequence	Other
Supplementary
Air Traffic Incident	other
Situations
ATC Facility	procedure or policy : unspecified

Narrative:

WX had been poor all day. During the XA00 rush, metering delays reached in excess of 10 mins. Training was occurring on 2 position, a check ride was occurring on a third position, and 2 of 6 sectors were combined to allow this. The supervisor was conducting a check ride on the high altitude sequencing sector d-side (alone, he is certified on the sector), the low altitude sector was staffed with a d-side only and an fpl. During the rush, the supervisor spent most of the time assisting the r-side controller, as opposed to evaluating the d-side's performance. There were no controllers on break and training was not broken to provide the radar handoffs so obviously needed. This is typical of the slipshod staffing practices that have become commonplace since the seventh area plan was implemented. Poor staffing practices/sector combination practices are rampant. Safety was certainly compromised, and will continue to be for the foreseeable future (until staffing increases).

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ARTCC RADAR CTLR CITES STAFFING PROBS AND LACK OF BREAKS AS A COMPROMISE TO SAFETY.

Narrative: WX HAD BEEN POOR ALL DAY. DURING THE XA00 RUSH, METERING DELAYS REACHED IN EXCESS OF 10 MINS. TRAINING WAS OCCURRING ON 2 POS, A CHK RIDE WAS OCCURRING ON A THIRD POS, AND 2 OF 6 SECTORS WERE COMBINED TO ALLOW THIS. THE SUPVR WAS CONDUCTING A CHK RIDE ON THE HIGH ALT SEQUENCING SECTOR D-SIDE (ALONE, HE IS CERTIFIED ON THE SECTOR), THE LOW ALT SECTOR WAS STAFFED WITH A D-SIDE ONLY AND AN FPL. DURING THE RUSH, THE SUPVR SPENT MOST OF THE TIME ASSISTING THE R-SIDE CTLR, AS OPPOSED TO EVALUATING THE D-SIDE'S PERFORMANCE. THERE WERE NO CTLRS ON BREAK AND TRAINING WAS NOT BROKEN TO PROVIDE THE RADAR HDOFS SO OBVIOUSLY NEEDED. THIS IS TYPICAL OF THE SLIPSHOD STAFFING PRACTICES THAT HAVE BECOME COMMONPLACE SINCE THE SEVENTH AREA PLAN WAS IMPLEMENTED. POOR STAFFING PRACTICES/SECTOR COMBINATION PRACTICES ARE RAMPANT. SAFETY WAS CERTAINLY COMPROMISED, AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE (UNTIL STAFFING INCREASES).

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.