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System error occurred between 2 B737's when ARTCC radar team did not see the pending conflict allegedly due to sector traffic saturation. Developmental controller states that supervisor and traffic management were watching but allegedly did nothing to meter traffic through the sector.
| Attributes | |
| ACN | 414582 |
| Time | |
| Date | 199809 |
| Day | Thu |
| Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
| Place | |
| Locale Reference | atc facility : vhp |
| State Reference | IN |
| Altitude | msl bound lower : 33000 msl bound upper : 33000 |
| Environment | |
| Light | Daylight |
| Aircraft 1 | |
| Controlling Facilities | artcc : zid |
| Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
| Make Model Name | B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model |
| Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
| Navigation In Use | Other |
| Flight Phase | descent other |
| Flight Plan | IFR |
| Aircraft 2 | |
| Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
| Make Model Name | B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model |
| Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
| Navigation In Use | Other |
| Flight Phase | cruise other |
| Flight Plan | IFR |
| Person 1 | |
| Affiliation | government : faa |
| Function | controller : flight data |
| Qualification | controller : developmental |
| Experience | controller non radar : 3 controller radar : 9 |
| ASRS Report | 414582 |
| Person 2 | |
| Affiliation | government : faa |
| Function | controller : radar |
| Qualification | controller : radar |
| Events | |
| Anomaly | conflict : airborne less severe non adherence : required legal separation other anomaly other |
| Independent Detector | atc equipment other atc equipment : unspecified |
| Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
| Consequence | faa : investigated |
| Miss Distance | horizontal : 22200 vertical : 1700 |
| Supplementary | |
| Primary Problem | ATC Human Performance |
| Air Traffic Incident | Operational Error Intra Facility Coordination Failure |
Narrative:
The sector (king high) was so busy. We had 25 aircraft on frequency and approximately 35 data blocks in the sector. No flow control in effect. My supervisor stood behind us and never took steps to alleviate the workload. I, as the 'D' associate, shut ZAU off and made them spin airplanes. This decision should have been made by flow control (tmu) or supervisor personnel. They knew an hour before this happened that this sector was going to get extremely busy and did nothing.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: SYS ERROR OCCURRED BTWN 2 B737'S WHEN ARTCC RADAR TEAM DID NOT SEE THE PENDING CONFLICT ALLEGEDLY DUE TO SECTOR TFC SATURATION. DEVELOPMENTAL CTLR STATES THAT SUPVR AND TFC MGMNT WERE WATCHING BUT ALLEGEDLY DID NOTHING TO METER TFC THROUGH THE SECTOR.
Narrative: THE SECTOR (KING HIGH) WAS SO BUSY. WE HAD 25 ACFT ON FREQ AND APPROX 35 DATA BLOCKS IN THE SECTOR. NO FLOW CTL IN EFFECT. MY SUPVR STOOD BEHIND US AND NEVER TOOK STEPS TO ALLEVIATE THE WORKLOAD. I, AS THE 'D' ASSOCIATE, SHUT ZAU OFF AND MADE THEM SPIN AIRPLANES. THIS DECISION SHOULD HAVE BEEN MADE BY FLOW CTL (TMU) OR SUPVR PERSONNEL. THEY KNEW AN HR BEFORE THIS HAPPENED THAT THIS SECTOR WAS GOING TO GET EXTREMELY BUSY AND DID NOTHING.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.