Narrative:

On sep/xa/98, I was a learjet first officer on a part 135 air ambulance flight between rdu and F54. The traffic was heavy while we were being vectored around to the northeast of F54. ASOS was reporting 5 mi visibility in haze. I was PF and talking with approach while the captain, who was acting as PNF, was getting an airport advisory from F54 unicom and talking with their pattern traffic. The captain takes over monitoring approach about the same time they turn us back toward the field on a 220 degree heading. Approach instructs us to report the field in sight and report canceling IFR. About the same time we receive these instructions I see what I think is F54 at our 12:30 - 1 O'clock position, which I verify with the GPS which confirms the heading and shows 7 DME. I point the field out to the captain and he immediately cancels IFR in order to monitor unicom and coordinate our pattern entry with other VFR traffic. Making normal traffic calls we enter the left downwind, fly the pattern and land at what we think is F54. On short final, I do notice that the runway number is 17 rather than 16 but remember thinking that 'I guess they haven't painted the new numbers yet,' which seemed logical in the split second I pondered it since I have experienced this before at other airports. After landing at gpm without a clearance, the tower calls us on the unicom frequency we had been using and informs us of our error, which a quick glance at the GPS confirms. The captain then asked the tower if we had caused any problems, to which the tower responds in the negative. Captain then asked if we needed to call the tower or make a report, to which tower said he didn't think that would be necessary. Tower then gives us a clearance to taxi back to departure end and clears us to take off. At this point, under strong desire to leave this embarrassing situation and the urgent nature of the flight, we taxied and took off without an IFR clearance and without leaving a copy of our weight and balance per operations specifications. We continued to F54 3 mi away and landed normally. There were many contributing factors to our error, little things that snowballed before they were idented. Heavy IFR and VFR traffic in reduced visibility taking a lot of our attention away from the approach and airport. Approach instructing us to report the field in sight at '12 - 1 O'clock' implying that we were in close proximity and probably looking at it. A closer reading of the charts would have revealed the close proximity of F54 and gpm. Canceling IFR instead of asking for the approach and canceling on final or on the ground. To avoid this type of problem in the future, I recommend pilots fly full approachs or at least be established on an inbound course in areas where there are numerous airports in close proximity of each other, even in VMC. Closely read charts in such areas and look for other airports in the area, check and doublechk. Also recommend that a note be placed on the approach plate where there are 2 similar airports in close proximity of each other and maybe approach could make such an advisory if it looks like there is a possible conflict. Supplemental information from acn 414721: upon arrival near arlington, we were vectored over dallas NAS at 2500 ft and cleared direct arlington. Furthermore, the runway at gpm is shorter than the runway at F54 and was not sufficient for part 135 landing. From our position at that time, looking for F54 in the haze (and watching for other aircraft) made gpm look very much like what we were looking for. There is 3.2 NM between the near paralleled runways (runway 17 versus runway 16). The airports both have large white helicopter facilities on their northwest corners, terminal/FBO facilities on their northeast corners, and t-hangars down their east side. Both my copilot and I fly around 1000 hours a yr in conditions very much like this.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ATX AIR AMBULANCE FLT LANDS AT THE WRONG ARPT WITHOUT BENEFIT OF LNDG CLRNC. DEST ARPT WAS A NON TWR ARPT. WRONG ARPT HAD AN ACTIVE ATCT.

Narrative: ON SEP/XA/98, I WAS A LEARJET FO ON A PART 135 AIR AMBULANCE FLT BTWN RDU AND F54. THE TFC WAS HVY WHILE WE WERE BEING VECTORED AROUND TO THE NE OF F54. ASOS WAS RPTING 5 MI VISIBILITY IN HAZE. I WAS PF AND TALKING WITH APCH WHILE THE CAPT, WHO WAS ACTING AS PNF, WAS GETTING AN ARPT ADVISORY FROM F54 UNICOM AND TALKING WITH THEIR PATTERN TFC. THE CAPT TAKES OVER MONITORING APCH ABOUT THE SAME TIME THEY TURN US BACK TOWARD THE FIELD ON A 220 DEG HDG. APCH INSTRUCTS US TO RPT THE FIELD IN SIGHT AND RPT CANCELING IFR. ABOUT THE SAME TIME WE RECEIVE THESE INSTRUCTIONS I SEE WHAT I THINK IS F54 AT OUR 12:30 - 1 O'CLOCK POS, WHICH I VERIFY WITH THE GPS WHICH CONFIRMS THE HDG AND SHOWS 7 DME. I POINT THE FIELD OUT TO THE CAPT AND HE IMMEDIATELY CANCELS IFR IN ORDER TO MONITOR UNICOM AND COORDINATE OUR PATTERN ENTRY WITH OTHER VFR TFC. MAKING NORMAL TFC CALLS WE ENTER THE L DOWNWIND, FLY THE PATTERN AND LAND AT WHAT WE THINK IS F54. ON SHORT FINAL, I DO NOTICE THAT THE RWY NUMBER IS 17 RATHER THAN 16 BUT REMEMBER THINKING THAT 'I GUESS THEY HAVEN'T PAINTED THE NEW NUMBERS YET,' WHICH SEEMED LOGICAL IN THE SPLIT SECOND I PONDERED IT SINCE I HAVE EXPERIENCED THIS BEFORE AT OTHER ARPTS. AFTER LNDG AT GPM WITHOUT A CLRNC, THE TWR CALLS US ON THE UNICOM FREQ WE HAD BEEN USING AND INFORMS US OF OUR ERROR, WHICH A QUICK GLANCE AT THE GPS CONFIRMS. THE CAPT THEN ASKED THE TWR IF WE HAD CAUSED ANY PROBS, TO WHICH THE TWR RESPONDS IN THE NEGATIVE. CAPT THEN ASKED IF WE NEEDED TO CALL THE TWR OR MAKE A RPT, TO WHICH TWR SAID HE DIDN'T THINK THAT WOULD BE NECESSARY. TWR THEN GIVES US A CLRNC TO TAXI BACK TO DEP END AND CLRS US TO TAKE OFF. AT THIS POINT, UNDER STRONG DESIRE TO LEAVE THIS EMBARRASSING SIT AND THE URGENT NATURE OF THE FLT, WE TAXIED AND TOOK OFF WITHOUT AN IFR CLRNC AND WITHOUT LEAVING A COPY OF OUR WT AND BAL PER OPS SPECS. WE CONTINUED TO F54 3 MI AWAY AND LANDED NORMALLY. THERE WERE MANY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO OUR ERROR, LITTLE THINGS THAT SNOWBALLED BEFORE THEY WERE IDENTED. HVY IFR AND VFR TFC IN REDUCED VISIBILITY TAKING A LOT OF OUR ATTN AWAY FROM THE APCH AND ARPT. APCH INSTRUCTING US TO RPT THE FIELD IN SIGHT AT '12 - 1 O'CLOCK' IMPLYING THAT WE WERE IN CLOSE PROX AND PROBABLY LOOKING AT IT. A CLOSER READING OF THE CHARTS WOULD HAVE REVEALED THE CLOSE PROX OF F54 AND GPM. CANCELING IFR INSTEAD OF ASKING FOR THE APCH AND CANCELING ON FINAL OR ON THE GND. TO AVOID THIS TYPE OF PROB IN THE FUTURE, I RECOMMEND PLTS FLY FULL APCHS OR AT LEAST BE ESTABLISHED ON AN INBOUND COURSE IN AREAS WHERE THERE ARE NUMEROUS ARPTS IN CLOSE PROX OF EACH OTHER, EVEN IN VMC. CLOSELY READ CHARTS IN SUCH AREAS AND LOOK FOR OTHER ARPTS IN THE AREA, CHK AND DOUBLECHK. ALSO RECOMMEND THAT A NOTE BE PLACED ON THE APCH PLATE WHERE THERE ARE 2 SIMILAR ARPTS IN CLOSE PROX OF EACH OTHER AND MAYBE APCH COULD MAKE SUCH AN ADVISORY IF IT LOOKS LIKE THERE IS A POSSIBLE CONFLICT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 414721: UPON ARR NEAR ARLINGTON, WE WERE VECTORED OVER DALLAS NAS AT 2500 FT AND CLRED DIRECT ARLINGTON. FURTHERMORE, THE RWY AT GPM IS SHORTER THAN THE RWY AT F54 AND WAS NOT SUFFICIENT FOR PART 135 LNDG. FROM OUR POS AT THAT TIME, LOOKING FOR F54 IN THE HAZE (AND WATCHING FOR OTHER ACFT) MADE GPM LOOK VERY MUCH LIKE WHAT WE WERE LOOKING FOR. THERE IS 3.2 NM BTWN THE NEAR PARALLELED RWYS (RWY 17 VERSUS RWY 16). THE ARPTS BOTH HAVE LARGE WHITE HELI FACILITIES ON THEIR NW CORNERS, TERMINAL/FBO FACILITIES ON THEIR NE CORNERS, AND T-HANGARS DOWN THEIR E SIDE. BOTH MY COPLT AND I FLY AROUND 1000 HRS A YR IN CONDITIONS VERY MUCH LIKE THIS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.