Narrative:

On oct/xa/98 at XX35, I approached the lava fingers and made my inbound call. I had just heard aircraft Y call 'up the tube to the vent.' there was a lot of radio traffic in the area at the time and I was listening to sort out who was where. An aircraft Z helicopter was at the vent, but I am not sure about the call sign. There was an exchange of position reports between these two. The aircraft Y and another aircraft kept blocking each other out. I responded 'blocked' so they would know. At kupa'ianaha I made a call for spillway arrival. At this point I still did not have visual contact with the aircraft Y and was starting to become concerned about this. I called my position at the notch 'right turn 3 point 2.' at this point the other aircraft was not in sight. I was thinking 'if in fact aircraft Y is coming around the vent as he had indicated I should be seeing him by now,' but he was in a hover at the jacuzzi. I called 'going wide at spillway' because there was a thin layer in close to the vent and aircraft Y was still not in sight or communicating properly at this point. As I came abeam the spillway I called 'going behind you aircraft Y and down the tube.' because of the thin layer I had dropped down to about 3050 ft MSL and was very wide of the spillway area. The S76 then started a right turn away from the vent into my flight path, I turned further left and dropped altitude as I departed the area down the lava tube to the shoreline. At this time I was thinking that I needed to talk to mr Y about traffic procedures in the area of the vent. If a pilot is going to stop or change his flight path after stating his intentions it is common practice T0 let the rest of us know. Any time I can't find traffic where it's reported to be it causes undue stress. It is hard to give a good tour if you're worried about someone blindsiding you, causing a career ending fireball and metal rain shower. His whole way of doing business in the area caused the rest of us to get away from him as quickly as possible. (The other 3 were operator Z aircraft.) when I got back to the airport, the office staff informed me that there were 3 FAA people on aircraft Y. I find it amazing that the very people who are supposed to be responsible for safety were on board that aircraft. I talked to captain Y about this incident, and he responded lamely that the FAA was loading them up with simulated emergency sits at the time. He told me one inspector instructed him to go back to the vent, after he had called out of the area, because the inspector had wanted to observe other traffic at the vent. The inspector believed that all 4 aircraft were in violation of sfar 71 WX minimums because the crew on the aircraft Y did not enter the area. We all know that they are going to be very conservative on a check ride, so why did he think that it was a good idea to create a traffic hazard by trying to get a bust on the other aircraft who went in? Furthermore emergency procedures and unnecessary talking on intercom in a high traffic area shows serious judgement problems with the FAA inspector on that aircraft. I took evasive action to get away from an aircraft that was being flown by a committee. I certainly hope that this is not going to be standard procedure for the S76 while operating at the puo'o vent.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AS350B AND SK76 HAD AN NMAC WHEN PLT OF THE SK76 WAS DIRECTED BY FAA INSPECTORS TO FLY NON STANDARD MANEUVERS AROUND A SIGHTSEEING VOLCANO.

Narrative: ON OCT/XA/98 AT XX35, I APCHED THE LAVA FINGERS AND MADE MY INBOUND CALL. I HAD JUST HEARD ACFT Y CALL 'UP THE TUBE TO THE VENT.' THERE WAS A LOT OF RADIO TFC IN THE AREA AT THE TIME AND I WAS LISTENING TO SORT OUT WHO WAS WHERE. AN ACFT Z HELI WAS AT THE VENT, BUT I AM NOT SURE ABOUT THE CALL SIGN. THERE WAS AN EXCHANGE OF POS RPTS BTWN THESE TWO. THE ACFT Y AND ANOTHER ACFT KEPT BLOCKING EACH OTHER OUT. I RESPONDED 'BLOCKED' SO THEY WOULD KNOW. AT KUPA'IANAHA I MADE A CALL FOR SPILLWAY ARR. AT THIS POINT I STILL DID NOT HAVE VISUAL CONTACT WITH THE ACFT Y AND WAS STARTING TO BECOME CONCERNED ABOUT THIS. I CALLED MY POS AT THE NOTCH 'R TURN 3 POINT 2.' AT THIS POINT THE OTHER ACFT WAS NOT IN SIGHT. I WAS THINKING 'IF IN FACT ACFT Y IS COMING AROUND THE VENT AS HE HAD INDICATED I SHOULD BE SEEING HIM BY NOW,' BUT HE WAS IN A HOVER AT THE JACUZZI. I CALLED 'GOING WIDE AT SPILLWAY' BECAUSE THERE WAS A THIN LAYER IN CLOSE TO THE VENT AND ACFT Y WAS STILL NOT IN SIGHT OR COMMUNICATING PROPERLY AT THIS POINT. AS I CAME ABEAM THE SPILLWAY I CALLED 'GOING BEHIND YOU ACFT Y AND DOWN THE TUBE.' BECAUSE OF THE THIN LAYER I HAD DROPPED DOWN TO ABOUT 3050 FT MSL AND WAS VERY WIDE OF THE SPILLWAY AREA. THE S76 THEN STARTED A R TURN AWAY FROM THE VENT INTO MY FLT PATH, I TURNED FURTHER L AND DROPPED ALT AS I DEPARTED THE AREA DOWN THE LAVA TUBE TO THE SHORELINE. AT THIS TIME I WAS THINKING THAT I NEEDED TO TALK TO MR Y ABOUT TFC PROCS IN THE AREA OF THE VENT. IF A PLT IS GOING TO STOP OR CHANGE HIS FLT PATH AFTER STATING HIS INTENTIONS IT IS COMMON PRACTICE T0 LET THE REST OF US KNOW. ANY TIME I CAN'T FIND TFC WHERE IT'S RPTED TO BE IT CAUSES UNDUE STRESS. IT IS HARD TO GIVE A GOOD TOUR IF YOU'RE WORRIED ABOUT SOMEONE BLINDSIDING YOU, CAUSING A CAREER ENDING FIREBALL AND METAL RAIN SHOWER. HIS WHOLE WAY OF DOING BUSINESS IN THE AREA CAUSED THE REST OF US TO GET AWAY FROM HIM AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. (THE OTHER 3 WERE OPERATOR Z ACFT.) WHEN I GOT BACK TO THE ARPT, THE OFFICE STAFF INFORMED ME THAT THERE WERE 3 FAA PEOPLE ON ACFT Y. I FIND IT AMAZING THAT THE VERY PEOPLE WHO ARE SUPPOSED TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR SAFETY WERE ON BOARD THAT ACFT. I TALKED TO CAPT Y ABOUT THIS INCIDENT, AND HE RESPONDED LAMELY THAT THE FAA WAS LOADING THEM UP WITH SIMULATED EMER SITS AT THE TIME. HE TOLD ME ONE INSPECTOR INSTRUCTED HIM TO GO BACK TO THE VENT, AFTER HE HAD CALLED OUT OF THE AREA, BECAUSE THE INSPECTOR HAD WANTED TO OBSERVE OTHER TFC AT THE VENT. THE INSPECTOR BELIEVED THAT ALL 4 ACFT WERE IN VIOLATION OF SFAR 71 WX MINIMUMS BECAUSE THE CREW ON THE ACFT Y DID NOT ENTER THE AREA. WE ALL KNOW THAT THEY ARE GOING TO BE VERY CONSERVATIVE ON A CHK RIDE, SO WHY DID HE THINK THAT IT WAS A GOOD IDEA TO CREATE A TFC HAZARD BY TRYING TO GET A BUST ON THE OTHER ACFT WHO WENT IN? FURTHERMORE EMER PROCS AND UNNECESSARY TALKING ON INTERCOM IN A HIGH TFC AREA SHOWS SERIOUS JUDGEMENT PROBS WITH THE FAA INSPECTOR ON THAT ACFT. I TOOK EVASIVE ACTION TO GET AWAY FROM AN ACFT THAT WAS BEING FLOWN BY A COMMITTEE. I CERTAINLY HOPE THAT THIS IS NOT GOING TO BE STANDARD PROC FOR THE S76 WHILE OPERATING AT THE PUO'O VENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.