Narrative:

On radar vector for an ILS runway 16R at seatac at XX00 local. Intercepted the final approach course well high. At approximately 2.5 mi, missed the approach and was vectored for another approach. Our second approach was to runway 16L. While on downwind prior to the second approach, I realized that I had inadvertently tuned the radios to the ILS frequency for runway 16L initially. The first officer, who was not in raw data, but in map, had not noticed the deviation and was to have idented my radio. (Whether he had not noticed the morse code difference or had idented his radio by mistake, I'm not certain.) the second approach was uneventful. Upon reflection, I believe the local controller noticed (tower) that we may have flown the wrong ILS initially and was helping us avoid a repeat problem by coordinating our arrival with approach to runway 16L the second time. Contributing factors, crew: long duty day with an additional unscheduled stop in jnu. A difficult approach and departure there. I was fighting a cold and both of us were tired. Controller: the approach controller gave us a short high turn onto the ILS (there was no traffic). A longer turn-on may have helped us discover the problem sooner.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CAPT OF A B737-400 MADE A MISSED APCH DUE TO NOT BEING ESTABLISHED ON THE ILS APCH. PROB FOUND TO BE CAUSED BY THE RADIO RECEIVER BEING TUNED TO THE WRONG ILS PARALLEL RWY. THE SECOND APCH TO THE OTHER RWY PROVED THIS ERROR.

Narrative: ON RADAR VECTOR FOR AN ILS RWY 16R AT SEATAC AT XX00 LCL. INTERCEPTED THE FINAL APCH COURSE WELL HIGH. AT APPROX 2.5 MI, MISSED THE APCH AND WAS VECTORED FOR ANOTHER APCH. OUR SECOND APCH WAS TO RWY 16L. WHILE ON DOWNWIND PRIOR TO THE SECOND APCH, I REALIZED THAT I HAD INADVERTENTLY TUNED THE RADIOS TO THE ILS FREQ FOR RWY 16L INITIALLY. THE FO, WHO WAS NOT IN RAW DATA, BUT IN MAP, HAD NOT NOTICED THE DEV AND WAS TO HAVE IDENTED MY RADIO. (WHETHER HE HAD NOT NOTICED THE MORSE CODE DIFFERENCE OR HAD IDENTED HIS RADIO BY MISTAKE, I'M NOT CERTAIN.) THE SECOND APCH WAS UNEVENTFUL. UPON REFLECTION, I BELIEVE THE LCL CTLR NOTICED (TWR) THAT WE MAY HAVE FLOWN THE WRONG ILS INITIALLY AND WAS HELPING US AVOID A REPEAT PROB BY COORDINATING OUR ARR WITH APCH TO RWY 16L THE SECOND TIME. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS, CREW: LONG DUTY DAY WITH AN ADDITIONAL UNSCHEDULED STOP IN JNU. A DIFFICULT APCH AND DEP THERE. I WAS FIGHTING A COLD AND BOTH OF US WERE TIRED. CTLR: THE APCH CTLR GAVE US A SHORT HIGH TURN ONTO THE ILS (THERE WAS NO TFC). A LONGER TURN-ON MAY HAVE HELPED US DISCOVER THE PROB SOONER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.