Narrative:

On nov/xa/98 I was the captain on air carrier flight xyz. I was the PNF. At acceleration altitude, the first officer called for the climb check. I ran the climb check to the automatic coarsen and held there waiting for 1500 ft AGL. At about 600 ft or so, we started to enter icing conditions and turn on the engine anti-ice. Almost immediately we got an air valve light on the left engine. This had been written up in november and signed off as fixed. I know what to do to fix the problem, if it can be fixed, so I do not go to the QRH. Big mistake, but I was trying to hurry so as to fix the problem or let ATC know we had to get out of icing conditions. I try to reset the engine anti-ice and it does no good. Now I tell the first officer I am going to pull the left power lever back slowly to see if this will open the valve. When I bring the power lever back up there is no torque on the engine. Now I go to the QRH, but find nothing that addresses this problem. The first officer and I discuss the problem and decide, since we don't know what is going on with the engine, to shut the engine down. We do this and declare an emergency. We landed and taxied to the gate without any incident. It was after we had parked and were offloading the passenger that I realized I had never finished the climb checks at 1500 ft and turned off the automatic coarsen. When I had pulled the power lever back, I had automatic coarsened the left engine. This is not meant as an excuse, but I believe that having had only about 6 hours sleep the night before, due to a scheduled reduced rest overnight, may have had something to do with me not thinking very well. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter said that during the climb the reporter was waiting to switch off the propeller autofeather system at 1500 ft when an engine bleed valve warning light came on at 600 ft. The reporter told the first officer that the reporter knew the fix for the bleed light on and pulled back on the power lever. The reporter said the aircraft immediately lost power on #1 engine and went to autofeather. The reporter said an emergency was declared and an uneventful landing was accomplished. The reporter stated when leaving the aircraft it occurred to the reporter the autofeather switch was still armed and was the cause of the power loss. The reporter said both crew members were tired and only had 6 hours sleep with 2 13-hour duty days.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A SAAB 340 IN INITIAL CLB DECLARED AN EMER AND DIVERTED DUE TO LOSS OF PWR IN #1 ENG CAUSED BY PULLING PWR LEVER BACK WITH AUTOFEATHER SYS ARMED.

Narrative: ON NOV/XA/98 I WAS THE CAPT ON ACR FLT XYZ. I WAS THE PNF. AT ACCELERATION ALT, THE FO CALLED FOR THE CLB CHK. I RAN THE CLB CHK TO THE AUTO COARSEN AND HELD THERE WAITING FOR 1500 FT AGL. AT ABOUT 600 FT OR SO, WE STARTED TO ENTER ICING CONDITIONS AND TURN ON THE ENG ANTI-ICE. ALMOST IMMEDIATELY WE GOT AN AIR VALVE LIGHT ON THE L ENG. THIS HAD BEEN WRITTEN UP IN NOVEMBER AND SIGNED OFF AS FIXED. I KNOW WHAT TO DO TO FIX THE PROB, IF IT CAN BE FIXED, SO I DO NOT GO TO THE QRH. BIG MISTAKE, BUT I WAS TRYING TO HURRY SO AS TO FIX THE PROB OR LET ATC KNOW WE HAD TO GET OUT OF ICING CONDITIONS. I TRY TO RESET THE ENG ANTI-ICE AND IT DOES NO GOOD. NOW I TELL THE FO I AM GOING TO PULL THE L PWR LEVER BACK SLOWLY TO SEE IF THIS WILL OPEN THE VALVE. WHEN I BRING THE PWR LEVER BACK UP THERE IS NO TORQUE ON THE ENG. NOW I GO TO THE QRH, BUT FIND NOTHING THAT ADDRESSES THIS PROB. THE FO AND I DISCUSS THE PROB AND DECIDE, SINCE WE DON'T KNOW WHAT IS GOING ON WITH THE ENG, TO SHUT THE ENG DOWN. WE DO THIS AND DECLARE AN EMER. WE LANDED AND TAXIED TO THE GATE WITHOUT ANY INCIDENT. IT WAS AFTER WE HAD PARKED AND WERE OFFLOADING THE PAX THAT I REALIZED I HAD NEVER FINISHED THE CLB CHKS AT 1500 FT AND TURNED OFF THE AUTO COARSEN. WHEN I HAD PULLED THE PWR LEVER BACK, I HAD AUTO COARSENED THE L ENG. THIS IS NOT MEANT AS AN EXCUSE, BUT I BELIEVE THAT HAVING HAD ONLY ABOUT 6 HRS SLEEP THE NIGHT BEFORE, DUE TO A SCHEDULED REDUCED REST OVERNIGHT, MAY HAVE HAD SOMETHING TO DO WITH ME NOT THINKING VERY WELL. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR SAID THAT DURING THE CLB THE RPTR WAS WAITING TO SWITCH OFF THE PROP AUTOFEATHER SYS AT 1500 FT WHEN AN ENG BLEED VALVE WARNING LIGHT CAME ON AT 600 FT. THE RPTR TOLD THE FO THAT THE RPTR KNEW THE FIX FOR THE BLEED LIGHT ON AND PULLED BACK ON THE PWR LEVER. THE RPTR SAID THE ACFT IMMEDIATELY LOST PWR ON #1 ENG AND WENT TO AUTOFEATHER. THE RPTR SAID AN EMER WAS DECLARED AND AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG WAS ACCOMPLISHED. THE RPTR STATED WHEN LEAVING THE ACFT IT OCCURRED TO THE RPTR THE AUTOFEATHER SWITCH WAS STILL ARMED AND WAS THE CAUSE OF THE PWR LOSS. THE RPTR SAID BOTH CREW MEMBERS WERE TIRED AND ONLY HAD 6 HRS SLEEP WITH 2 13-HR DUTY DAYS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.