Narrative:

B737-300 oklahoma city to dallas. Takeoff was on runway 31. WX was not a factor. Takeoff clearance was fly heading 010 degrees and climb to 5000 ft and tower advised that a light aircraft was orbiting north of the field VFR. The first officer asked tower if they still wanted us to fly a 010 degree heading. Tower confirmed a 010 degree heading. After takeoff, during the turn to 010 degrees, tower amended the altitude clearance to 4000 ft. Departure subsequently issued heading of 070 degrees and then 090 degrees. Tower did not give any further calls about the light aircraft traffic. At about 3000 ft, the captain engaged the autoplt in the command mode with 4000 ft in the altitude clearance window (automatic altitude acquire was armed). Approaching 090 degree heading and 4000 ft, a TCASII TA/RA announced 'reduce vertical speed.' this was the first warning of potential traffic conflict. The crew diverted their attention to the TCASII and acquiring the second aircraft visually. At the TCASII alert, the light aircraft was directly on our nose and about 1300 ft high. Both the captain and first officer gave the pop up traffic TA/RA our undivided attention. The crew picked up a visual on the light aircraft within 5 seconds (at 12 O'clock, 3 NM, slightly high) and verified that adequate separation existed. When the crew looked back inside the cockpit at altitude following visual acquisition of the light aircraft, both the captain and the first officer realized that altitude hold had not engaged, and that our aircraft had climbed through the assigned altitude by 400 ft to 4400 ft. The captain immediately corrected the altitude deviation -- descending back down to 4000 ft. The light aircraft passed directly overhead as we descended towards 4000 ft and at the same time, departure control directed us to maintain 4000 ft. The minimum aircraft separation was approximately 1000 ft. At no time was any evasive action required or taken. Lessons learned: this captain and first officer learned that extra attention to aircraft parameters is required during TCASII events to prevent altitude, airspeed, or heading deviations while the crew's attention is distraction. The TCASII alert, as we were rolling out and leveling off, was totally unexpected and diverted our attention away from monitoring the leveloff. This initially caused us to miss the fact that the autoplt did not acquire the 4000 ft altitude and leveloff. Following the TA/RA, we referenced the TCASII scope and then looked outside, we felt that the most critical action at that moment was to get a tally on the light aircraft and to visually guarantee safe separation. From the viewpoint of air traffic control, we believe that it would have been possible to completely avoid any possible aircraft conflict by vectoring our aircraft to stay laterally clear of the light aircraft. Vectoring us west and then south or further to the north before turning east would have totally avoided the possibility of any TCASII alerts or aircraft conflicts. Additionally, had ATC pointed out the light traffic as we climbed out, we could have attempted to pick up a visual prior to any TCASII alerts. Having a visual prior to the TCASII TA/RA would have allowed the first officer to note the alert and quickly confirm that we had visual on the traffic while the captain continued to fly the parameters assigned by ATC.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 FLC RECEIVED MULTIPLE HDG AND ALT CLRNCS DURING TKOF AND INITIAL CLB. WHILE RESOLVING TCASII RA, AN ALTDEV OCCURRED.

Narrative: B737-300 OKLAHOMA CITY TO DALLAS. TKOF WAS ON RWY 31. WX WAS NOT A FACTOR. TKOF CLRNC WAS FLY HDG 010 DEGS AND CLB TO 5000 FT AND TWR ADVISED THAT A LIGHT ACFT WAS ORBITING N OF THE FIELD VFR. THE FO ASKED TWR IF THEY STILL WANTED US TO FLY A 010 DEG HDG. TWR CONFIRMED A 010 DEG HDG. AFTER TKOF, DURING THE TURN TO 010 DEGS, TWR AMENDED THE ALT CLRNC TO 4000 FT. DEP SUBSEQUENTLY ISSUED HDG OF 070 DEGS AND THEN 090 DEGS. TWR DID NOT GIVE ANY FURTHER CALLS ABOUT THE LIGHT ACFT TFC. AT ABOUT 3000 FT, THE CAPT ENGAGED THE AUTOPLT IN THE COMMAND MODE WITH 4000 FT IN THE ALT CLRNC WINDOW (AUTOMATIC ALT ACQUIRE WAS ARMED). APCHING 090 DEG HDG AND 4000 FT, A TCASII TA/RA ANNOUNCED 'REDUCE VERT SPD.' THIS WAS THE FIRST WARNING OF POTENTIAL TFC CONFLICT. THE CREW DIVERTED THEIR ATTN TO THE TCASII AND ACQUIRING THE SECOND ACFT VISUALLY. AT THE TCASII ALERT, THE LIGHT ACFT WAS DIRECTLY ON OUR NOSE AND ABOUT 1300 FT HIGH. BOTH THE CAPT AND FO GAVE THE POP UP TFC TA/RA OUR UNDIVIDED ATTN. THE CREW PICKED UP A VISUAL ON THE LIGHT ACFT WITHIN 5 SECONDS (AT 12 O'CLOCK, 3 NM, SLIGHTLY HIGH) AND VERIFIED THAT ADEQUATE SEPARATION EXISTED. WHEN THE CREW LOOKED BACK INSIDE THE COCKPIT AT ALT FOLLOWING VISUAL ACQUISITION OF THE LIGHT ACFT, BOTH THE CAPT AND THE FO REALIZED THAT ALT HOLD HAD NOT ENGAGED, AND THAT OUR ACFT HAD CLBED THROUGH THE ASSIGNED ALT BY 400 FT TO 4400 FT. THE CAPT IMMEDIATELY CORRECTED THE ALTDEV -- DSNDING BACK DOWN TO 4000 FT. THE LIGHT ACFT PASSED DIRECTLY OVERHEAD AS WE DSNDED TOWARDS 4000 FT AND AT THE SAME TIME, DEP CTL DIRECTED US TO MAINTAIN 4000 FT. THE MINIMUM ACFT SEPARATION WAS APPROX 1000 FT. AT NO TIME WAS ANY EVASIVE ACTION REQUIRED OR TAKEN. LESSONS LEARNED: THIS CAPT AND FO LEARNED THAT EXTRA ATTN TO ACFT PARAMETERS IS REQUIRED DURING TCASII EVENTS TO PREVENT ALT, AIRSPD, OR HDG DEVS WHILE THE CREW'S ATTN IS DISTR. THE TCASII ALERT, AS WE WERE ROLLING OUT AND LEVELING OFF, WAS TOTALLY UNEXPECTED AND DIVERTED OUR ATTN AWAY FROM MONITORING THE LEVELOFF. THIS INITIALLY CAUSED US TO MISS THE FACT THAT THE AUTOPLT DID NOT ACQUIRE THE 4000 FT ALT AND LEVELOFF. FOLLOWING THE TA/RA, WE REFED THE TCASII SCOPE AND THEN LOOKED OUTSIDE, WE FELT THAT THE MOST CRITICAL ACTION AT THAT MOMENT WAS TO GET A TALLY ON THE LIGHT ACFT AND TO VISUALLY GUARANTEE SAFE SEPARATION. FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF AIR TFC CTL, WE BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE TO COMPLETELY AVOID ANY POSSIBLE ACFT CONFLICT BY VECTORING OUR ACFT TO STAY LATERALLY CLR OF THE LIGHT ACFT. VECTORING US W AND THEN S OR FURTHER TO THE N BEFORE TURNING E WOULD HAVE TOTALLY AVOIDED THE POSSIBILITY OF ANY TCASII ALERTS OR ACFT CONFLICTS. ADDITIONALLY, HAD ATC POINTED OUT THE LIGHT TFC AS WE CLBED OUT, WE COULD HAVE ATTEMPTED TO PICK UP A VISUAL PRIOR TO ANY TCASII ALERTS. HAVING A VISUAL PRIOR TO THE TCASII TA/RA WOULD HAVE ALLOWED THE FO TO NOTE THE ALERT AND QUICKLY CONFIRM THAT WE HAD VISUAL ON THE TFC WHILE THE CAPT CONTINUED TO FLY THE PARAMETERS ASSIGNED BY ATC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.