Narrative:

We followed 5 aircraft on taxiway a to runway 1R sfo. First officer was making takeoff and I was handling radios. We were cleared into position and did so. As we came to a stop, I heard what I thought was takeoff clearance. I acknowledged this with our call sign. We called out final items on takeoff checklist and began power up and takeoff roll with me calling out power up, acknowledgement of throttle control xfer, engine and airspeed checks, etc. Continuing to gear up and responding to first officer's callouts for confign changes, etc. After 1000 ft I noticed an aircraft ahead and to my left. About that time tower gave us a turn to 030 degree radial away from the traffic and gave us a leveloff at 4000 ft, a change from our pre departure clearance altitude of 15000 ft. I considered this to be for separation from the observed traffic on my left. Tower then gave us departure control frequency. I acknowledged the handoff and reported I had observed the traffic. Tower then asked me to call on reaching atl. We were vectored by departure control onto the departure SID and continued to atl. I was later informed that I had acted on another aircraft takeoff clearance which had departed runway 1L. (I have not yet heard the tower tapes.) factors influencing actions: 1) no aircraft ahead of us had used runway 1L. 2) I was familiar with the criss-cross pattern, ie, an aircraft lands runway 28 then one departs runway 1. This may have caused a mind set that while holding in position and observing an aircraft landing runway 28, I was preconditioned to hearing a takeoff clearance for my aircraft. 3) the light rain had obscured vision through the left side window (no wipers) and I failed to observe the other aircraft on runway 1L. 4) once power up began, thought process reverted to inside cockpit, gauges, callouts, etc, which diverted my attention so that neither myself nor the first officer heard any correction to the acknowledgement of the takeoff clearance which I had transmitted.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B767 CREW TOOK OFF AFTER RECEIVING CLRNC FOR ANOTHER ACFT.

Narrative: WE FOLLOWED 5 ACFT ON TXWY A TO RWY 1R SFO. FO WAS MAKING TKOF AND I WAS HANDLING RADIOS. WE WERE CLRED INTO POS AND DID SO. AS WE CAME TO A STOP, I HEARD WHAT I THOUGHT WAS TKOF CLRNC. I ACKNOWLEDGED THIS WITH OUR CALL SIGN. WE CALLED OUT FINAL ITEMS ON TKOF CHKLIST AND BEGAN PWR UP AND TKOF ROLL WITH ME CALLING OUT PWR UP, ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THROTTLE CTL XFER, ENG AND AIRSPD CHKS, ETC. CONTINUING TO GEAR UP AND RESPONDING TO FO'S CALLOUTS FOR CONFIGN CHANGES, ETC. AFTER 1000 FT I NOTICED AN ACFT AHEAD AND TO MY L. ABOUT THAT TIME TWR GAVE US A TURN TO 030 DEG RADIAL AWAY FROM THE TFC AND GAVE US A LEVELOFF AT 4000 FT, A CHANGE FROM OUR PDC ALT OF 15000 FT. I CONSIDERED THIS TO BE FOR SEPARATION FROM THE OBSERVED TFC ON MY L. TWR THEN GAVE US DEP CTL FREQ. I ACKNOWLEDGED THE HDOF AND RPTED I HAD OBSERVED THE TFC. TWR THEN ASKED ME TO CALL ON REACHING ATL. WE WERE VECTORED BY DEP CTL ONTO THE DEP SID AND CONTINUED TO ATL. I WAS LATER INFORMED THAT I HAD ACTED ON ANOTHER ACFT TKOF CLRNC WHICH HAD DEPARTED RWY 1L. (I HAVE NOT YET HEARD THE TWR TAPES.) FACTORS INFLUENCING ACTIONS: 1) NO ACFT AHEAD OF US HAD USED RWY 1L. 2) I WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE CRISS-CROSS PATTERN, IE, AN ACFT LANDS RWY 28 THEN ONE DEPARTS RWY 1. THIS MAY HAVE CAUSED A MIND SET THAT WHILE HOLDING IN POS AND OBSERVING AN ACFT LNDG RWY 28, I WAS PRECONDITIONED TO HEARING A TKOF CLRNC FOR MY ACFT. 3) THE LIGHT RAIN HAD OBSCURED VISION THROUGH THE L SIDE WINDOW (NO WIPERS) AND I FAILED TO OBSERVE THE OTHER ACFT ON RWY 1L. 4) ONCE PWR UP BEGAN, THOUGHT PROCESS REVERTED TO INSIDE COCKPIT, GAUGES, CALLOUTS, ETC, WHICH DIVERTED MY ATTN SO THAT NEITHER MYSELF NOR THE FO HEARD ANY CORRECTION TO THE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE TKOF CLRNC WHICH I HAD XMITTED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.