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B737 crew spilled coffee on the center console. The #2 VHF radio and navigation were inoperative. The ILS DME was notamed unreliable.
| Attributes | |
| ACN | 420985 |
| Time | |
| Date | 199811 |
| Day | Mon |
| Local Time Of Day | 1801 To 2400 |
| Place | |
| Locale Reference | atc facility : san airport : san |
| State Reference | CA |
| Altitude | msl bound lower : 1500 msl bound upper : 2000 |
| Environment | |
| Flight Conditions | IMC |
| Light | Night |
| Aircraft 1 | |
| Controlling Facilities | tracon : san |
| Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
| Make Model Name | B727 Undifferentiated or Other Model |
| Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
| Navigation In Use | Other Other |
| Flight Phase | descent : approach landing : missed approach |
| Flight Plan | IFR |
| Person 1 | |
| Affiliation | company : air carrier |
| Function | flight crew : first officer |
| Qualification | pilot : atp |
| Experience | flight time last 90 days : 100 flight time total : 14000 flight time type : 10000 |
| ASRS Report | 420985 |
| Person 2 | |
| Affiliation | company : air carrier |
| Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
| Qualification | pilot : atp |
| Events | |
| Anomaly | conflict : ground critical non adherence : clearance non adherence : published procedure other anomaly other |
| Independent Detector | other controllera other flight crewa |
| Resolutory Action | controller : issued new clearance other |
| Consequence | Other |
| Supplementary | |
| Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
| Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
We were flying inbound to lindberg field at san diego using the localizer 27 at that field. En route from the east coast at cruise, we had a coffee spill that made #2 VOR frequency unreadable at that time. The problem we thought was corrected as we neared san diego as one could make out the frequency at that time. However, when I selected the frequency for the localizer 27 I had off flags on my HSI and no DME. The captain's localizer receiver was working normal and we were going to use it to determine the DME for the approach. I would be in LNAV according to company policy. We were on the approach at 2000 ft MSL inbound to the FAF and at the appropriate DME and started our descent to the MDA of 700 ft. At 1500 ft and descending, approach informed us that he had a 'low altitude warning' for us and for us to climb, which we did initiating the missed approach procedure. The problem was that we were not aware of the fact that the DME for that approach was unreliable and we missed the information from ATC informing us that it was. The captain was using his DME for the approach. Since we were left with only 1 VOR/DME we should have as a backup requested radar fixes from approach to identify the fixes for the approach. The coffee spill that left the #2 NAVAID inoperative to the missed information about the DME being inoperative led to a situation that had us lower on the approach than we should have been.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B737 CREW SPILLED COFFEE ON THE CTR CONSOLE. THE #2 VHF RADIO AND NAV WERE INOP. THE ILS DME WAS NOTAMED UNRELIABLE.
Narrative: WE WERE FLYING INBOUND TO LINDBERG FIELD AT SAN DIEGO USING THE LOC 27 AT THAT FIELD. ENRTE FROM THE EAST COAST AT CRUISE, WE HAD A COFFEE SPILL THAT MADE #2 VOR FREQ UNREADABLE AT THAT TIME. THE PROB WE THOUGHT WAS CORRECTED AS WE NEARED SAN DIEGO AS ONE COULD MAKE OUT THE FREQ AT THAT TIME. HOWEVER, WHEN I SELECTED THE FREQ FOR THE LOC 27 I HAD OFF FLAGS ON MY HSI AND NO DME. THE CAPT'S LOC RECEIVER WAS WORKING NORMAL AND WE WERE GOING TO USE IT TO DETERMINE THE DME FOR THE APCH. I WOULD BE IN LNAV ACCORDING TO COMPANY POLICY. WE WERE ON THE APCH AT 2000 FT MSL INBOUND TO THE FAF AND AT THE APPROPRIATE DME AND STARTED OUR DSCNT TO THE MDA OF 700 FT. AT 1500 FT AND DSNDING, APCH INFORMED US THAT HE HAD A 'LOW ALT WARNING' FOR US AND FOR US TO CLB, WHICH WE DID INITIATING THE MISSED APCH PROC. THE PROB WAS THAT WE WERE NOT AWARE OF THE FACT THAT THE DME FOR THAT APCH WAS UNRELIABLE AND WE MISSED THE INFO FROM ATC INFORMING US THAT IT WAS. THE CAPT WAS USING HIS DME FOR THE APCH. SINCE WE WERE LEFT WITH ONLY 1 VOR/DME WE SHOULD HAVE AS A BACKUP REQUESTED RADAR FIXES FROM APCH TO IDENT THE FIXES FOR THE APCH. THE COFFEE SPILL THAT LEFT THE #2 NAVAID INOP TO THE MISSED INFO ABOUT THE DME BEING INOP LED TO A SIT THAT HAD US LOWER ON THE APCH THAN WE SHOULD HAVE BEEN.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.