Narrative:

On nov/xa/98 we departed vny for sfo. We were issued the clearance of the canoga 7 departure avenal transition as filed. The aircraft had just come in and we were quick turning to go to sfo. The PNF programmed the FMS's while I tended to the fueling of the aircraft. On taxi we briefed the departure SID and routing. We departed on the canoga 7 departure which goes over gmn VOR, corez intersection and then avenal VOR. As we departed gmn VOR (about 30 NM northwest of gmn) the controller asked us if we were on the SID. We replied 'affirmative.' the controller further queried 'what is your heading?' we replied '295 degree heading.' the controller said 'roger, turn right heading 310 degrees and expedite your turn.' we promptly complied. We observed another aircraft on TCASII but at no time did any conflict exist. In fact, we were never issued an alert by the TCASII or by the controller. The controller then cleared us direct to bsr and the flight continued without incident. The controller mentioned, prior to the handoff, that it is important to navigation the SID because it keeps departures away from the inbounds. After we leveled off, the PNF and I figured out what happened. When he programmed the FMS's he accidentally omitted the fix called corez. This caused the navigation error and the aircraft to be in the wrong place. I have since issued a memo suggesting that all pilots programming the FMS's xchk each fix against the clearance as well as against each FMS. Also, both pilots must be present when the FMS's are loaded or at least confirm each fix entered into each FMS. In the current environment of automation, I think mistakes like this are more likely to happen. I hope by revealing such incidents to NASA, further occurrences can and will be prevented.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: G2 CREW HAD TRACK DEV.

Narrative: ON NOV/XA/98 WE DEPARTED VNY FOR SFO. WE WERE ISSUED THE CLRNC OF THE CANOGA 7 DEP AVENAL TRANSITION AS FILED. THE ACFT HAD JUST COME IN AND WE WERE QUICK TURNING TO GO TO SFO. THE PNF PROGRAMMED THE FMS'S WHILE I TENDED TO THE FUELING OF THE ACFT. ON TAXI WE BRIEFED THE DEP SID AND ROUTING. WE DEPARTED ON THE CANOGA 7 DEP WHICH GOES OVER GMN VOR, COREZ INTXN AND THEN AVENAL VOR. AS WE DEPARTED GMN VOR (ABOUT 30 NM NW OF GMN) THE CTLR ASKED US IF WE WERE ON THE SID. WE REPLIED 'AFFIRMATIVE.' THE CTLR FURTHER QUERIED 'WHAT IS YOUR HDG?' WE REPLIED '295 DEG HDG.' THE CTLR SAID 'ROGER, TURN R HDG 310 DEGS AND EXPEDITE YOUR TURN.' WE PROMPTLY COMPLIED. WE OBSERVED ANOTHER ACFT ON TCASII BUT AT NO TIME DID ANY CONFLICT EXIST. IN FACT, WE WERE NEVER ISSUED AN ALERT BY THE TCASII OR BY THE CTLR. THE CTLR THEN CLRED US DIRECT TO BSR AND THE FLT CONTINUED WITHOUT INCIDENT. THE CTLR MENTIONED, PRIOR TO THE HDOF, THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO NAV THE SID BECAUSE IT KEEPS DEPS AWAY FROM THE INBOUNDS. AFTER WE LEVELED OFF, THE PNF AND I FIGURED OUT WHAT HAPPENED. WHEN HE PROGRAMMED THE FMS'S HE ACCIDENTALLY OMITTED THE FIX CALLED COREZ. THIS CAUSED THE NAV ERROR AND THE ACFT TO BE IN THE WRONG PLACE. I HAVE SINCE ISSUED A MEMO SUGGESTING THAT ALL PLTS PROGRAMMING THE FMS'S XCHK EACH FIX AGAINST THE CLRNC AS WELL AS AGAINST EACH FMS. ALSO, BOTH PLTS MUST BE PRESENT WHEN THE FMS'S ARE LOADED OR AT LEAST CONFIRM EACH FIX ENTERED INTO EACH FMS. IN THE CURRENT ENVIRONMENT OF AUTOMATION, I THINK MISTAKES LIKE THIS ARE MORE LIKELY TO HAPPEN. I HOPE BY REVEALING SUCH INCIDENTS TO NASA, FURTHER OCCURRENCES CAN AND WILL BE PREVENTED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.