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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 421973 |
Time | |
Date | 199811 |
Day | Wed |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : mco |
State Reference | FL |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | MD-80 Super 80 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | landing other other |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight attendant : on duty |
Qualification | other other : other |
ASRS Report | 421973 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : critical non adherence : far other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | aircraft equipment other aircraft equipment : unspecified other flight crewa other other : unspecified |
Resolutory Action | none taken : unable other |
Consequence | Other |
Narrative:
This was a flight from bos to mco back to bos with the cockpit crew changing in mco. The captain from the first segment informed the next captain and me that there was a problem with the landing gear that he thought maintenance should check out. The captain for the second segment opted to not have it checked stating that it was a minor maintenance problem that could wait. Shortly after takeoff, I noticed that we were not climbing and the landing gear had been recycled 4 or 5 times. I was called to the cockpit and the captain informed me that the nosegear was not retracting, but they also weren't sure if it was locked in the down position. He said we had about 15 mins and we were going to fly by the tower to make sure the gear was down before we tried to land. He said the aircraft was overweight so the landing may be hard and there was a possibility of fire from the tires and brakes. He said that if we needed to evacuate/evacuation he would say easy victor 3 times and state which exits we could not use. I then asked if we should start on our planned emergency checklist and he said 'no, I don't want to panic the passenger.' I then briefed the other flight attendants, we secured the cabin and took our seats. We landed without any further problems. Human performance: I felt that the captain should not have decided to have us not follow our planned emergency checklist. I believe it's better to have informed, prepared passenger. I also felt that a PA should have been made much sooner than it was to inform passenger of the problem as some people were becoming upset. Also, in the captain's last PA after landing, he made a joke saying, 'well folks, I bet we gave you a better ride than you had at disney world!' I felt this was very inappropriate and inconsiderate as many passenger were frightened.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: FLT ATTENDANT RPT REGARDING AN S80 WITH NOSE GEAR PROBS WRITTEN UP, BUT CAPT CHOSE NOT TO HAVE MAINT CHK PRIOR TO DEP. NOSE GEAR WOULD NOT RETRACT AND ACFT RETURNED WITH OVERWT LNDG.
Narrative: THIS WAS A FLT FROM BOS TO MCO BACK TO BOS WITH THE COCKPIT CREW CHANGING IN MCO. THE CAPT FROM THE FIRST SEGMENT INFORMED THE NEXT CAPT AND ME THAT THERE WAS A PROB WITH THE LNDG GEAR THAT HE THOUGHT MAINT SHOULD CHK OUT. THE CAPT FOR THE SECOND SEGMENT OPTED TO NOT HAVE IT CHKED STATING THAT IT WAS A MINOR MAINT PROB THAT COULD WAIT. SHORTLY AFTER TKOF, I NOTICED THAT WE WERE NOT CLBING AND THE LNDG GEAR HAD BEEN RECYCLED 4 OR 5 TIMES. I WAS CALLED TO THE COCKPIT AND THE CAPT INFORMED ME THAT THE NOSEGEAR WAS NOT RETRACTING, BUT THEY ALSO WEREN'T SURE IF IT WAS LOCKED IN THE DOWN POS. HE SAID WE HAD ABOUT 15 MINS AND WE WERE GOING TO FLY BY THE TWR TO MAKE SURE THE GEAR WAS DOWN BEFORE WE TRIED TO LAND. HE SAID THE ACFT WAS OVERWT SO THE LNDG MAY BE HARD AND THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY OF FIRE FROM THE TIRES AND BRAKES. HE SAID THAT IF WE NEEDED TO EVAC HE WOULD SAY EASY VICTOR 3 TIMES AND STATE WHICH EXITS WE COULD NOT USE. I THEN ASKED IF WE SHOULD START ON OUR PLANNED EMER CHKLIST AND HE SAID 'NO, I DON'T WANT TO PANIC THE PAX.' I THEN BRIEFED THE OTHER FLT ATTENDANTS, WE SECURED THE CABIN AND TOOK OUR SEATS. WE LANDED WITHOUT ANY FURTHER PROBS. HUMAN PERFORMANCE: I FELT THAT THE CAPT SHOULD NOT HAVE DECIDED TO HAVE US NOT FOLLOW OUR PLANNED EMER CHKLIST. I BELIEVE IT'S BETTER TO HAVE INFORMED, PREPARED PAX. I ALSO FELT THAT A PA SHOULD HAVE BEEN MADE MUCH SOONER THAN IT WAS TO INFORM PAX OF THE PROB AS SOME PEOPLE WERE BECOMING UPSET. ALSO, IN THE CAPT'S LAST PA AFTER LNDG, HE MADE A JOKE SAYING, 'WELL FOLKS, I BET WE GAVE YOU A BETTER RIDE THAN YOU HAD AT DISNEY WORLD!' I FELT THIS WAS VERY INAPPROPRIATE AND INCONSIDERATE AS MANY PAX WERE FRIGHTENED.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.