Narrative:

Aircraft X, C377, was proceeding southwest along V1 in the ZDC ewn (25) sector VFR at 4500 ft. This aircraft was handed off to gsb approach and communication xferred at about 15 mi northeast of iso VOR, about 3 or 4 mi from gsb approach airspace. Gsb initiated a handoff to me on aircraft Y, PA32 IFR landing pgv. Handoff is accepted when aircraft Y is out of approximately 7000 ft for 3000 ft (15 mi south of pgv airport). Aircraft came up on my frequency (at this time the C377 was at aircraft Y's 12 O'clock and 4 mi head on!). Aircraft Y checked in out of about 5000 ft descending to 3000 ft. My first transmission was 'had gsb called the traffic at 12 O'clock and 4 mi to him.' he replied 'about 15 mi ago' and asked if he should turn. I turned the aircraft 110 degrees left and continued to call traffic, descending the aircraft to 2200 ft. Aircraft Y never saw the C377 traffic so I turned him another 20 degrees left to ensure the targets wouldn't merge (figuring the cessna pilot may initiate an evasive maneuver). The targets missed by approximately 1/4 mi -- it was close. Out of around 3600-3700 ft, aircraft Y was advised 'previous traffic no factor' and vectored for pgv. Gsb approach had radar and communications on both of these aircraft in their airspace. They were head-on with one descending through the other, with targets that were going to merge. Gsb should have made more than 1 traffic call to the IFR, not just advise once and forget about it. Merging target procedures should've been followed by gsb. A small bit of common sense would've also helped in this instance -- perhaps stopping aircraft Y at 6000 ft until he had the traffic, another traffic call -- anything! Separate known traffic! This could have very easily been a mac.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZDC RADAR CTLR HANDED OFF VFR C337 TO GSB APCH. A SHORT TIME LATER GSB MADE A HDOF TO DC9 ON AN IFR PA32 DSNDING INTO THE C337 RESULTING IN AN NMAC.

Narrative: ACFT X, C377, WAS PROCEEDING SW ALONG V1 IN THE ZDC EWN (25) SECTOR VFR AT 4500 FT. THIS ACFT WAS HANDED OFF TO GSB APCH AND COM XFERRED AT ABOUT 15 MI NE OF ISO VOR, ABOUT 3 OR 4 MI FROM GSB APCH AIRSPACE. GSB INITIATED A HDOF TO ME ON ACFT Y, PA32 IFR LNDG PGV. HDOF IS ACCEPTED WHEN ACFT Y IS OUT OF APPROX 7000 FT FOR 3000 FT (15 MI S OF PGV ARPT). ACFT CAME UP ON MY FREQ (AT THIS TIME THE C377 WAS AT ACFT Y'S 12 O'CLOCK AND 4 MI HEAD ON!). ACFT Y CHKED IN OUT OF ABOUT 5000 FT DSNDING TO 3000 FT. MY FIRST XMISSION WAS 'HAD GSB CALLED THE TFC AT 12 O'CLOCK AND 4 MI TO HIM.' HE REPLIED 'ABOUT 15 MI AGO' AND ASKED IF HE SHOULD TURN. I TURNED THE ACFT 110 DEGS L AND CONTINUED TO CALL TFC, DSNDING THE ACFT TO 2200 FT. ACFT Y NEVER SAW THE C377 TFC SO I TURNED HIM ANOTHER 20 DEGS L TO ENSURE THE TARGETS WOULDN'T MERGE (FIGURING THE CESSNA PLT MAY INITIATE AN EVASIVE MANEUVER). THE TARGETS MISSED BY APPROX 1/4 MI -- IT WAS CLOSE. OUT OF AROUND 3600-3700 FT, ACFT Y WAS ADVISED 'PREVIOUS TFC NO FACTOR' AND VECTORED FOR PGV. GSB APCH HAD RADAR AND COMS ON BOTH OF THESE ACFT IN THEIR AIRSPACE. THEY WERE HEAD-ON WITH ONE DSNDING THROUGH THE OTHER, WITH TARGETS THAT WERE GOING TO MERGE. GSB SHOULD HAVE MADE MORE THAN 1 TFC CALL TO THE IFR, NOT JUST ADVISE ONCE AND FORGET ABOUT IT. MERGING TARGET PROCS SHOULD'VE BEEN FOLLOWED BY GSB. A SMALL BIT OF COMMON SENSE WOULD'VE ALSO HELPED IN THIS INSTANCE -- PERHAPS STOPPING ACFT Y AT 6000 FT UNTIL HE HAD THE TFC, ANOTHER TFC CALL -- ANYTHING! SEPARATE KNOWN TFC! THIS COULD HAVE VERY EASILY BEEN A MAC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.