Narrative:

We departed runway 8R at ont on the pom 6 departure, cleared to 16000 ft. Approaching the pom VOR, socal departure said, 'climb, maintain 16000 ft and comply with restrs.' prior to this, at the gate, I briefed the departure including the 2 crossing restrs and entered them into the FMS. I, however, entered our initial clearance altitude into the fcp in error (16000 ft, I believe). So, when the controller called, we were approaching 8000 ft, but unfortunately we did not catch the gist of the message and with the fcp incorrectly set as a result of an erroneous assumption and also inattn, we climbed through 8000 ft. The controller advised us of our transgression at approximately 9000 ft while we were still climbing. He then cleared us higher and did not indicate whether we had caused a traffic conflict. Factors: 1) I did brief the departure, but did not wait for the captain to find the chart before I began so he could back me up. 2) I relied too heavily on automation, ie, I entered the crossing restrs into the FMS and assumed this would take care of itself, and meet the restrs. This was a bad assumption as this aircraft will comply with crossing restrs on a descent, but not on a climb -- even with a lower or higher altitude (respectively) entered in the fcp. On a climb, an 'at or below' crossing restr must be entered on the fcp until crossing the fix, as the aircraft will not honor the FMS restr. On descent, however, the aircraft will honor an FMS restr -- even with a lower clearance altitude entered in the fcp. Why the difference, I don't know. I did learn this in ground school, but on the line a climb crossing restr is much less common and the habit xferred. 3) when we originally briefed, we were expecting a runway 26L departure. I believe I then discounted the 8000 ft restr as not a factor because of the short distance to the VOR. Changing runways at the last min changed this, but complacency was already in place. 4) no excuses on why the restrs weren't in the front of the brain, anyway. Other possible factors and thoughts: 1) both crew members not in the best frame of mind due to discussing a marginal contract settlement with the company. 2) since we are a cargo aircraft, the FAA and company have not seen fit to require TCASII on these airplanes. Might have saved the day in a conflict.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN A310C FLC CLBS ABOVE THE ASSIGNED RESTR ALT ON THE POM 6 DEP PROC. FO ADMITS TO SETTING THE FCP ALT TO AN ALT THAT EXCEEDED THE FIRST ALT RESTR ON THE SID.

Narrative: WE DEPARTED RWY 8R AT ONT ON THE POM 6 DEP, CLRED TO 16000 FT. APCHING THE POM VOR, SOCAL DEP SAID, 'CLB, MAINTAIN 16000 FT AND COMPLY WITH RESTRS.' PRIOR TO THIS, AT THE GATE, I BRIEFED THE DEP INCLUDING THE 2 XING RESTRS AND ENTERED THEM INTO THE FMS. I, HOWEVER, ENTERED OUR INITIAL CLRNC ALT INTO THE FCP IN ERROR (16000 FT, I BELIEVE). SO, WHEN THE CTLR CALLED, WE WERE APCHING 8000 FT, BUT UNFORTUNATELY WE DID NOT CATCH THE GIST OF THE MESSAGE AND WITH THE FCP INCORRECTLY SET AS A RESULT OF AN ERRONEOUS ASSUMPTION AND ALSO INATTN, WE CLBED THROUGH 8000 FT. THE CTLR ADVISED US OF OUR TRANSGRESSION AT APPROX 9000 FT WHILE WE WERE STILL CLBING. HE THEN CLRED US HIGHER AND DID NOT INDICATE WHETHER WE HAD CAUSED A TFC CONFLICT. FACTORS: 1) I DID BRIEF THE DEP, BUT DID NOT WAIT FOR THE CAPT TO FIND THE CHART BEFORE I BEGAN SO HE COULD BACK ME UP. 2) I RELIED TOO HEAVILY ON AUTOMATION, IE, I ENTERED THE XING RESTRS INTO THE FMS AND ASSUMED THIS WOULD TAKE CARE OF ITSELF, AND MEET THE RESTRS. THIS WAS A BAD ASSUMPTION AS THIS ACFT WILL COMPLY WITH XING RESTRS ON A DSCNT, BUT NOT ON A CLB -- EVEN WITH A LOWER OR HIGHER ALT (RESPECTIVELY) ENTERED IN THE FCP. ON A CLB, AN 'AT OR BELOW' XING RESTR MUST BE ENTERED ON THE FCP UNTIL XING THE FIX, AS THE ACFT WILL NOT HONOR THE FMS RESTR. ON DSCNT, HOWEVER, THE ACFT WILL HONOR AN FMS RESTR -- EVEN WITH A LOWER CLRNC ALT ENTERED IN THE FCP. WHY THE DIFFERENCE, I DON'T KNOW. I DID LEARN THIS IN GND SCHOOL, BUT ON THE LINE A CLB XING RESTR IS MUCH LESS COMMON AND THE HABIT XFERRED. 3) WHEN WE ORIGINALLY BRIEFED, WE WERE EXPECTING A RWY 26L DEP. I BELIEVE I THEN DISCOUNTED THE 8000 FT RESTR AS NOT A FACTOR BECAUSE OF THE SHORT DISTANCE TO THE VOR. CHANGING RWYS AT THE LAST MIN CHANGED THIS, BUT COMPLACENCY WAS ALREADY IN PLACE. 4) NO EXCUSES ON WHY THE RESTRS WEREN'T IN THE FRONT OF THE BRAIN, ANYWAY. OTHER POSSIBLE FACTORS AND THOUGHTS: 1) BOTH CREW MEMBERS NOT IN THE BEST FRAME OF MIND DUE TO DISCUSSING A MARGINAL CONTRACT SETTLEMENT WITH THE COMPANY. 2) SINCE WE ARE A CARGO ACFT, THE FAA AND COMPANY HAVE NOT SEEN FIT TO REQUIRE TCASII ON THESE AIRPLANES. MIGHT HAVE SAVED THE DAY IN A CONFLICT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.