Narrative:

On camrn 3 arrival into jfk we were given 'cross hoggs at FL190' (as expected on the STAR). The captain (PF) immediately started the descent (we were at FL330 about 20 mi from sie). A classic chain of events caused us to cross the restr almost 2000 ft high. At top of descent, I thought to myself 'this is a classic situation for a deviation,' but I did not have the discipline to tell everyone else in the cockpit that I thought so. If I had, the event might not have occurred. The chain of events: 1) I was brought in mid trip (late in day 3 of 4 day trip, so I was kind of an outsider). 2) captain was a line check airman who set the tone of 'let's all be real laid back.' this inhibited me from doing my usual thing of trying to do everything by the book. Flight engineer was 'line check flight engineer' and because of this, I thought he was 'looking after' us more than the usual engineer -- thus increasing my complacency. 3) captain was flying and at the same time playing with his new GPS. (You see, he did not want to get into any trouble learning that stuff while flying his private planes.) so he was using a navigation source for the crossing restr that I did not have. This was distracting him markedly -- as it had for the first part of the day -- and the rest! (Yes, that's right, he kept using it!) 4) he was chit-chatting with a flight attendant who was sitting on the jump seat. Thus, further distracting the crew. 5) I was eating a sandwich the flight attendant brought to us, and I was very hungry having not had the time to eat yet (it's now after lunchtime) thus distracting me even more. 6) at about 30 mi to the fix with about 5000 ft to go, I decided that everything was ok and went back to eating, but the captain was descending at almost 350 KIAS and I had not fully realized our tailwind. (After the fact I calculated it at 96 KTS.) so our ground speed (about 600 KTS) was in fact far too high for our rate of descent. (I usually descend at 300 KIAS as do most pilots as it is the company descent speed.) at the fix ATC asked us what our altitude was. The captain jumped on the radio and replied 'FL210 and descending.' he then proceeded to push the nose over and at some 30 KTS above barber pole, continued to talk to ATC (with the overspeed klacker going). I finally had enough! I put my sandwich in the trash and told him to pull the spoilers, slow down and put the GPS in his bag. He said we didn't need to! But he finally did. We almost missed our second crossing restr, but made it. To sum it up: distrs, distrs, then denial, then, finally, actions. Factors: assuming check airmen are somehow more competent. Lack of CRM by entire crew. Differences in cockpit philosophy allowing me to lower my adherence to company procedures. Lack of awareness of ground speed (even with GPS!). In retrospect (and perhaps of no real consequence), ATC had been having problems all day because of the tailwind. Things to do: 1) stick to company procedures -- even if the other pilots seem to snicker. 2) verbalize any observations that might change the outcome of the flight, ie, 'this sure looks like a perfect setup for an altitude deviation.' 3) never assume anybody's ability until you know first hand. 4) if lack of cockpit professionalism bothers you, you must speak up! (Reading, too much chit-chat, using a GPS, lack of proper briefings, etc). Sorry for the long report, but the whole thing was ridiculous and would have made a great training film on how not to run a cockpit! Yes, I guess it can happen to me. Supplemental information from acn 425315: clearance to cross hoggs at FL190 from ZNY. Due to tailwinds and a late descent, crew crossed at FL210. No conflicts on TCASII or by ATC. The B727 does not have ground speed indications and the excessive tailwind was not idented.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B727 FO RPT ON WHY HIS DSNDING B727 FAILS TO MAKE THE FL190 ALT XING RESTR AT HOGGS ON THE CAMRN 3 ARR INTO JFK.

Narrative: ON CAMRN 3 ARR INTO JFK WE WERE GIVEN 'CROSS HOGGS AT FL190' (AS EXPECTED ON THE STAR). THE CAPT (PF) IMMEDIATELY STARTED THE DSCNT (WE WERE AT FL330 ABOUT 20 MI FROM SIE). A CLASSIC CHAIN OF EVENTS CAUSED US TO CROSS THE RESTR ALMOST 2000 FT HIGH. AT TOP OF DSCNT, I THOUGHT TO MYSELF 'THIS IS A CLASSIC SIT FOR A DEV,' BUT I DID NOT HAVE THE DISCIPLINE TO TELL EVERYONE ELSE IN THE COCKPIT THAT I THOUGHT SO. IF I HAD, THE EVENT MIGHT NOT HAVE OCCURRED. THE CHAIN OF EVENTS: 1) I WAS BROUGHT IN MID TRIP (LATE IN DAY 3 OF 4 DAY TRIP, SO I WAS KIND OF AN OUTSIDER). 2) CAPT WAS A LINE CHK AIRMAN WHO SET THE TONE OF 'LET'S ALL BE REAL LAID BACK.' THIS INHIBITED ME FROM DOING MY USUAL THING OF TRYING TO DO EVERYTHING BY THE BOOK. FE WAS 'LINE CHK FE' AND BECAUSE OF THIS, I THOUGHT HE WAS 'LOOKING AFTER' US MORE THAN THE USUAL ENGINEER -- THUS INCREASING MY COMPLACENCY. 3) CAPT WAS FLYING AND AT THE SAME TIME PLAYING WITH HIS NEW GPS. (YOU SEE, HE DID NOT WANT TO GET INTO ANY TROUBLE LEARNING THAT STUFF WHILE FLYING HIS PVT PLANES.) SO HE WAS USING A NAV SOURCE FOR THE XING RESTR THAT I DID NOT HAVE. THIS WAS DISTRACTING HIM MARKEDLY -- AS IT HAD FOR THE FIRST PART OF THE DAY -- AND THE REST! (YES, THAT'S RIGHT, HE KEPT USING IT!) 4) HE WAS CHIT-CHATTING WITH A FLT ATTENDANT WHO WAS SITTING ON THE JUMP SEAT. THUS, FURTHER DISTRACTING THE CREW. 5) I WAS EATING A SANDWICH THE FLT ATTENDANT BROUGHT TO US, AND I WAS VERY HUNGRY HAVING NOT HAD THE TIME TO EAT YET (IT'S NOW AFTER LUNCHTIME) THUS DISTRACTING ME EVEN MORE. 6) AT ABOUT 30 MI TO THE FIX WITH ABOUT 5000 FT TO GO, I DECIDED THAT EVERYTHING WAS OK AND WENT BACK TO EATING, BUT THE CAPT WAS DSNDING AT ALMOST 350 KIAS AND I HAD NOT FULLY REALIZED OUR TAILWIND. (AFTER THE FACT I CALCULATED IT AT 96 KTS.) SO OUR GND SPD (ABOUT 600 KTS) WAS IN FACT FAR TOO HIGH FOR OUR RATE OF DSCNT. (I USUALLY DSND AT 300 KIAS AS DO MOST PLTS AS IT IS THE COMPANY DSCNT SPD.) AT THE FIX ATC ASKED US WHAT OUR ALT WAS. THE CAPT JUMPED ON THE RADIO AND REPLIED 'FL210 AND DSNDING.' HE THEN PROCEEDED TO PUSH THE NOSE OVER AND AT SOME 30 KTS ABOVE BARBER POLE, CONTINUED TO TALK TO ATC (WITH THE OVERSPEED KLACKER GOING). I FINALLY HAD ENOUGH! I PUT MY SANDWICH IN THE TRASH AND TOLD HIM TO PULL THE SPOILERS, SLOW DOWN AND PUT THE GPS IN HIS BAG. HE SAID WE DIDN'T NEED TO! BUT HE FINALLY DID. WE ALMOST MISSED OUR SECOND XING RESTR, BUT MADE IT. TO SUM IT UP: DISTRS, DISTRS, THEN DENIAL, THEN, FINALLY, ACTIONS. FACTORS: ASSUMING CHK AIRMEN ARE SOMEHOW MORE COMPETENT. LACK OF CRM BY ENTIRE CREW. DIFFERENCES IN COCKPIT PHILOSOPHY ALLOWING ME TO LOWER MY ADHERENCE TO COMPANY PROCS. LACK OF AWARENESS OF GND SPD (EVEN WITH GPS!). IN RETROSPECT (AND PERHAPS OF NO REAL CONSEQUENCE), ATC HAD BEEN HAVING PROBS ALL DAY BECAUSE OF THE TAILWIND. THINGS TO DO: 1) STICK TO COMPANY PROCS -- EVEN IF THE OTHER PLTS SEEM TO SNICKER. 2) VERBALIZE ANY OBSERVATIONS THAT MIGHT CHANGE THE OUTCOME OF THE FLT, IE, 'THIS SURE LOOKS LIKE A PERFECT SETUP FOR AN ALTDEV.' 3) NEVER ASSUME ANYBODY'S ABILITY UNTIL YOU KNOW FIRST HAND. 4) IF LACK OF COCKPIT PROFESSIONALISM BOTHERS YOU, YOU MUST SPEAK UP! (READING, TOO MUCH CHIT-CHAT, USING A GPS, LACK OF PROPER BRIEFINGS, ETC). SORRY FOR THE LONG RPT, BUT THE WHOLE THING WAS RIDICULOUS AND WOULD HAVE MADE A GREAT TRAINING FILM ON HOW NOT TO RUN A COCKPIT! YES, I GUESS IT CAN HAPPEN TO ME. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 425315: CLRNC TO CROSS HOGGS AT FL190 FROM ZNY. DUE TO TAILWINDS AND A LATE DSCNT, CREW CROSSED AT FL210. NO CONFLICTS ON TCASII OR BY ATC. THE B727 DOES NOT HAVE GND SPD INDICATIONS AND THE EXCESSIVE TAILWIND WAS NOT IDENTED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.