Narrative:

The aircraft we had for this flight had 2 MEL's: an inoperative fuel gauge, and an inoperative APU. At the time we pushed from the gate (approximately XA00) dfw was in the midst of a departure rush. Since we had to do a xbleed start, we did not do the after start check immediately upon taxiing (per company policy) since we still had an engine to start. We got clearance to taxi and requested a spot to do the xbleed start. We stopped on the parallel taxiway G, adjacent to the terminal, as instructed and completed the start. As we were finishing, ground control was giving instructions to aircraft taxiing to runway 18L mentioning us in reference. Aircraft were taxiing south on taxiway G (we were facing north on taxiway G) en route to taxiway wj to turn and line up northbound on taxiway F for runway 18L. We heard this, completed the after start check, and told ground we were ready to taxi. We were given instructions to hold short of taxiway wj, give way to opposite direction traffic, then proceed north to taxiway Z to taxiway hy to taxiway Y across the bridge to taxiway J to taxiway ef for takeoff on runway 17R, follow an air carrier aircraft. With all the above, taxiing to a new and unfamiliar runway (for this crew) in the dark, we didn't complete the before takeoff check. As we were cleared for takeoff and applied power, the takeoff warning horn sounded and immediately realized that the flaps had not been extended for takeoff. Our speed at this point was less than taxi speed and we notified tower, cleared the runway at taxiway eh (at the end of runway 17R). We completed the before takeoff check and made a normal takeoff and departure. There were many distrs leading up to this incident which should have been warning signals. There was a time pressure element, we were running late and knew we had an airplane change in a short ground time in denver before our next flight. The APU and the necessity for the xbleed start precluded the normal flow of calling for flaps and the before takeoff check as we taxi from the gate. This is not that uncommon though, and it should have happened in the same sequence when we called for taxi after the start. In that case, I was distraction by calling for taxi, so ground control knew we were ready to move. Immediately after that call we were given a complicated taxi route with hold short and follow instructions and we were concentrating on finding the txwys in the dark. Taking a few seconds to call for and position the flaps before calling for taxi would have saved more time than the way things worked out. Apparently all this activity made me feel that we had done the before takeoff check so when we were at the end of the runway we were ready to go. I was quite disturbed by this incident and unpleasantly surprised by how easily I could be distraction and neglect a critical element of flight. I have added a personal verbalized check of takeoff confign when I now take the runway for takeoff.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 CREW ABORTED TKOF AFTER RECEIVING THE TKOF WARNING HORN DUE TO FLAP CONFIGN.

Narrative: THE ACFT WE HAD FOR THIS FLT HAD 2 MEL'S: AN INOP FUEL GAUGE, AND AN INOP APU. AT THE TIME WE PUSHED FROM THE GATE (APPROX XA00) DFW WAS IN THE MIDST OF A DEP RUSH. SINCE WE HAD TO DO A XBLEED START, WE DID NOT DO THE AFTER START CHK IMMEDIATELY UPON TAXIING (PER COMPANY POLICY) SINCE WE STILL HAD AN ENG TO START. WE GOT CLRNC TO TAXI AND REQUESTED A SPOT TO DO THE XBLEED START. WE STOPPED ON THE PARALLEL TXWY G, ADJACENT TO THE TERMINAL, AS INSTRUCTED AND COMPLETED THE START. AS WE WERE FINISHING, GND CTL WAS GIVING INSTRUCTIONS TO ACFT TAXIING TO RWY 18L MENTIONING US IN REF. ACFT WERE TAXIING S ON TXWY G (WE WERE FACING N ON TXWY G) ENRTE TO TXWY WJ TO TURN AND LINE UP NBOUND ON TXWY F FOR RWY 18L. WE HEARD THIS, COMPLETED THE AFTER START CHK, AND TOLD GND WE WERE READY TO TAXI. WE WERE GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS TO HOLD SHORT OF TXWY WJ, GIVE WAY TO OPPOSITE DIRECTION TFC, THEN PROCEED N TO TXWY Z TO TXWY HY TO TXWY Y ACROSS THE BRIDGE TO TXWY J TO TXWY EF FOR TKOF ON RWY 17R, FOLLOW AN ACR ACFT. WITH ALL THE ABOVE, TAXIING TO A NEW AND UNFAMILIAR RWY (FOR THIS CREW) IN THE DARK, WE DIDN'T COMPLETE THE BEFORE TKOF CHK. AS WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF AND APPLIED PWR, THE TKOF WARNING HORN SOUNDED AND IMMEDIATELY REALIZED THAT THE FLAPS HAD NOT BEEN EXTENDED FOR TKOF. OUR SPD AT THIS POINT WAS LESS THAN TAXI SPD AND WE NOTIFIED TWR, CLRED THE RWY AT TXWY EH (AT THE END OF RWY 17R). WE COMPLETED THE BEFORE TKOF CHK AND MADE A NORMAL TKOF AND DEP. THERE WERE MANY DISTRS LEADING UP TO THIS INCIDENT WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN WARNING SIGNALS. THERE WAS A TIME PRESSURE ELEMENT, WE WERE RUNNING LATE AND KNEW WE HAD AN AIRPLANE CHANGE IN A SHORT GND TIME IN DENVER BEFORE OUR NEXT FLT. THE APU AND THE NECESSITY FOR THE XBLEED START PRECLUDED THE NORMAL FLOW OF CALLING FOR FLAPS AND THE BEFORE TKOF CHK AS WE TAXI FROM THE GATE. THIS IS NOT THAT UNCOMMON THOUGH, AND IT SHOULD HAVE HAPPENED IN THE SAME SEQUENCE WHEN WE CALLED FOR TAXI AFTER THE START. IN THAT CASE, I WAS DISTR BY CALLING FOR TAXI, SO GND CTL KNEW WE WERE READY TO MOVE. IMMEDIATELY AFTER THAT CALL WE WERE GIVEN A COMPLICATED TAXI RTE WITH HOLD SHORT AND FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS AND WE WERE CONCENTRATING ON FINDING THE TXWYS IN THE DARK. TAKING A FEW SECONDS TO CALL FOR AND POS THE FLAPS BEFORE CALLING FOR TAXI WOULD HAVE SAVED MORE TIME THAN THE WAY THINGS WORKED OUT. APPARENTLY ALL THIS ACTIVITY MADE ME FEEL THAT WE HAD DONE THE BEFORE TKOF CHK SO WHEN WE WERE AT THE END OF THE RWY WE WERE READY TO GO. I WAS QUITE DISTURBED BY THIS INCIDENT AND UNPLEASANTLY SURPRISED BY HOW EASILY I COULD BE DISTR AND NEGLECT A CRITICAL ELEMENT OF FLT. I HAVE ADDED A PERSONAL VERBALIZED CHK OF TKOF CONFIGN WHEN I NOW TAKE THE RWY FOR TKOF.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.