Narrative:

Following pushback, phx ground control taxi clearance was to runway 8R via taxiway D and transition to taxiway east after passing the terminal. Immediately as taxi began, clearance was amended to transition to taxiway east 'now!' assuming that the taxiway E6 stub was a transition to taxiway east, we turned onto it and the captain immediately recognized we were approaching the active runway 8R and stopped the aircraft well short of the runway, however, with the nose over the hold short line. This problem, as always, was a combination of poor or no taxiway markings in the area as taxiway D and taxiway east are one continuous slab on concrete in this area. In addition, my attention was momentarily diverted by checklists and closeout information. Also, interestingly enough, the clearance being amended as we were approaching the taxiway E6 stub was also a contributing factor as, had we previously passed this stub, our attention may have been drawn back to the airport diagram, which, by the way, is also poorly marked. Lesson learned: be certain both crew members fully understand and agree on the clearance prior to executing. I'm also of the opinion that the aircraft could have been stopped well short of the line had the captain applied the brakes more abruptly. However, did not due to possible consideration for cabin crew safety.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A TAXIING B757-200 PERFORMS A RWY INCURSION AT TXWY E6 AT PHX, AZ.

Narrative: FOLLOWING PUSHBACK, PHX GND CTL TAXI CLRNC WAS TO RWY 8R VIA TXWY D AND TRANSITION TO TXWY E AFTER PASSING THE TERMINAL. IMMEDIATELY AS TAXI BEGAN, CLRNC WAS AMENDED TO TRANSITION TO TXWY E 'NOW!' ASSUMING THAT THE TXWY E6 STUB WAS A TRANSITION TO TXWY E, WE TURNED ONTO IT AND THE CAPT IMMEDIATELY RECOGNIZED WE WERE APCHING THE ACTIVE RWY 8R AND STOPPED THE ACFT WELL SHORT OF THE RWY, HOWEVER, WITH THE NOSE OVER THE HOLD SHORT LINE. THIS PROB, AS ALWAYS, WAS A COMBINATION OF POOR OR NO TXWY MARKINGS IN THE AREA AS TXWY D AND TXWY E ARE ONE CONTINUOUS SLAB ON CONCRETE IN THIS AREA. IN ADDITION, MY ATTN WAS MOMENTARILY DIVERTED BY CHKLISTS AND CLOSEOUT INFO. ALSO, INTERESTINGLY ENOUGH, THE CLRNC BEING AMENDED AS WE WERE APCHING THE TXWY E6 STUB WAS ALSO A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR AS, HAD WE PREVIOUSLY PASSED THIS STUB, OUR ATTN MAY HAVE BEEN DRAWN BACK TO THE ARPT DIAGRAM, WHICH, BY THE WAY, IS ALSO POORLY MARKED. LESSON LEARNED: BE CERTAIN BOTH CREW MEMBERS FULLY UNDERSTAND AND AGREE ON THE CLRNC PRIOR TO EXECUTING. I'M ALSO OF THE OPINION THAT THE ACFT COULD HAVE BEEN STOPPED WELL SHORT OF THE LINE HAD THE CAPT APPLIED THE BRAKES MORE ABRUPTLY. HOWEVER, DID NOT DUE TO POSSIBLE CONSIDERATION FOR CABIN CREW SAFETY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.