Narrative:

Flight took off from slc approximately XA30 jan/xa/99. We taxied through ice, snow and water. We took off and entered IMC about 1200 ft AGL. We climbed to 2400 ft into VMC. We then started the ILS into runway 25 at twf. At final approach in VMC about 5900 ft, I called for gear down, before landing checks. At that time all red light appeared and no gear down indications (included no gear door opening noise). New hire jump seat pulled out QRH and read gear procedures for us. Captain then recycled gear 3-6 times. The gear then came down and locked. Captain then advised flight attendant that the gear came down and locked and we would return for landing. Captain had advised ATC we were in VMC and broke off the approach and would track localizer to airport. Tower advised us to stay at 6000-8000 ft in VMC, and I did just that. After that, the tower asked us how many souls and fuel on board. Captain answered. After the gear was down, captain asked for the procedure turn and ILS approach again. We left the gear down. Did the approach and broke out 1000 ft AGL. We were surprised to see fire truck at runway. We landed uneventfully . I stayed on aircraft to observe fueling and noticed lots of ice on gear during walkaround. (Whether it was there from slc or during approach to twf is unknown.) captain asked customer service to board inside and the passenger then came out. Captain returned and I inquired as to what maintenance control had said. He informed me that we were going to deice the wheel wells really well and also the aircraft and depart. We returned to slc and during an approach in IMC again the same gear indications happened, but it only took 2 times to recycle gear. We landed uneventfully. Captain wrote up aircraft and maintenance took aircraft. During gear swings, maintenance found no mechanical problems. I later found out that the captain had been put on hold and hung up from maintenance control while in twf. He had had the problem before many times (about 10) with ice and knew by his experience that is what they would have advised. I feel that 2 things would have prevented this from becoming even an issue. First, the captain should have talked to maintenance control so that the problem back in slc when it happened again could be shared with them instead of all the decision to depart twf being the captain's. And second, the captain should have advised the first officer and jump seat (rider) that he 'never talked to maintenance control at the time of the departure' instead of leading me to believe that he had, and that the deicing of the wheel wells was their idea and not his. Using CRM and being honest with me would have had myself suggest he get the mechanic's ok before departing. Although he had had the problem before and he was relying on his experience, it's always a good idea to have mechanical support in case it turned out to be mechanical problem and not ice. And informing the first officer the truth at twf would have prevented the whole issue resting on the captain's shoulder because I would have suggested he go, call again. Then if he made the choice to leave, then it would be all his choice, but may be with him letting the rest of the flight crew believe it was maintenance's choice. This could become a problem for him.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN EMB120 FO RPT ON A RECURRING GEAR EXTENSION PROB ASSOCIATED WITH SLUSH AND ICING PROBS. THE CAPT IN THIS INCIDENT DEPARTED TWF WITHOUT ENTERING THE GEAR PROB IN THE LOGBOOK BECAUSE OF AN ASSUMPTION OF ICE STICKING TO THE GEAR.

Narrative: FLT TOOK OFF FROM SLC APPROX XA30 JAN/XA/99. WE TAXIED THROUGH ICE, SNOW AND WATER. WE TOOK OFF AND ENTERED IMC ABOUT 1200 FT AGL. WE CLBED TO 2400 FT INTO VMC. WE THEN STARTED THE ILS INTO RWY 25 AT TWF. AT FINAL APCH IN VMC ABOUT 5900 FT, I CALLED FOR GEAR DOWN, BEFORE LNDG CHKS. AT THAT TIME ALL RED LIGHT APPEARED AND NO GEAR DOWN INDICATIONS (INCLUDED NO GEAR DOOR OPENING NOISE). NEW HIRE JUMP SEAT PULLED OUT QRH AND READ GEAR PROCS FOR US. CAPT THEN RECYCLED GEAR 3-6 TIMES. THE GEAR THEN CAME DOWN AND LOCKED. CAPT THEN ADVISED FLT ATTENDANT THAT THE GEAR CAME DOWN AND LOCKED AND WE WOULD RETURN FOR LNDG. CAPT HAD ADVISED ATC WE WERE IN VMC AND BROKE OFF THE APCH AND WOULD TRACK LOC TO ARPT. TWR ADVISED US TO STAY AT 6000-8000 FT IN VMC, AND I DID JUST THAT. AFTER THAT, THE TWR ASKED US HOW MANY SOULS AND FUEL ON BOARD. CAPT ANSWERED. AFTER THE GEAR WAS DOWN, CAPT ASKED FOR THE PROC TURN AND ILS APCH AGAIN. WE LEFT THE GEAR DOWN. DID THE APCH AND BROKE OUT 1000 FT AGL. WE WERE SURPRISED TO SEE FIRE TRUCK AT RWY. WE LANDED UNEVENTFULLY . I STAYED ON ACFT TO OBSERVE FUELING AND NOTICED LOTS OF ICE ON GEAR DURING WALKAROUND. (WHETHER IT WAS THERE FROM SLC OR DURING APCH TO TWF IS UNKNOWN.) CAPT ASKED CUSTOMER SVC TO BOARD INSIDE AND THE PAX THEN CAME OUT. CAPT RETURNED AND I INQUIRED AS TO WHAT MAINT CTL HAD SAID. HE INFORMED ME THAT WE WERE GOING TO DEICE THE WHEEL WELLS REALLY WELL AND ALSO THE ACFT AND DEPART. WE RETURNED TO SLC AND DURING AN APCH IN IMC AGAIN THE SAME GEAR INDICATIONS HAPPENED, BUT IT ONLY TOOK 2 TIMES TO RECYCLE GEAR. WE LANDED UNEVENTFULLY. CAPT WROTE UP ACFT AND MAINT TOOK ACFT. DURING GEAR SWINGS, MAINT FOUND NO MECHANICAL PROBS. I LATER FOUND OUT THAT THE CAPT HAD BEEN PUT ON HOLD AND HUNG UP FROM MAINT CTL WHILE IN TWF. HE HAD HAD THE PROB BEFORE MANY TIMES (ABOUT 10) WITH ICE AND KNEW BY HIS EXPERIENCE THAT IS WHAT THEY WOULD HAVE ADVISED. I FEEL THAT 2 THINGS WOULD HAVE PREVENTED THIS FROM BECOMING EVEN AN ISSUE. FIRST, THE CAPT SHOULD HAVE TALKED TO MAINT CTL SO THAT THE PROB BACK IN SLC WHEN IT HAPPENED AGAIN COULD BE SHARED WITH THEM INSTEAD OF ALL THE DECISION TO DEPART TWF BEING THE CAPT'S. AND SECOND, THE CAPT SHOULD HAVE ADVISED THE FO AND JUMP SEAT (RIDER) THAT HE 'NEVER TALKED TO MAINT CTL AT THE TIME OF THE DEP' INSTEAD OF LEADING ME TO BELIEVE THAT HE HAD, AND THAT THE DEICING OF THE WHEEL WELLS WAS THEIR IDEA AND NOT HIS. USING CRM AND BEING HONEST WITH ME WOULD HAVE HAD MYSELF SUGGEST HE GET THE MECH'S OK BEFORE DEPARTING. ALTHOUGH HE HAD HAD THE PROB BEFORE AND HE WAS RELYING ON HIS EXPERIENCE, IT'S ALWAYS A GOOD IDEA TO HAVE MECHANICAL SUPPORT IN CASE IT TURNED OUT TO BE MECHANICAL PROB AND NOT ICE. AND INFORMING THE FO THE TRUTH AT TWF WOULD HAVE PREVENTED THE WHOLE ISSUE RESTING ON THE CAPT'S SHOULDER BECAUSE I WOULD HAVE SUGGESTED HE GO, CALL AGAIN. THEN IF HE MADE THE CHOICE TO LEAVE, THEN IT WOULD BE ALL HIS CHOICE, BUT MAY BE WITH HIM LETTING THE REST OF THE FLC BELIEVE IT WAS MAINT'S CHOICE. THIS COULD BECOME A PROB FOR HIM.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.