Narrative:

Phl to mht with snow and light freezing rain. 3 MEL's on the aircraft and a lot of pressure to get flight out on time. The most deleterious MEL was that 1 power management computer was inoperative. This requires that both power management computers be 'off' for takeoff. If autothrottles are not armed the flight director command bars do not drop down into view when on takeoff roll requiring pilot to hit 'heading select' and level change after takeoff to get command bars. (On an 800 ft RVR takeoff, this should not have been allowed. In other words, on very low visibility takeoffs, autothrottle and flight directors should be fully operational, because that's how we've trained, and it's what we've come to depend on.) on approach into mht, the WX was 1200 ft RVR. RVR came up to, I believe, 2000 ft. It didn't cross my mind that mht was not a CAT ii runway. On my mind was the moderate ice we were in at 4000 ft and a 41 KT tailwind at altitude on the approach. After 1 turn in holding, the RVR came up and we decided to try an approach. The controller vectored up too far from the localizer for a turn on and we intercepted the GS inside the marker before we intercepted the localizer. We immediately announced a go around to the controller and he vectored us back out for another approach. During this extremely busy time in the cockpit, reports of the RVR continued to be broadcast. RVR would go down to 1200 ft then up to 2500 ft. The RVR was broadcast at 2500-3000 ft RVR on our runway. At minimums, the runway environment was in sight and we landed. My feeling is that the RVR was nowhere near 3000 ft RVR (maybe 1200 ft). Pilots are being pushed more and more to make scheduled departures with faulty equipment. Unfortunately, with our aircraft today, one system inoperative ties into several other system and renders them useless also. Also, pilots do not have the time to look into operations specifications, FARS, and airport diagrams that are barely readable with a -6 size font, to see if a particular runway is compatible with CAT ii or CAT III minimums. During extremely bad WX, I feel both ATIS and approach control or tower should tell aircraft what type of approachs are being made. Also on ATIS if CAT ii and CAT III approachs being made, then make it mandatory to announce that on the ATIS. Training the controller about approach minimums should also be done. While we were on approach and said we needed 1800 ft RVR, a commuter was asked if he needed that, and he responded no he could go lower. (How, I don't know, since the runway was only a CAT I runway and we couldn't even have accepted an approach if it had been 1800 ft RVR.) given the same situation again, not only would I not have flown that approach to a landing, I would never have accepted the aircraft for flight due to the MEL's on the power management computers and autothrottle.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF B737-300 MAKES APCH BELOW MINIMUMS AND LANDS SAFELY.

Narrative: PHL TO MHT WITH SNOW AND LIGHT FREEZING RAIN. 3 MEL'S ON THE ACFT AND A LOT OF PRESSURE TO GET FLT OUT ON TIME. THE MOST DELETERIOUS MEL WAS THAT 1 PWR MGMNT COMPUTER WAS INOP. THIS REQUIRES THAT BOTH PWR MGMNT COMPUTERS BE 'OFF' FOR TKOF. IF AUTOTHROTTLES ARE NOT ARMED THE FLT DIRECTOR COMMAND BARS DO NOT DROP DOWN INTO VIEW WHEN ON TKOF ROLL REQUIRING PLT TO HIT 'HDG SELECT' AND LEVEL CHANGE AFTER TKOF TO GET COMMAND BARS. (ON AN 800 FT RVR TKOF, THIS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED. IN OTHER WORDS, ON VERY LOW VISIBILITY TKOFS, AUTOTHROTTLE AND FLT DIRECTORS SHOULD BE FULLY OPERATIONAL, BECAUSE THAT'S HOW WE'VE TRAINED, AND IT'S WHAT WE'VE COME TO DEPEND ON.) ON APCH INTO MHT, THE WX WAS 1200 FT RVR. RVR CAME UP TO, I BELIEVE, 2000 FT. IT DIDN'T CROSS MY MIND THAT MHT WAS NOT A CAT II RWY. ON MY MIND WAS THE MODERATE ICE WE WERE IN AT 4000 FT AND A 41 KT TAILWIND AT ALT ON THE APCH. AFTER 1 TURN IN HOLDING, THE RVR CAME UP AND WE DECIDED TO TRY AN APCH. THE CTLR VECTORED UP TOO FAR FROM THE LOC FOR A TURN ON AND WE INTERCEPTED THE GS INSIDE THE MARKER BEFORE WE INTERCEPTED THE LOC. WE IMMEDIATELY ANNOUNCED A GAR TO THE CTLR AND HE VECTORED US BACK OUT FOR ANOTHER APCH. DURING THIS EXTREMELY BUSY TIME IN THE COCKPIT, RPTS OF THE RVR CONTINUED TO BE BROADCAST. RVR WOULD GO DOWN TO 1200 FT THEN UP TO 2500 FT. THE RVR WAS BROADCAST AT 2500-3000 FT RVR ON OUR RWY. AT MINIMUMS, THE RWY ENVIRONMENT WAS IN SIGHT AND WE LANDED. MY FEELING IS THAT THE RVR WAS NOWHERE NEAR 3000 FT RVR (MAYBE 1200 FT). PLTS ARE BEING PUSHED MORE AND MORE TO MAKE SCHEDULED DEPS WITH FAULTY EQUIP. UNFORTUNATELY, WITH OUR ACFT TODAY, ONE SYS INOP TIES INTO SEVERAL OTHER SYS AND RENDERS THEM USELESS ALSO. ALSO, PLTS DO NOT HAVE THE TIME TO LOOK INTO OPS SPECS, FARS, AND ARPT DIAGRAMS THAT ARE BARELY READABLE WITH A -6 SIZE FONT, TO SEE IF A PARTICULAR RWY IS COMPATIBLE WITH CAT II OR CAT III MINIMUMS. DURING EXTREMELY BAD WX, I FEEL BOTH ATIS AND APCH CTL OR TWR SHOULD TELL ACFT WHAT TYPE OF APCHS ARE BEING MADE. ALSO ON ATIS IF CAT II AND CAT III APCHS BEING MADE, THEN MAKE IT MANDATORY TO ANNOUNCE THAT ON THE ATIS. TRAINING THE CTLR ABOUT APCH MINIMUMS SHOULD ALSO BE DONE. WHILE WE WERE ON APCH AND SAID WE NEEDED 1800 FT RVR, A COMMUTER WAS ASKED IF HE NEEDED THAT, AND HE RESPONDED NO HE COULD GO LOWER. (HOW, I DON'T KNOW, SINCE THE RWY WAS ONLY A CAT I RWY AND WE COULDN'T EVEN HAVE ACCEPTED AN APCH IF IT HAD BEEN 1800 FT RVR.) GIVEN THE SAME SIT AGAIN, NOT ONLY WOULD I NOT HAVE FLOWN THAT APCH TO A LNDG, I WOULD NEVER HAVE ACCEPTED THE ACFT FOR FLT DUE TO THE MEL'S ON THE PWR MGMNT COMPUTERS AND AUTOTHROTTLE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.