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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 427001 |
Time | |
Date | 199901 |
Day | Sat |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | atc facility : pye |
State Reference | CA |
Altitude | msl bound lower : 24000 msl bound upper : 24000 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Flight Phase | other |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Flight Phase | descent other |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | government : faa |
Function | controller : radar |
Experience | controller radar : 4 |
ASRS Report | 427001 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Events | |
Anomaly | conflict : airborne less severe non adherence : published procedure non adherence : required legal separation |
Independent Detector | other controllera |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | faa : investigated |
Miss Distance | horizontal : 1600 vertical : 300 |
Supplementary | |
Air Traffic Incident | Operational Error |
Narrative:
1 aircraft in holding at FL240 in high altitude airspace (B737 for sfo). This aircraft's data block was suppressed due to congestion at the holding stack with 6 or 7 other aircraft. MD80 for sjc was at FL260 and issued descent to FL230. Instructor questioned the clearance and the MD80 was reissued FL250. Transmission was not acknowledged. After frequency congestion cleared, the clearance to FL250 was reissued again and MD80 began climb back to FL250. 2 sectors were combined. As in most cases, this incident could have been avoided in various ways: 1) high altitude should/could have rerted the sjc arrival clear of the holding stack. 2) verbal coordination between the radar associate position and the radar position relative to the 2 aircraft in question prior to the incident. 3) extending the leader lines on the data blocks to more easily separate them. 4) decombine position when entering holding or complexity increases. 5) greater controller vigilance. 6) pilots should be aware of normal separation criteria and in conjunction with TCASII question control instructions placing them in proximity to other aircraft, ie, teamwork.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: ACFT Y WAS GIVEN A DSCNT CLRNC TO STAY ABOVE ACFT X, WHO WAS HOLDING. NO ACKNOWLEDGEMENT WAS RECEIVED FROM ACFT Y. LATER, CLRNC WAS REISSUED TO ACFT Y. ACFT Y CLBED INTO ACFT X'S ALT, LEGAL SEPARATION LOST.
Narrative: 1 ACFT IN HOLDING AT FL240 IN HIGH ALT AIRSPACE (B737 FOR SFO). THIS ACFT'S DATA BLOCK WAS SUPPRESSED DUE TO CONGESTION AT THE HOLDING STACK WITH 6 OR 7 OTHER ACFT. MD80 FOR SJC WAS AT FL260 AND ISSUED DSCNT TO FL230. INSTRUCTOR QUESTIONED THE CLRNC AND THE MD80 WAS REISSUED FL250. XMISSION WAS NOT ACKNOWLEDGED. AFTER FREQ CONGESTION CLRED, THE CLRNC TO FL250 WAS REISSUED AGAIN AND MD80 BEGAN CLB BACK TO FL250. 2 SECTORS WERE COMBINED. AS IN MOST CASES, THIS INCIDENT COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IN VARIOUS WAYS: 1) HIGH ALT SHOULD/COULD HAVE RERTED THE SJC ARR CLR OF THE HOLDING STACK. 2) VERBAL COORD BTWN THE RADAR ASSOCIATE POS AND THE RADAR POS RELATIVE TO THE 2 ACFT IN QUESTION PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT. 3) EXTENDING THE LEADER LINES ON THE DATA BLOCKS TO MORE EASILY SEPARATE THEM. 4) DECOMBINE POS WHEN ENTERING HOLDING OR COMPLEXITY INCREASES. 5) GREATER CTLR VIGILANCE. 6) PLTS SHOULD BE AWARE OF NORMAL SEPARATION CRITERIA AND IN CONJUNCTION WITH TCASII QUESTION CTL INSTRUCTIONS PLACING THEM IN PROX TO OTHER ACFT, IE, TEAMWORK.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.