Narrative:

We (air carrier #1)(west) pushed back from msp gate X at XP35L having delayed boarding passenger for 35 mins due to flow control to ord. When we called for taxi clearance, we were told our wheels up time had changed. We had 10 mins to taxi. We were assigned runway 30L for takeoff. When we got to the waiting line for runway 30L on taxiway a, there were 8 aircraft waiting for takeoff. Also, runway 30L was in use for landing with an uninterrupted line of approaching aircraft with minimum spacing on the approach. Also, the controllers were allowing air carrier #2 (X) to get in line ahead of many of the rest of the waiting aircraft as the aircraft completed deicing from their de- ice area on taxiway B. We had deiced at the gate. We were cleared for takeoff. We were already in takeoff position with the parking brake set. The aircraft, air carrier #3 (Y) which had landed when we were given a taxi into position and hold clearance, apparently had some difficulty finding his turnoff. This gave us come concern as there was another aircraft 3 mi out on final approach to runway 30L. When we were cleared for takeoff, I pushed the throttles up to approximately 1.4 EPR. When the engines stabilized at 1.4 EPR, I quickly checked the engine instruments for normal readings and looked down the runway to both sides to be sure the takeoff path was clear. I verified the parking brake released and advanced the throttles to takeoff thrust. I also glanced down at the TCASII display and noted that the aircraft on approach was 2 mi behind us at 600 ft AGL. The spacing was close but safe. In short, this was a SOP takeoff maneuver and 'normal' operation for msp. We have no procedure for an 'immediate takeoff' or and 'expedited takeoff.' we have only one standard takeoff procedure. Shortly after we began the takeoff roll, the tower controller transmitted 'air carrier #1 takeoff clearance canceled, turn off at the next right.' I immediately aborted the takeoff as instructed. However, during the abort we passed taxiway A2 which is the turnoff I assumed the controller wanted. Since we were moving too fast to turn off at taxiway A2, I continued down to taxiway A3 and exited the runway as instructed. The tower controller sent the landing aircraft (air carrier #4)(Z) around. I asked the tower controller the reason for the abort and he did not respond. After exiting the runway, we asked the ground controller the reason for the abort. He responded that we had not begun our takeoff roll as instructed and the tower controller decided to taxi us off the runway. I believe the decision making of this tower controller was untimely, unprofessional, and exhibited poor judgement. It resulted in an unnecessary go around and an unnecessary aborted takeoff. If there was enough spacing for us to taxi off the runway before the approaching aircraft landed, surely there was sufficient spacing for us to continue the takeoff which we had already begun. The problem, perceived by this tower controller, was insufficient spacing between an arriving and departing aircraft. If the controller perceives that the departing aircraft is taking too long to begin the takeoff roll, but there is still time (sufficient spacing between aircraft) to solve the problem, the solution should be presented to the departing captain as either 'start your takeoff roll or exit the runway.' if the controller perceives that insufficient spacing already exists for whatever reason, the safest and most reasonable solution is to have the aircraft in takeoff position hold position and issue an immediate go around to the aircraft on final approach. A go around issued at 500 ft AGL is much safer than one issued at 100 ft AGL. Also, a go around issued at 500 ft AGL is much less startling to passenger of both aircraft than a go around issued at 100 ft AGL. In this case the tower controller canceled takeoff clearance to an aircraft that was already on the takeoff roll and directed that aircraft to exit the runway using a taxiway that had not been recently used and was still covered with snow and slush with unknown braking action. The fact that this controller apparently did not perceive our aircraft to be on takeoff roll indicates a lack of qualification. Further, not realizing his mistake, he delayed issuing a go around clearance to the arriving aircraft until a very unsafe condition developed. None of the solutions proposed by this controller matched the problem. But what is more distressing is that the solution taken by this controller jeopardizedthe safety of both aircraft and caused further delay to an already overburdened system. I had to comply with this controller's directive to abort my takeoff even though I did not perceive the spacing between my departing aircraft and the arriving aircraft to be insufficient. Unfortunately, the controller perceived that we could do what was impossible for us to do without unnecessarily violent and potentially dangerous maneuvering given the condition of taxiway A2. This could have been an honest mistake. However, I believe this controller presented this solution in an effort to register a complaint that he believed we had not acted swiftly enough. In fact, all our actions were directed toward safety and his apparently were directed toward making a point.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR FLC DIRECTED TO ABORT TKOF WHEN TWR LCL CTLR PERCEIVES INSUFFICIENT SEPARATION BTWN ARR AND DEP. PIC OF TKOF ABORTED ACFT PERCEIVES INCONSISTENT AND POORLY APPLIED ATC TECHNIQUE.

Narrative: WE (ACR #1)(W) PUSHED BACK FROM MSP GATE X AT XP35L HAVING DELAYED BOARDING PAX FOR 35 MINS DUE TO FLOW CTL TO ORD. WHEN WE CALLED FOR TAXI CLRNC, WE WERE TOLD OUR WHEELS UP TIME HAD CHANGED. WE HAD 10 MINS TO TAXI. WE WERE ASSIGNED RWY 30L FOR TKOF. WHEN WE GOT TO THE WAITING LINE FOR RWY 30L ON TXWY A, THERE WERE 8 ACFT WAITING FOR TKOF. ALSO, RWY 30L WAS IN USE FOR LNDG WITH AN UNINTERRUPTED LINE OF APCHING ACFT WITH MINIMUM SPACING ON THE APCH. ALSO, THE CTLRS WERE ALLOWING ACR #2 (X) TO GET IN LINE AHEAD OF MANY OF THE REST OF THE WAITING ACFT AS THE ACFT COMPLETED DEICING FROM THEIR DE- ICE AREA ON TXWY B. WE HAD DEICED AT THE GATE. WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF. WE WERE ALREADY IN TKOF POS WITH THE PARKING BRAKE SET. THE ACFT, ACR #3 (Y) WHICH HAD LANDED WHEN WE WERE GIVEN A TAXI INTO POS AND HOLD CLRNC, APPARENTLY HAD SOME DIFFICULTY FINDING HIS TURNOFF. THIS GAVE US COME CONCERN AS THERE WAS ANOTHER ACFT 3 MI OUT ON FINAL APCH TO RWY 30L. WHEN WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF, I PUSHED THE THROTTLES UP TO APPROX 1.4 EPR. WHEN THE ENGS STABILIZED AT 1.4 EPR, I QUICKLY CHKED THE ENG INSTS FOR NORMAL READINGS AND LOOKED DOWN THE RWY TO BOTH SIDES TO BE SURE THE TKOF PATH WAS CLR. I VERIFIED THE PARKING BRAKE RELEASED AND ADVANCED THE THROTTLES TO TKOF THRUST. I ALSO GLANCED DOWN AT THE TCASII DISPLAY AND NOTED THAT THE ACFT ON APCH WAS 2 MI BEHIND US AT 600 FT AGL. THE SPACING WAS CLOSE BUT SAFE. IN SHORT, THIS WAS A SOP TKOF MANEUVER AND 'NORMAL' OP FOR MSP. WE HAVE NO PROC FOR AN 'IMMEDIATE TKOF' OR AND 'EXPEDITED TKOF.' WE HAVE ONLY ONE STANDARD TKOF PROC. SHORTLY AFTER WE BEGAN THE TKOF ROLL, THE TWR CTLR XMITTED 'ACR #1 TKOF CLRNC CANCELED, TURN OFF AT THE NEXT R.' I IMMEDIATELY ABORTED THE TKOF AS INSTRUCTED. HOWEVER, DURING THE ABORT WE PASSED TXWY A2 WHICH IS THE TURNOFF I ASSUMED THE CTLR WANTED. SINCE WE WERE MOVING TOO FAST TO TURN OFF AT TXWY A2, I CONTINUED DOWN TO TXWY A3 AND EXITED THE RWY AS INSTRUCTED. THE TWR CTLR SENT THE LNDG ACFT (ACR #4)(Z) AROUND. I ASKED THE TWR CTLR THE REASON FOR THE ABORT AND HE DID NOT RESPOND. AFTER EXITING THE RWY, WE ASKED THE GND CTLR THE REASON FOR THE ABORT. HE RESPONDED THAT WE HAD NOT BEGUN OUR TKOF ROLL AS INSTRUCTED AND THE TWR CTLR DECIDED TO TAXI US OFF THE RWY. I BELIEVE THE DECISION MAKING OF THIS TWR CTLR WAS UNTIMELY, UNPROFESSIONAL, AND EXHIBITED POOR JUDGEMENT. IT RESULTED IN AN UNNECESSARY GAR AND AN UNNECESSARY ABORTED TKOF. IF THERE WAS ENOUGH SPACING FOR US TO TAXI OFF THE RWY BEFORE THE APCHING ACFT LANDED, SURELY THERE WAS SUFFICIENT SPACING FOR US TO CONTINUE THE TKOF WHICH WE HAD ALREADY BEGUN. THE PROB, PERCEIVED BY THIS TWR CTLR, WAS INSUFFICIENT SPACING BTWN AN ARRIVING AND DEPARTING ACFT. IF THE CTLR PERCEIVES THAT THE DEPARTING ACFT IS TAKING TOO LONG TO BEGIN THE TKOF ROLL, BUT THERE IS STILL TIME (SUFFICIENT SPACING BTWN ACFT) TO SOLVE THE PROB, THE SOLUTION SHOULD BE PRESENTED TO THE DEPARTING CAPT AS EITHER 'START YOUR TKOF ROLL OR EXIT THE RWY.' IF THE CTLR PERCEIVES THAT INSUFFICIENT SPACING ALREADY EXISTS FOR WHATEVER REASON, THE SAFEST AND MOST REASONABLE SOLUTION IS TO HAVE THE ACFT IN TKOF POS HOLD POS AND ISSUE AN IMMEDIATE GAR TO THE ACFT ON FINAL APCH. A GAR ISSUED AT 500 FT AGL IS MUCH SAFER THAN ONE ISSUED AT 100 FT AGL. ALSO, A GAR ISSUED AT 500 FT AGL IS MUCH LESS STARTLING TO PAX OF BOTH ACFT THAN A GAR ISSUED AT 100 FT AGL. IN THIS CASE THE TWR CTLR CANCELED TKOF CLRNC TO AN ACFT THAT WAS ALREADY ON THE TKOF ROLL AND DIRECTED THAT ACFT TO EXIT THE RWY USING A TXWY THAT HAD NOT BEEN RECENTLY USED AND WAS STILL COVERED WITH SNOW AND SLUSH WITH UNKNOWN BRAKING ACTION. THE FACT THAT THIS CTLR APPARENTLY DID NOT PERCEIVE OUR ACFT TO BE ON TKOF ROLL INDICATES A LACK OF QUALIFICATION. FURTHER, NOT REALIZING HIS MISTAKE, HE DELAYED ISSUING A GAR CLRNC TO THE ARRIVING ACFT UNTIL A VERY UNSAFE CONDITION DEVELOPED. NONE OF THE SOLUTIONS PROPOSED BY THIS CTLR MATCHED THE PROB. BUT WHAT IS MORE DISTRESSING IS THAT THE SOLUTION TAKEN BY THIS CTLR JEOPARDIZEDTHE SAFETY OF BOTH ACFT AND CAUSED FURTHER DELAY TO AN ALREADY OVERBURDENED SYS. I HAD TO COMPLY WITH THIS CTLR'S DIRECTIVE TO ABORT MY TKOF EVEN THOUGH I DID NOT PERCEIVE THE SPACING BTWN MY DEPARTING ACFT AND THE ARRIVING ACFT TO BE INSUFFICIENT. UNFORTUNATELY, THE CTLR PERCEIVED THAT WE COULD DO WHAT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO DO WITHOUT UNNECESSARILY VIOLENT AND POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS MANEUVERING GIVEN THE CONDITION OF TXWY A2. THIS COULD HAVE BEEN AN HONEST MISTAKE. HOWEVER, I BELIEVE THIS CTLR PRESENTED THIS SOLUTION IN AN EFFORT TO REGISTER A COMPLAINT THAT HE BELIEVED WE HAD NOT ACTED SWIFTLY ENOUGH. IN FACT, ALL OUR ACTIONS WERE DIRECTED TOWARD SAFETY AND HIS APPARENTLY WERE DIRECTED TOWARD MAKING A POINT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.