Narrative:

During the transition to landing from the localizer runway 6L approach at anc, we got very low before seeing the VASI and climbing up to complete the approach and landing. Why? Lots of reasons, but there are 2 that I will address in an attempt to help my fellow pilots. 1) I didn't compute and use a visual descent point and almost paid a very dear price for that omission. I know we are told to use all available aids during the transition from approach to landing phase, but I still suggest re-emphasizing it. I know better and I usually do computer a visual descent point and even have several indicated on charts in my flight kit, eg, gum. Why didn't I this time? Part of that answer is in point #2. 2) fatigue. Please try to come up with a workable solution to prevent putting reserves in position/patterns that will be greatly impacted by fatigue. The 3 of us had been awake for over 24 hours by the time we shot the approach to anc. I won't speak for my other crew members, but I know that my mind was slow and so was my xchk. Having made those 2 points, I will try to explain the circumstances surrounding our flight. Being a normal day on reserve, I got up at XA30. I was notified about pattern on jan/xa/99 at XB30. The pattern had a deadhead to ord at XE00. After finishing some things I was doing, I tried unsuccessfully to take a nap and left my house at XC00 for the deadhead flight. I slept a little on the flight to ord. We had a 3 hour 46 min wait in ord so I tried to sleep there for 1 hour, but only dozed. Then we flew to anc and made our approach. I had only had a little fitful rest in the last 27 hours. My other crew members had similar stories in terms of rest. Did fatigue play a factor? Sure. Do we have a policy where we cannot fly if we are too fatigued? Sure. The problem is making the right decision before beginning a 6 hour flight. Once airborne, it's too late. The anc ATIS stated that the ILS to runway 6R was the approach in use. I briefed that approach. Abeam the field on downwind, we were told that runway 6R was closed for plowing and the approach would beflown to runway 6L using the localizer runway 6L approach. I asked the PNF to ask for 10 mi so we could brief the new approach. I was not specific enough and instead of an extra 10 mi, we got a 10 mi final. I briefed the approach, but felt rushed and did not mention a visual descent point. If there had been a published visual descent point on the approach chart, it would have helped us since we are trained not to violate a published visual descent point unless needed to make a normal landing. I didn't brief it and there was no reminder on the approach plate so I wasn't thinking visual descent point. So what did I do? Exactly what I do in the simulator. At the MDA and seeing the approach lights, I started a slow descent for landing. The problem was it was too early and we got very low before seeing the VASI and correcting. In hindsight, all we had to do was use the available DME and compute our own visual descent point which would have been about 3 DME. Maybe someone else can learn from my mistake and this is certainly a good reason to add a depiction of a visual descent point to the anc localizer runway 6L approach chart. Please push the charting authority/authorized to add a visual descent point to the localizer runway 6L approach plate at anc. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter felt embarrassed that he allowed his aircraft to get within 100 ft AGL 1 mi from the runway. Aircraft flown was a B747-200 flying a non precision approach to runway 6L at anc. The flight crew was assigned a change of runway 10 mi out on approach to runway 6R. The reporter failed to calculate a visual descent point, therefore, he wasn't really prepared for the descent. The aircraft flew down to 100 ft AGL about 4000-6000 ft from the runway. The first officer called 100 ft and the reporter captain added power to raise the nose and gain some altitude to get back on a proper descent profile. When they left the MDA they could not see any approach lights nor any VASI. It was then that no visual descent point had been calculated for this approach. MDA was only 339 ft AGL so there was little room to descend below MDA and still be safe. Reporter had flown from ordto anc and emphasized the flight crew was fatigued after flying an all night flight of 6 hours. Because of the fatigue, a visual descent point was not calculated because of a change in runway close in to the airport rushed the flight crew. Reporter now wished they had taken more time with a longer final to do things right. Because of the need for a visual descent point, reporter would like a visual descent point to be printed on all non precision approach charts. Reporter would also like the approach controller to be of more help by asking if they needed more time to set up for the approach.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B747-200 FLYING INTO ANC, DSNDS WITHIN 100 FT AGL DURING APCH TO RWY 6L.

Narrative: DURING THE TRANSITION TO LNDG FROM THE LOC RWY 6L APCH AT ANC, WE GOT VERY LOW BEFORE SEEING THE VASI AND CLBING UP TO COMPLETE THE APCH AND LNDG. WHY? LOTS OF REASONS, BUT THERE ARE 2 THAT I WILL ADDRESS IN AN ATTEMPT TO HELP MY FELLOW PLTS. 1) I DIDN'T COMPUTE AND USE A VISUAL DSCNT POINT AND ALMOST PAID A VERY DEAR PRICE FOR THAT OMISSION. I KNOW WE ARE TOLD TO USE ALL AVAILABLE AIDS DURING THE TRANSITION FROM APCH TO LNDG PHASE, BUT I STILL SUGGEST RE-EMPHASIZING IT. I KNOW BETTER AND I USUALLY DO COMPUTER A VISUAL DSCNT POINT AND EVEN HAVE SEVERAL INDICATED ON CHARTS IN MY FLT KIT, EG, GUM. WHY DIDN'T I THIS TIME? PART OF THAT ANSWER IS IN POINT #2. 2) FATIGUE. PLEASE TRY TO COME UP WITH A WORKABLE SOLUTION TO PREVENT PUTTING RESERVES IN POS/PATTERNS THAT WILL BE GREATLY IMPACTED BY FATIGUE. THE 3 OF US HAD BEEN AWAKE FOR OVER 24 HRS BY THE TIME WE SHOT THE APCH TO ANC. I WON'T SPEAK FOR MY OTHER CREW MEMBERS, BUT I KNOW THAT MY MIND WAS SLOW AND SO WAS MY XCHK. HAVING MADE THOSE 2 POINTS, I WILL TRY TO EXPLAIN THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING OUR FLT. BEING A NORMAL DAY ON RESERVE, I GOT UP AT XA30. I WAS NOTIFIED ABOUT PATTERN ON JAN/XA/99 AT XB30. THE PATTERN HAD A DEADHEAD TO ORD AT XE00. AFTER FINISHING SOME THINGS I WAS DOING, I TRIED UNSUCCESSFULLY TO TAKE A NAP AND LEFT MY HOUSE AT XC00 FOR THE DEADHEAD FLT. I SLEPT A LITTLE ON THE FLT TO ORD. WE HAD A 3 HR 46 MIN WAIT IN ORD SO I TRIED TO SLEEP THERE FOR 1 HR, BUT ONLY DOZED. THEN WE FLEW TO ANC AND MADE OUR APCH. I HAD ONLY HAD A LITTLE FITFUL REST IN THE LAST 27 HRS. MY OTHER CREW MEMBERS HAD SIMILAR STORIES IN TERMS OF REST. DID FATIGUE PLAY A FACTOR? SURE. DO WE HAVE A POLICY WHERE WE CANNOT FLY IF WE ARE TOO FATIGUED? SURE. THE PROB IS MAKING THE RIGHT DECISION BEFORE BEGINNING A 6 HR FLT. ONCE AIRBORNE, IT'S TOO LATE. THE ANC ATIS STATED THAT THE ILS TO RWY 6R WAS THE APCH IN USE. I BRIEFED THAT APCH. ABEAM THE FIELD ON DOWNWIND, WE WERE TOLD THAT RWY 6R WAS CLOSED FOR PLOWING AND THE APCH WOULD BEFLOWN TO RWY 6L USING THE LOC RWY 6L APCH. I ASKED THE PNF TO ASK FOR 10 MI SO WE COULD BRIEF THE NEW APCH. I WAS NOT SPECIFIC ENOUGH AND INSTEAD OF AN EXTRA 10 MI, WE GOT A 10 MI FINAL. I BRIEFED THE APCH, BUT FELT RUSHED AND DID NOT MENTION A VISUAL DSCNT POINT. IF THERE HAD BEEN A PUBLISHED VISUAL DSCNT POINT ON THE APCH CHART, IT WOULD HAVE HELPED US SINCE WE ARE TRAINED NOT TO VIOLATE A PUBLISHED VISUAL DSCNT POINT UNLESS NEEDED TO MAKE A NORMAL LNDG. I DIDN'T BRIEF IT AND THERE WAS NO REMINDER ON THE APCH PLATE SO I WASN'T THINKING VISUAL DSCNT POINT. SO WHAT DID I DO? EXACTLY WHAT I DO IN THE SIMULATOR. AT THE MDA AND SEEING THE APCH LIGHTS, I STARTED A SLOW DSCNT FOR LNDG. THE PROB WAS IT WAS TOO EARLY AND WE GOT VERY LOW BEFORE SEEING THE VASI AND CORRECTING. IN HINDSIGHT, ALL WE HAD TO DO WAS USE THE AVAILABLE DME AND COMPUTE OUR OWN VISUAL DSCNT POINT WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN ABOUT 3 DME. MAYBE SOMEONE ELSE CAN LEARN FROM MY MISTAKE AND THIS IS CERTAINLY A GOOD REASON TO ADD A DEPICTION OF A VISUAL DSCNT POINT TO THE ANC LOC RWY 6L APCH CHART. PLEASE PUSH THE CHARTING AUTH TO ADD A VISUAL DSCNT POINT TO THE LOC RWY 6L APCH PLATE AT ANC. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR FELT EMBARRASSED THAT HE ALLOWED HIS ACFT TO GET WITHIN 100 FT AGL 1 MI FROM THE RWY. ACFT FLOWN WAS A B747-200 FLYING A NON PRECISION APCH TO RWY 6L AT ANC. THE FLC WAS ASSIGNED A CHANGE OF RWY 10 MI OUT ON APCH TO RWY 6R. THE RPTR FAILED TO CALCULATE A VISUAL DSCNT POINT, THEREFORE, HE WASN'T REALLY PREPARED FOR THE DSCNT. THE ACFT FLEW DOWN TO 100 FT AGL ABOUT 4000-6000 FT FROM THE RWY. THE FO CALLED 100 FT AND THE RPTR CAPT ADDED PWR TO RAISE THE NOSE AND GAIN SOME ALT TO GET BACK ON A PROPER DSCNT PROFILE. WHEN THEY LEFT THE MDA THEY COULD NOT SEE ANY APCH LIGHTS NOR ANY VASI. IT WAS THEN THAT NO VISUAL DSCNT POINT HAD BEEN CALCULATED FOR THIS APCH. MDA WAS ONLY 339 FT AGL SO THERE WAS LITTLE ROOM TO DSND BELOW MDA AND STILL BE SAFE. RPTR HAD FLOWN FROM ORDTO ANC AND EMPHASIZED THE FLC WAS FATIGUED AFTER FLYING AN ALL NIGHT FLT OF 6 HRS. BECAUSE OF THE FATIGUE, A VISUAL DSCNT POINT WAS NOT CALCULATED BECAUSE OF A CHANGE IN RWY CLOSE IN TO THE ARPT RUSHED THE FLC. RPTR NOW WISHED THEY HAD TAKEN MORE TIME WITH A LONGER FINAL TO DO THINGS RIGHT. BECAUSE OF THE NEED FOR A VISUAL DSCNT POINT, RPTR WOULD LIKE A VISUAL DSCNT POINT TO BE PRINTED ON ALL NON PRECISION APCH CHARTS. RPTR WOULD ALSO LIKE THE APCH CTLR TO BE OF MORE HELP BY ASKING IF THEY NEEDED MORE TIME TO SET UP FOR THE APCH.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.