Narrative:

FL330 cruise flight. First officer out of his seat. L1011 passed us from right to left -- very close. Captain did not see L1011 until after the near miss occurred. ATC not in contact with either aircraft at the time. TCASII would have helped. We did not have it installed. Supplemental information from acn 429417: we were on a revenue flight at FL330, heading approximately 120 degrees on a clearance direct to gqe VOR. I went back to the lavatory. I asked what happened. The flight engineer told me that we just came very close to a plane, which I then observed at our 8-9 O'clock position and approximately less than 1 mi. Captain tried to raise center. I began to check the high altitude en route chart for a frequency. Very shortly thereafter, the flight engineer observed a message notification on our ACARS. The captain checked in with them and they acknowledged us. Shortly thereafter, the captain asked if the center showed a traffic conflict with us a few mi back. They said they did and asked if we took evasive action. The captain responded that we did not, but would have if we had seen the traffic. The center also told us that they were not in communication with the L1011. Somehow there was a lack of communication between ATC and both aircraft. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, our aircraft was not TCASII equipped. TCASII more than likely would have prevented this situation. Supplemental information from acn 430354: I turned to say something to the captain. Through the observer's seat behind the captain, a DC10 aircraft at our 8 O'clock position, cruising at the same altitude FL330. DC10 appeared to be approximately 1/2 mi away, slightly behind our aircraft, at a slower speed and closing at about a 30 degree converging angle to our aircraft. I immediately brought the DC10 to the captain's attention and turned our aircraft approximately 30 degrees to the right to reduce the intercept angle. This resulted in a new heading of approximately 110 degrees. Supplemental information from acn 430044: LNAV direct to mkc. At about 10 mi nne of sln VOR, first officer turned to captain and noticed at approximately 8 O'clock position a merging of another aircraft at same flight level and less than 1/2 mi (approximately). First officer immediately turned from heading 080 degrees to new heading of 110 degrees to right to avoid the aircraft. The air carrier xxy DC10 passed behind us. After several attempted calls to ATC and change radio frequency, we received a frequency from FSS to contact ATC in area, which handed us to ZTL. Supplemental information from acn 429904: on mar/xa/99 2 aircraft's radar targets merged on our radar scope. I was working ZDV sector 18 interphone position. Both aircraft were level at FL330. Neither aircraft was equipped with TCASII. Both aircraft were NORDO -- we could not talk to either plane. The aircraft targets merged approximately 30 mi north of hayes, ks. My radar controller then noticed the 2 limited data blocks at FL330 and brought the full data block up on our scope. We attempted to establish communications with both but they were not on our frequency. We watched for the next few mins as the aircraft got closer together and eventually did merge into 1 target. The targets did come back apart and the aircraft continued on their courses. By this time they were in ZKC's airspace and I do not know if they were contacted about the incident or if either aircraft saw the other one. Supplemental information from acn 429920: air carrier xyz failed to make frequency change from ZLC to ZDV sector 34. Sector 34 attempted communications -- xfer to ZDV sector 33 following radar handoff. Upon receiving no reply, I informed the supervisor to call commercial radio for air carrier xyz. Awareness was a significant causal factor as air carrier xyz was out of radio contact for approximately 1 hour and there was no response to 3 commercial radio calls. Supplemental information from acn 429947: the controllers and supervisor attempted all known means to contact the aircraft, including phone calls to both airline's base operations. Air carrier xxy phone numbers had been changed. Recommendations: have pilots check radios every 30 mins or so if they have not been contacted by ATC. Data link would help as a backup communication. TCASII for cargo aircraft would assist. Supplemental information from acn 430347: I was working ZDV sector 34 radar and took a handoff on air carrier xyz from ZLC. ZLC did not xfer communications on air carrier xx to my sector. Calls to commercial radio for air carrier xyz did not raise the aircraft. Air carrier xyz flew several hundred mi without talking to ATC, eventually violating the protected airspace of L1011 over mkc that was also NORDO. Both aircraft managed to find the correct frequency shortly after the incident. Causal factors: air carrier xyz got a wrong frequency and never went back for the right one. Air carrier xyz never got a frequency change from ZLC. I didn't realize air carrier xyz hadn't checked on. He flew 12-15 mins in ZDV airspace before we knew it. ZLC couldn't have reached him by then. Our backup plans didn't work. Why didn't air carrier xyz try to find a good frequency? Cargo aircraft need TCASII.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DC10 AND L1011 NEAR MISS, SAME TIME, SAME ALT, SAME PLACE NEAR SLN.

Narrative: FL330 CRUISE FLT. FO OUT OF HIS SEAT. L1011 PASSED US FROM R TO L -- VERY CLOSE. CAPT DID NOT SEE L1011 UNTIL AFTER THE NEAR MISS OCCURRED. ATC NOT IN CONTACT WITH EITHER ACFT AT THE TIME. TCASII WOULD HAVE HELPED. WE DID NOT HAVE IT INSTALLED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 429417: WE WERE ON A REVENUE FLT AT FL330, HDG APPROX 120 DEGS ON A CLRNC DIRECT TO GQE VOR. I WENT BACK TO THE LAVATORY. I ASKED WHAT HAPPENED. THE FE TOLD ME THAT WE JUST CAME VERY CLOSE TO A PLANE, WHICH I THEN OBSERVED AT OUR 8-9 O'CLOCK POS AND APPROX LESS THAN 1 MI. CAPT TRIED TO RAISE CTR. I BEGAN TO CHK THE HIGH ALT ENRTE CHART FOR A FREQ. VERY SHORTLY THEREAFTER, THE FE OBSERVED A MESSAGE NOTIFICATION ON OUR ACARS. THE CAPT CHKED IN WITH THEM AND THEY ACKNOWLEDGED US. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, THE CAPT ASKED IF THE CTR SHOWED A TFC CONFLICT WITH US A FEW MI BACK. THEY SAID THEY DID AND ASKED IF WE TOOK EVASIVE ACTION. THE CAPT RESPONDED THAT WE DID NOT, BUT WOULD HAVE IF WE HAD SEEN THE TFC. THE CTR ALSO TOLD US THAT THEY WERE NOT IN COM WITH THE L1011. SOMEHOW THERE WAS A LACK OF COM BTWN ATC AND BOTH ACFT. FINALLY, AND PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANTLY, OUR ACFT WAS NOT TCASII EQUIPPED. TCASII MORE THAN LIKELY WOULD HAVE PREVENTED THIS SIT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 430354: I TURNED TO SAY SOMETHING TO THE CAPT. THROUGH THE OBSERVER'S SEAT BEHIND THE CAPT, A DC10 ACFT AT OUR 8 O'CLOCK POS, CRUISING AT THE SAME ALT FL330. DC10 APPEARED TO BE APPROX 1/2 MI AWAY, SLIGHTLY BEHIND OUR ACFT, AT A SLOWER SPD AND CLOSING AT ABOUT A 30 DEG CONVERGING ANGLE TO OUR ACFT. I IMMEDIATELY BROUGHT THE DC10 TO THE CAPT'S ATTN AND TURNED OUR ACFT APPROX 30 DEGS TO THE R TO REDUCE THE INTERCEPT ANGLE. THIS RESULTED IN A NEW HDG OF APPROX 110 DEGS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 430044: LNAV DIRECT TO MKC. AT ABOUT 10 MI NNE OF SLN VOR, FO TURNED TO CAPT AND NOTICED AT APPROX 8 O'CLOCK POS A MERGING OF ANOTHER ACFT AT SAME FLT LEVEL AND LESS THAN 1/2 MI (APPROX). FO IMMEDIATELY TURNED FROM HDG 080 DEGS TO NEW HDG OF 110 DEGS TO R TO AVOID THE ACFT. THE ACR XXY DC10 PASSED BEHIND US. AFTER SEVERAL ATTEMPTED CALLS TO ATC AND CHANGE RADIO FREQ, WE RECEIVED A FREQ FROM FSS TO CONTACT ATC IN AREA, WHICH HANDED US TO ZTL. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 429904: ON MAR/XA/99 2 ACFT'S RADAR TARGETS MERGED ON OUR RADAR SCOPE. I WAS WORKING ZDV SECTOR 18 INTERPHONE POS. BOTH ACFT WERE LEVEL AT FL330. NEITHER ACFT WAS EQUIPPED WITH TCASII. BOTH ACFT WERE NORDO -- WE COULD NOT TALK TO EITHER PLANE. THE ACFT TARGETS MERGED APPROX 30 MI N OF HAYES, KS. MY RADAR CTLR THEN NOTICED THE 2 LIMITED DATA BLOCKS AT FL330 AND BROUGHT THE FULL DATA BLOCK UP ON OUR SCOPE. WE ATTEMPTED TO ESTABLISH COMS WITH BOTH BUT THEY WERE NOT ON OUR FREQ. WE WATCHED FOR THE NEXT FEW MINS AS THE ACFT GOT CLOSER TOGETHER AND EVENTUALLY DID MERGE INTO 1 TARGET. THE TARGETS DID COME BACK APART AND THE ACFT CONTINUED ON THEIR COURSES. BY THIS TIME THEY WERE IN ZKC'S AIRSPACE AND I DO NOT KNOW IF THEY WERE CONTACTED ABOUT THE INCIDENT OR IF EITHER ACFT SAW THE OTHER ONE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 429920: ACR XYZ FAILED TO MAKE FREQ CHANGE FROM ZLC TO ZDV SECTOR 34. SECTOR 34 ATTEMPTED COMS -- XFER TO ZDV SECTOR 33 FOLLOWING RADAR HDOF. UPON RECEIVING NO REPLY, I INFORMED THE SUPVR TO CALL COMMERCIAL RADIO FOR ACR XYZ. AWARENESS WAS A SIGNIFICANT CAUSAL FACTOR AS ACR XYZ WAS OUT OF RADIO CONTACT FOR APPROX 1 HR AND THERE WAS NO RESPONSE TO 3 COMMERCIAL RADIO CALLS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 429947: THE CTLRS AND SUPVR ATTEMPTED ALL KNOWN MEANS TO CONTACT THE ACFT, INCLUDING PHONE CALLS TO BOTH AIRLINE'S BASE OPS. ACR XXY PHONE NUMBERS HAD BEEN CHANGED. RECOMMENDATIONS: HAVE PLTS CHK RADIOS EVERY 30 MINS OR SO IF THEY HAVE NOT BEEN CONTACTED BY ATC. DATA LINK WOULD HELP AS A BACKUP COM. TCASII FOR CARGO ACFT WOULD ASSIST. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 430347: I WAS WORKING ZDV SECTOR 34 RADAR AND TOOK A HDOF ON ACR XYZ FROM ZLC. ZLC DID NOT XFER COMS ON ACR XX TO MY SECTOR. CALLS TO COMMERCIAL RADIO FOR ACR XYZ DID NOT RAISE THE ACFT. ACR XYZ FLEW SEVERAL HUNDRED MI WITHOUT TALKING TO ATC, EVENTUALLY VIOLATING THE PROTECTED AIRSPACE OF L1011 OVER MKC THAT WAS ALSO NORDO. BOTH ACFT MANAGED TO FIND THE CORRECT FREQ SHORTLY AFTER THE INCIDENT. CAUSAL FACTORS: ACR XYZ GOT A WRONG FREQ AND NEVER WENT BACK FOR THE RIGHT ONE. ACR XYZ NEVER GOT A FREQ CHANGE FROM ZLC. I DIDN'T REALIZE ACR XYZ HADN'T CHKED ON. HE FLEW 12-15 MINS IN ZDV AIRSPACE BEFORE WE KNEW IT. ZLC COULDN'T HAVE REACHED HIM BY THEN. OUR BACKUP PLANS DIDN'T WORK. WHY DIDN'T ACR XYZ TRY TO FIND A GOOD FREQ? CARGO ACFT NEED TCASII.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.