Narrative:

After engine start and receiving the ATIS information from my position in front of FBO, I called ground control and stated I had the ATIS and was ready to taxi to runway 27, the runway in use. Transmission from ground was scratchy and hard to understand, but I thought I heard directions for taxi to runway 27. I did not hear or acknowledge any hold short instructions. I heard taxiway D to taxiway B. I began taxiing to runway 27, crossing runway 14/32 and runway 1/19. At this point, I was contacted by ground control asking 'what are you doing? You just crossed 2 active runways.' I acknowledged that I had indeed done that, that I knew how important it was, and I told ground what I thought had been my instructions. I was informed that I was in error, that I had been issued hold short instructions. I was then told to continue on taxiway B and hold short at runway 27 for release. At this point, I was a little unnerved. I took advantage of the wait to perform a runup and regain my composure. I heard a call with what I thought was my n-number allowing me to cross runway 27 to continue my taxi to the approach end of the runway. (There was no parallel taxiway on the south side from my location.) again, ground came on asking what I was doing, saying I had done it again. This made no sense to me as I had heard (at least I thought I had heard) permission to cross and continue to the end of runway 27. What ground then said was that I had been told to 'hold for release' and 'contact tower.' what he didn't say was that he was expecting me to make an intersection departure from the point where I was holding short for all that time. So, I made several serious errors. I believe ground control did also. There were no known diversions, gars, or conflicts with other airplanes. I believe a number of factors contributed to this series of events: first, I was fatigued from the work I had gone to wilmington to do and should have rested, perhaps had a meal, before flying. Second, the quality of radio transmission from ground control to my initial location was poor. Further, the controller was speaking quickly and brusquely. Third, I acknowledged taxi instructions to runway 27 but did not acknowledge the requirement to hold short at runway 14/32, nor did ground come back to me and confirm the need to hold short. (I would have been a little surprised to have been issued hold short instructions for a runway that had been notamed as 'closed,' which runway 14/32 was.) the controller did not react until I had crossed runway 1/19, and then issued further, incomplete instructions, having omitted any reference to an expected intersection departure. Needed: better radios for ground. Hold short instructions should have been clarified by both parties. I should have delayed departure until I was less fatigued. Since I was at an unfamiliar airport I should have confirmed permission to proceed with taxi as I encountered the other runways.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PVT INST RATED PLT OF A MOONEY MO20 FAILED TO HOLD SHORT OF 3 ACTIVE RWYS DURING TAXI OUT DUE TO A MISUNDERSTANDING FROM GND CTL INSTRUCTIONS.

Narrative: AFTER ENG START AND RECEIVING THE ATIS INFO FROM MY POS IN FRONT OF FBO, I CALLED GND CTL AND STATED I HAD THE ATIS AND WAS READY TO TAXI TO RWY 27, THE RWY IN USE. XMISSION FROM GND WAS SCRATCHY AND HARD TO UNDERSTAND, BUT I THOUGHT I HEARD DIRECTIONS FOR TAXI TO RWY 27. I DID NOT HEAR OR ACKNOWLEDGE ANY HOLD SHORT INSTRUCTIONS. I HEARD TXWY D TO TXWY B. I BEGAN TAXIING TO RWY 27, XING RWY 14/32 AND RWY 1/19. AT THIS POINT, I WAS CONTACTED BY GND CTL ASKING 'WHAT ARE YOU DOING? YOU JUST CROSSED 2 ACTIVE RWYS.' I ACKNOWLEDGED THAT I HAD INDEED DONE THAT, THAT I KNEW HOW IMPORTANT IT WAS, AND I TOLD GND WHAT I THOUGHT HAD BEEN MY INSTRUCTIONS. I WAS INFORMED THAT I WAS IN ERROR, THAT I HAD BEEN ISSUED HOLD SHORT INSTRUCTIONS. I WAS THEN TOLD TO CONTINUE ON TXWY B AND HOLD SHORT AT RWY 27 FOR RELEASE. AT THIS POINT, I WAS A LITTLE UNNERVED. I TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THE WAIT TO PERFORM A RUNUP AND REGAIN MY COMPOSURE. I HEARD A CALL WITH WHAT I THOUGHT WAS MY N-NUMBER ALLOWING ME TO CROSS RWY 27 TO CONTINUE MY TAXI TO THE APCH END OF THE RWY. (THERE WAS NO PARALLEL TXWY ON THE S SIDE FROM MY LOCATION.) AGAIN, GND CAME ON ASKING WHAT I WAS DOING, SAYING I HAD DONE IT AGAIN. THIS MADE NO SENSE TO ME AS I HAD HEARD (AT LEAST I THOUGHT I HAD HEARD) PERMISSION TO CROSS AND CONTINUE TO THE END OF RWY 27. WHAT GND THEN SAID WAS THAT I HAD BEEN TOLD TO 'HOLD FOR RELEASE' AND 'CONTACT TWR.' WHAT HE DIDN'T SAY WAS THAT HE WAS EXPECTING ME TO MAKE AN INTXN DEP FROM THE POINT WHERE I WAS HOLDING SHORT FOR ALL THAT TIME. SO, I MADE SEVERAL SERIOUS ERRORS. I BELIEVE GND CTL DID ALSO. THERE WERE NO KNOWN DIVERSIONS, GARS, OR CONFLICTS WITH OTHER AIRPLANES. I BELIEVE A NUMBER OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO THIS SERIES OF EVENTS: FIRST, I WAS FATIGUED FROM THE WORK I HAD GONE TO WILMINGTON TO DO AND SHOULD HAVE RESTED, PERHAPS HAD A MEAL, BEFORE FLYING. SECOND, THE QUALITY OF RADIO XMISSION FROM GND CTL TO MY INITIAL LOCATION WAS POOR. FURTHER, THE CTLR WAS SPEAKING QUICKLY AND BRUSQUELY. THIRD, I ACKNOWLEDGED TAXI INSTRUCTIONS TO RWY 27 BUT DID NOT ACKNOWLEDGE THE REQUIREMENT TO HOLD SHORT AT RWY 14/32, NOR DID GND COME BACK TO ME AND CONFIRM THE NEED TO HOLD SHORT. (I WOULD HAVE BEEN A LITTLE SURPRISED TO HAVE BEEN ISSUED HOLD SHORT INSTRUCTIONS FOR A RWY THAT HAD BEEN NOTAMED AS 'CLOSED,' WHICH RWY 14/32 WAS.) THE CTLR DID NOT REACT UNTIL I HAD CROSSED RWY 1/19, AND THEN ISSUED FURTHER, INCOMPLETE INSTRUCTIONS, HAVING OMITTED ANY REF TO AN EXPECTED INTXN DEP. NEEDED: BETTER RADIOS FOR GND. HOLD SHORT INSTRUCTIONS SHOULD HAVE BEEN CLARIFIED BY BOTH PARTIES. I SHOULD HAVE DELAYED DEP UNTIL I WAS LESS FATIGUED. SINCE I WAS AT AN UNFAMILIAR ARPT I SHOULD HAVE CONFIRMED PERMISSION TO PROCEED WITH TAXI AS I ENCOUNTERED THE OTHER RWYS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.