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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 429650 |
Time | |
Date | 199902 |
Day | Mon |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | navaid : fqm.vor |
State Reference | PA |
Altitude | msl single value : 20000 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | artcc : zny.artcc |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | MD-80 Super 80 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Route In Use | arrival star : fqm.fqm1 |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
ASRS Report | 429650 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : commercial pilot : instrument pilot : multi engine |
Events | |
Anomaly | non adherence : far non adherence : published procedure non adherence : clearance other spatial deviation |
Independent Detector | other controllera |
Resolutory Action | controller : issued new clearance controller : issued alert flight crew : returned to intended course |
Consequence | other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
We were told to hold as published over williamsport (110 degree radial inbound). During the first outbound leg of the holding pattern, we were given a right turn heading 095 degrees and told to resume the STAR and descend to FL180. I was flying and the copilot was getting ATIS. I neglected to change the radial from 110 degrees (the inbound holding radial) to 118 degrees (the outbound STAR radial). The first officer went ahead to the next VOR and dialed in the inbound. He didn't mention to me what he was doing and I didn't ask or notice. Likewise he did not notice what I was doing. ZNY eventually said, I have you 5 mi north of centerline, turn right 20 degrees and rejoin, which we did. I am a new (45 hours by myself captain) having lived large portions of the last 6 yrs as an international officer in the B767. The first officer is a pretty new copilot (230 hours) having been furloughed and an flight engineer until 3 months ago and this was the first leg of a 2 day trip. I tried to foster good cockpit communications, briefing that I will think out loud and will always say something when I am touching any switch and would he do the same. Apparently, I need to extend this attitude to radio switches as well. When center called us north, the first officer's HSI agreed and he felt bad that he had not said anything. In summary: talking, turning, descending exiting holding, changing courses and radio aids, seating the passenger, getting ATIS -- all in the middle of trying to brief the expected ILS to runway 4R -- got the better of my management skills. In the future, I will manage the workload better and provide a better example early in the flight of what I mean by CRM.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: AN AIRLINE MD80 CREW DEPARTED A VORTAC ON THE WRONG RADIAL WHILE PERFORMING A STAR INTO EWR. THE ARTCC CTLR CORRECTED THEM.
Narrative: WE WERE TOLD TO HOLD AS PUBLISHED OVER WILLIAMSPORT (110 DEG RADIAL INBOUND). DURING THE FIRST OUTBOUND LEG OF THE HOLDING PATTERN, WE WERE GIVEN A R TURN HDG 095 DEGS AND TOLD TO RESUME THE STAR AND DSND TO FL180. I WAS FLYING AND THE COPLT WAS GETTING ATIS. I NEGLECTED TO CHANGE THE RADIAL FROM 110 DEGS (THE INBOUND HOLDING RADIAL) TO 118 DEGS (THE OUTBOUND STAR RADIAL). THE FO WENT AHEAD TO THE NEXT VOR AND DIALED IN THE INBOUND. HE DIDN'T MENTION TO ME WHAT HE WAS DOING AND I DIDN'T ASK OR NOTICE. LIKEWISE HE DID NOT NOTICE WHAT I WAS DOING. ZNY EVENTUALLY SAID, I HAVE YOU 5 MI N OF CTRLINE, TURN R 20 DEGS AND REJOIN, WHICH WE DID. I AM A NEW (45 HRS BY MYSELF CAPT) HAVING LIVED LARGE PORTIONS OF THE LAST 6 YRS AS AN INTL OFFICER IN THE B767. THE FO IS A PRETTY NEW COPLT (230 HRS) HAVING BEEN FURLOUGHED AND AN FE UNTIL 3 MONTHS AGO AND THIS WAS THE FIRST LEG OF A 2 DAY TRIP. I TRIED TO FOSTER GOOD COCKPIT COMS, BRIEFING THAT I WILL THINK OUT LOUD AND WILL ALWAYS SAY SOMETHING WHEN I AM TOUCHING ANY SWITCH AND WOULD HE DO THE SAME. APPARENTLY, I NEED TO EXTEND THIS ATTITUDE TO RADIO SWITCHES AS WELL. WHEN CTR CALLED US N, THE FO'S HSI AGREED AND HE FELT BAD THAT HE HAD NOT SAID ANYTHING. IN SUMMARY: TALKING, TURNING, DSNDING EXITING HOLDING, CHANGING COURSES AND RADIO AIDS, SEATING THE PAX, GETTING ATIS -- ALL IN THE MIDDLE OF TRYING TO BRIEF THE EXPECTED ILS TO RWY 4R -- GOT THE BETTER OF MY MGMNT SKILLS. IN THE FUTURE, I WILL MANAGE THE WORKLOAD BETTER AND PROVIDE A BETTER EXAMPLE EARLY IN THE FLT OF WHAT I MEAN BY CRM.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.