Narrative:

I was the captain and PNF of the subject flight. This was my third and final leg of the day. It was the second and final leg for the other crew members. It was also our second leg as a crew. The jump seat was occupied by a company check airman conducting a 2-LEG line check on me. The first leg, with me flying as PF, had gone well, with minor discrepancies briefed during our ground time at psp. My first officer, during our CRM briefing conducted prior to the first leg, had mentioned that he had only been with the company about 6 months and was soliciting input and advice in all phases of the operation. He also mentioned that he was not entirely familiar with psp and as a result elected to fly the second, more familiar leg, ie, psp-sea. Our initial clearance was on the palm 3.psp departure with a clearance to climb to and maintain 13000 ft. After receipt of the clearance, my first officer and I discussed power settings and departure strategies. Due to fairly strong gusty winds at psp, and some turbulence experienced during our preceding approach and landing, we decided to take off using maximum power and to climb as rapidly as possible out of the valley for turbulence avoidance. We departed runway 31L. Upon initial contact with departure control we were given a heading of 360 degrees to intercept V386 and an amended altitude of 7000 ft. As we rolled out on our 360 degree heading, and LNAV was engaged for flight director guidance, departure control pointed out company traffic at 10-11 O'clock, crossing left to right, and descending to 8000 ft. I acquired the traffic, reported it in sight, and then came inside to note that we were passing 6000 ft and climbing at +3000 FPM. Departure control then issued us 'maintain visual separation, climb to and maintain 13000 ft.' almost simultaneously the following events occurred: 1) I acknowledged the clearance, dialed 13000 ft into the altitude alerter, and looked outside to reacquire the traffic. 2) the check airman on the jump seat said 'this isn't working out.' 3) the first officer began a smooth, positive pitch over to reduce the vertical speed. 4) I engaged heading select (which disengaged LNAV), rolled the heading selector approximately 45 degrees left of course to initiate a turn behind the traffic, and called departure control and stated something to the effect of 'we need a turn to the left to avoid the traffic.' departure control responded with a clearance to turn left to 300 degrees as the TCASII RA began. The RA consisted of 'reduce climb,' followed by 'monitor vertical speed' followed by 'clear of conflict.' in the midst of the RA the company transmitted, 'do you guys see us?' and I responded on the frequency, 'yeah, we sure do.' the company traffic in question was initially displayed on our TCASII at +1.9 and the RA was resolved with the traffic displayed at +1.2. We passed horizontally approximately 1 - 1.3 NM behind the traffic. Our maximum altitude during this event was 7400 ft with no altitude loss. The entire event lasted about 20 seconds. Upon conclusion of the RA, we resumed course and re-established the climb. Supplemental information from acn 430181: we (captain, first officer, and myself) realized at the same time that a climb would not work. The captain and myself verbalized to turn more left and level off. The first officer increased our turn rate and started to level off. If our rate of climb was reduced from 3300 FPM to 1000 FPM the TCASII would not have gone off and if psp departure would've issued a clearance for us to deviation as needed and maintain visual. The captain of our flight suggested a CRM problem. Because the first officer is new to the company (6 months) and I (the check airman) was in the jump seat giving a line check. The captain didn't want to tell the first officer how to fly the airplane, ie, reduce our climb rate so we wouldn't get an RA. The first officer added that in the future he would be more vigilant in reducing rates of climb. The captain said when psp departure gave us the clearance to maintain visual on company traffic climb and maintain 13000 ft, the captain mind set was that the phraseology lured him into a mind set that there was separation and we couldn't deviate from our 360 degree heading. The first officer agreed. A better ATC phraseology would've been: 'maintain visual, climb to 13000 ft when clear of traffic,' or 'maintain visual contact, pilot's discretion, climb and maintain 13000 ft.' supplemental information from acn 430452: I've had some time to think about what occurred that day and believe there were several factors involved. I believe it was a bit of a set-up on ATC's part. The mind set on an IFR departure is that ATC will do a reasonable job at keeping IFR traffic separated. From this experience, I have a much higher awareness in the need to identify potential conflicts as early as possible to maximize avoidance! ATC can help as well by restricting a higher altitude until visually clear of traffic.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CLBING B737-400 HAS A POTENTIAL CONFLICT WITH A DSNDING, XING MD80 NEAR 8000 FT. THE B737 HAD A HIGH CLB RATE AND WAS ISSUED A VISUAL SEPARATION CLB TO 13000 FT.

Narrative: I WAS THE CAPT AND PNF OF THE SUBJECT FLT. THIS WAS MY THIRD AND FINAL LEG OF THE DAY. IT WAS THE SECOND AND FINAL LEG FOR THE OTHER CREW MEMBERS. IT WAS ALSO OUR SECOND LEG AS A CREW. THE JUMP SEAT WAS OCCUPIED BY A COMPANY CHK AIRMAN CONDUCTING A 2-LEG LINE CHK ON ME. THE FIRST LEG, WITH ME FLYING AS PF, HAD GONE WELL, WITH MINOR DISCREPANCIES BRIEFED DURING OUR GND TIME AT PSP. MY FO, DURING OUR CRM BRIEFING CONDUCTED PRIOR TO THE FIRST LEG, HAD MENTIONED THAT HE HAD ONLY BEEN WITH THE COMPANY ABOUT 6 MONTHS AND WAS SOLICITING INPUT AND ADVICE IN ALL PHASES OF THE OP. HE ALSO MENTIONED THAT HE WAS NOT ENTIRELY FAMILIAR WITH PSP AND AS A RESULT ELECTED TO FLY THE SECOND, MORE FAMILIAR LEG, IE, PSP-SEA. OUR INITIAL CLRNC WAS ON THE PALM 3.PSP DEP WITH A CLRNC TO CLB TO AND MAINTAIN 13000 FT. AFTER RECEIPT OF THE CLRNC, MY FO AND I DISCUSSED PWR SETTINGS AND DEP STRATEGIES. DUE TO FAIRLY STRONG GUSTY WINDS AT PSP, AND SOME TURB EXPERIENCED DURING OUR PRECEDING APCH AND LNDG, WE DECIDED TO TAKE OFF USING MAX PWR AND TO CLB AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE OUT OF THE VALLEY FOR TURB AVOIDANCE. WE DEPARTED RWY 31L. UPON INITIAL CONTACT WITH DEP CTL WE WERE GIVEN A HDG OF 360 DEGS TO INTERCEPT V386 AND AN AMENDED ALT OF 7000 FT. AS WE ROLLED OUT ON OUR 360 DEG HDG, AND LNAV WAS ENGAGED FOR FLT DIRECTOR GUIDANCE, DEP CTL POINTED OUT COMPANY TFC AT 10-11 O'CLOCK, XING L TO R, AND DSNDING TO 8000 FT. I ACQUIRED THE TFC, RPTED IT IN SIGHT, AND THEN CAME INSIDE TO NOTE THAT WE WERE PASSING 6000 FT AND CLBING AT +3000 FPM. DEP CTL THEN ISSUED US 'MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION, CLB TO AND MAINTAIN 13000 FT.' ALMOST SIMULTANEOUSLY THE FOLLOWING EVENTS OCCURRED: 1) I ACKNOWLEDGED THE CLRNC, DIALED 13000 FT INTO THE ALT ALERTER, AND LOOKED OUTSIDE TO REACQUIRE THE TFC. 2) THE CHK AIRMAN ON THE JUMP SEAT SAID 'THIS ISN'T WORKING OUT.' 3) THE FO BEGAN A SMOOTH, POSITIVE PITCH OVER TO REDUCE THE VERT SPD. 4) I ENGAGED HDG SELECT (WHICH DISENGAGED LNAV), ROLLED THE HDG SELECTOR APPROX 45 DEGS L OF COURSE TO INITIATE A TURN BEHIND THE TFC, AND CALLED DEP CTL AND STATED SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT OF 'WE NEED A TURN TO THE L TO AVOID THE TFC.' DEP CTL RESPONDED WITH A CLRNC TO TURN L TO 300 DEGS AS THE TCASII RA BEGAN. THE RA CONSISTED OF 'REDUCE CLB,' FOLLOWED BY 'MONITOR VERT SPD' FOLLOWED BY 'CLR OF CONFLICT.' IN THE MIDST OF THE RA THE COMPANY XMITTED, 'DO YOU GUYS SEE US?' AND I RESPONDED ON THE FREQ, 'YEAH, WE SURE DO.' THE COMPANY TFC IN QUESTION WAS INITIALLY DISPLAYED ON OUR TCASII AT +1.9 AND THE RA WAS RESOLVED WITH THE TFC DISPLAYED AT +1.2. WE PASSED HORIZLY APPROX 1 - 1.3 NM BEHIND THE TFC. OUR MAX ALT DURING THIS EVENT WAS 7400 FT WITH NO ALT LOSS. THE ENTIRE EVENT LASTED ABOUT 20 SECONDS. UPON CONCLUSION OF THE RA, WE RESUMED COURSE AND RE-ESTABLISHED THE CLB. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 430181: WE (CAPT, FO, AND MYSELF) REALIZED AT THE SAME TIME THAT A CLB WOULD NOT WORK. THE CAPT AND MYSELF VERBALIZED TO TURN MORE L AND LEVEL OFF. THE FO INCREASED OUR TURN RATE AND STARTED TO LEVEL OFF. IF OUR RATE OF CLB WAS REDUCED FROM 3300 FPM TO 1000 FPM THE TCASII WOULD NOT HAVE GONE OFF AND IF PSP DEP WOULD'VE ISSUED A CLRNC FOR US TO DEV AS NEEDED AND MAINTAIN VISUAL. THE CAPT OF OUR FLT SUGGESTED A CRM PROB. BECAUSE THE FO IS NEW TO THE COMPANY (6 MONTHS) AND I (THE CHK AIRMAN) WAS IN THE JUMP SEAT GIVING A LINE CHK. THE CAPT DIDN'T WANT TO TELL THE FO HOW TO FLY THE AIRPLANE, IE, REDUCE OUR CLB RATE SO WE WOULDN'T GET AN RA. THE FO ADDED THAT IN THE FUTURE HE WOULD BE MORE VIGILANT IN REDUCING RATES OF CLB. THE CAPT SAID WHEN PSP DEP GAVE US THE CLRNC TO MAINTAIN VISUAL ON COMPANY TFC CLB AND MAINTAIN 13000 FT, THE CAPT MIND SET WAS THAT THE PHRASEOLOGY LURED HIM INTO A MIND SET THAT THERE WAS SEPARATION AND WE COULDN'T DEVIATE FROM OUR 360 DEG HDG. THE FO AGREED. A BETTER ATC PHRASEOLOGY WOULD'VE BEEN: 'MAINTAIN VISUAL, CLB TO 13000 FT WHEN CLR OF TFC,' OR 'MAINTAIN VISUAL CONTACT, PLT'S DISCRETION, CLB AND MAINTAIN 13000 FT.' SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 430452: I'VE HAD SOME TIME TO THINK ABOUT WHAT OCCURRED THAT DAY AND BELIEVE THERE WERE SEVERAL FACTORS INVOLVED. I BELIEVE IT WAS A BIT OF A SET-UP ON ATC'S PART. THE MIND SET ON AN IFR DEP IS THAT ATC WILL DO A REASONABLE JOB AT KEEPING IFR TFC SEPARATED. FROM THIS EXPERIENCE, I HAVE A MUCH HIGHER AWARENESS IN THE NEED TO IDENT POTENTIAL CONFLICTS AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE TO MAXIMIZE AVOIDANCE! ATC CAN HELP AS WELL BY RESTRICTING A HIGHER ALT UNTIL VISUALLY CLR OF TFC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.