Narrative:

Flight from orlando to milwaukee. Aircraft was level at FL310 over atlanta. As first officer, I was PF. The flight plan listed FL350 as a final altitude. The FMS showed that FL363 was actually available so the captain had put in a request for FL350, which was denied by center. Approximately 5-10 mins prior to climb to FL350, the autothrottles automatically disengaged, probably because of .18 disparity in EPR readouts (other indications relatively matched, ie, ff, N1, N2). I bumped up power on right engine closer to left EPR reading and re-engaged autothrottles. The captain decided to call our maintenance control over cockpit airplane to let them know of disparity and what had happened. While he was on the phone, center said FL350 was available if we could be there within 2 mins because of traffic. I accepted the clearance and began climb to FL350 in the vertical speed mode (2000 FPM climb). The captain was aware we were going to FL350 while he was still talking to our maintenance. As aircraft climbed through approximately FL330 the autothrottles disengaged a second time. I manually brought power on right side (which was less than left side again). Up to match left EPR to maximum climb setting. I was aware of the airspeed decay as we approached FL350. Because the plane was not accelerating, I initiated a shallow descent (200 FPM down). The plane began to buffet, I immediately disengaged the autoplt and called aloud the captain's name. I had already stated a descent while he emphasized 'put the nose down,' when he was surprised to see how slow we were (approximately 210 KTS). The buffet ceased but we were descending. I was concerned about the traffic, and in fact saw the traffic below us and to our left pass by. Center inquired if we had seen the traffic. The captain acknowledged with 'affirmative' and stated we needed to descend to FL310 because our speed was slow (or something to that effect). Center did clear us to FL310 and then came back giving us a phone number to call after landing in milwaukee. Remainder of flight uneventful. Phone call to ZTL revealed we were 1100 ft above and 3.2 mi east of traffic. Contributing factors: captain's attention distraction while talking to our maintenance control concerning EPR disparity during our climb. Expeditious climb to FL350 and going into vertical speed mode to reach FL350 within 2 mins, thus exceeding climb limitation of aircraft based on our weight. My lack of knowledge of when to expect slow speed buffet. My concern to reach FL350 to avoid conflict.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FO OF AN MD88 LOST CTL OF ACFT DURING HIGH ALT LEVELOFF DUE TO LACK OF AIRSPD CAUSING LTSS WITH ANOTHER ACFT.

Narrative: FLT FROM ORLANDO TO MILWAUKEE. ACFT WAS LEVEL AT FL310 OVER ATLANTA. AS FO, I WAS PF. THE FLT PLAN LISTED FL350 AS A FINAL ALT. THE FMS SHOWED THAT FL363 WAS ACTUALLY AVAILABLE SO THE CAPT HAD PUT IN A REQUEST FOR FL350, WHICH WAS DENIED BY CTR. APPROX 5-10 MINS PRIOR TO CLB TO FL350, THE AUTOTHROTTLES AUTOMATICALLY DISENGAGED, PROBABLY BECAUSE OF .18 DISPARITY IN EPR READOUTS (OTHER INDICATIONS RELATIVELY MATCHED, IE, FF, N1, N2). I BUMPED UP PWR ON R ENG CLOSER TO L EPR READING AND RE-ENGAGED AUTOTHROTTLES. THE CAPT DECIDED TO CALL OUR MAINT CTL OVER COCKPIT AIRPLANE TO LET THEM KNOW OF DISPARITY AND WHAT HAD HAPPENED. WHILE HE WAS ON THE PHONE, CTR SAID FL350 WAS AVAILABLE IF WE COULD BE THERE WITHIN 2 MINS BECAUSE OF TFC. I ACCEPTED THE CLRNC AND BEGAN CLB TO FL350 IN THE VERT SPD MODE (2000 FPM CLB). THE CAPT WAS AWARE WE WERE GOING TO FL350 WHILE HE WAS STILL TALKING TO OUR MAINT. AS ACFT CLBED THROUGH APPROX FL330 THE AUTOTHROTTLES DISENGAGED A SECOND TIME. I MANUALLY BROUGHT PWR ON R SIDE (WHICH WAS LESS THAN L SIDE AGAIN). UP TO MATCH L EPR TO MAX CLB SETTING. I WAS AWARE OF THE AIRSPD DECAY AS WE APCHED FL350. BECAUSE THE PLANE WAS NOT ACCELERATING, I INITIATED A SHALLOW DSCNT (200 FPM DOWN). THE PLANE BEGAN TO BUFFET, I IMMEDIATELY DISENGAGED THE AUTOPLT AND CALLED ALOUD THE CAPT'S NAME. I HAD ALREADY STATED A DSCNT WHILE HE EMPHASIZED 'PUT THE NOSE DOWN,' WHEN HE WAS SURPRISED TO SEE HOW SLOW WE WERE (APPROX 210 KTS). THE BUFFET CEASED BUT WE WERE DSNDING. I WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE TFC, AND IN FACT SAW THE TFC BELOW US AND TO OUR L PASS BY. CTR INQUIRED IF WE HAD SEEN THE TFC. THE CAPT ACKNOWLEDGED WITH 'AFFIRMATIVE' AND STATED WE NEEDED TO DSND TO FL310 BECAUSE OUR SPD WAS SLOW (OR SOMETHING TO THAT EFFECT). CTR DID CLR US TO FL310 AND THEN CAME BACK GIVING US A PHONE NUMBER TO CALL AFTER LNDG IN MILWAUKEE. REMAINDER OF FLT UNEVENTFUL. PHONE CALL TO ZTL REVEALED WE WERE 1100 FT ABOVE AND 3.2 MI E OF TFC. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: CAPT'S ATTN DISTR WHILE TALKING TO OUR MAINT CTL CONCERNING EPR DISPARITY DURING OUR CLB. EXPEDITIOUS CLB TO FL350 AND GOING INTO VERT SPD MODE TO REACH FL350 WITHIN 2 MINS, THUS EXCEEDING CLB LIMITATION OF ACFT BASED ON OUR WT. MY LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF WHEN TO EXPECT SLOW SPD BUFFET. MY CONCERN TO REACH FL350 TO AVOID CONFLICT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.