Narrative:

We arrived at flight XXX 30-40 mins after scheduled departure. Following flight attendant briefing and walkaround inspection, first officer and I set about cockpit preparation. Numerous interruptions occurred but we finished. As we completed the checklist and were entering 'final awabs' external power was pulled before APU up to speed and all data was lost. Present position was lost so the first officer initiated a new alignment. While we waited, we cleared up several cabin, crew and briefing items. One of these was an HF check. While we could weakly hear other calls there was no response to our requests. Both first officer and I could hear me transmitting. I next tried a VHF (ATC) SELCAL check just to be sure we could transmit and receive, and received SELCAL. 1 hour 19 mins late we departed atl for mpto (panama). Passing FL180 we accomplished the VHF check and I decided to try an HF SELCAL check. First officer called for a navigation accuracy and magnetic compass check. I performed as requested and forgot the HF check. Later in our flight after passing montego bay, I remembered the failure to get the SELCAL check (the volume on the HF was on but very low). I turned up the volume and made a number of xmissions with no responses. We could hear other planes weakly on new york and houston frequencys. Next I tried caribbean HF frequencys and could hear loud spanish xmissions but did not get any answers. We had full communication with kingston center as we continued outbound toward panama. While first officer flew, I referenced my flight operations manual and commercial charts to see what needed to be done. Later in my reading, I found a reference that said if HF inoperative to coordinate with dispatch to be routed so as to stay in VHF range. (In other words, we probably shouldn't be where we were.) at that time I decided the distance that we would be out of VHF contact would be small and since we were monitoring HF guard we would hear any xmissions and could transmit on ACARS. I felt it would be more hazardous to turn around at that point. Simply put, I should not have forgotten the HF check until so late into the flight and should have been more concerned with the incomplete check on the ground. Company procedure does allow dispatch if both pilots confirm that we sound like we are transmitting.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF A B757 LOST HF COMS ON AN OVERWATER ENRTE TO FOREIGN DESTS DUE HF RADIO MALFUNCTION. CAPT DECIDED TO CONTINUE TOWARD DEST SINCE THERE WAS ONLY A SHORT DSCNT TO VHF COVERAGE EVEN THOUGH COMPANY FLT MANUAL INSTRUCTED TO CONTACT DISPATCHER FOR REROUTING FLT.

Narrative: WE ARRIVED AT FLT XXX 30-40 MINS AFTER SCHEDULED DEP. FOLLOWING FLT ATTENDANT BRIEFING AND WALKAROUND INSPECTION, FO AND I SET ABOUT COCKPIT PREPARATION. NUMEROUS INTERRUPTIONS OCCURRED BUT WE FINISHED. AS WE COMPLETED THE CHKLIST AND WERE ENTERING 'FINAL AWABS' EXTERNAL PWR WAS PULLED BEFORE APU UP TO SPD AND ALL DATA WAS LOST. PRESENT POS WAS LOST SO THE FO INITIATED A NEW ALIGNMENT. WHILE WE WAITED, WE CLRED UP SEVERAL CABIN, CREW AND BRIEFING ITEMS. ONE OF THESE WAS AN HF CHK. WHILE WE COULD WEAKLY HEAR OTHER CALLS THERE WAS NO RESPONSE TO OUR REQUESTS. BOTH FO AND I COULD HEAR ME XMITTING. I NEXT TRIED A VHF (ATC) SELCAL CHK JUST TO BE SURE WE COULD XMIT AND RECEIVE, AND RECEIVED SELCAL. 1 HR 19 MINS LATE WE DEPARTED ATL FOR MPTO (PANAMA). PASSING FL180 WE ACCOMPLISHED THE VHF CHK AND I DECIDED TO TRY AN HF SELCAL CHK. FO CALLED FOR A NAV ACCURACY AND MAGNETIC COMPASS CHK. I PERFORMED AS REQUESTED AND FORGOT THE HF CHK. LATER IN OUR FLT AFTER PASSING MONTEGO BAY, I REMEMBERED THE FAILURE TO GET THE SELCAL CHK (THE VOLUME ON THE HF WAS ON BUT VERY LOW). I TURNED UP THE VOLUME AND MADE A NUMBER OF XMISSIONS WITH NO RESPONSES. WE COULD HEAR OTHER PLANES WEAKLY ON NEW YORK AND HOUSTON FREQS. NEXT I TRIED CARIBBEAN HF FREQS AND COULD HEAR LOUD SPANISH XMISSIONS BUT DID NOT GET ANY ANSWERS. WE HAD FULL COM WITH KINGSTON CTR AS WE CONTINUED OUTBOUND TOWARD PANAMA. WHILE FO FLEW, I REFED MY FLT OPS MANUAL AND COMMERCIAL CHARTS TO SEE WHAT NEEDED TO BE DONE. LATER IN MY READING, I FOUND A REF THAT SAID IF HF INOP TO COORDINATE WITH DISPATCH TO BE ROUTED SO AS TO STAY IN VHF RANGE. (IN OTHER WORDS, WE PROBABLY SHOULDN'T BE WHERE WE WERE.) AT THAT TIME I DECIDED THE DISTANCE THAT WE WOULD BE OUT OF VHF CONTACT WOULD BE SMALL AND SINCE WE WERE MONITORING HF GUARD WE WOULD HEAR ANY XMISSIONS AND COULD XMIT ON ACARS. I FELT IT WOULD BE MORE HAZARDOUS TO TURN AROUND AT THAT POINT. SIMPLY PUT, I SHOULD NOT HAVE FORGOTTEN THE HF CHK UNTIL SO LATE INTO THE FLT AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE CONCERNED WITH THE INCOMPLETE CHK ON THE GND. COMPANY PROC DOES ALLOW DISPATCH IF BOTH PLTS CONFIRM THAT WE SOUND LIKE WE ARE XMITTING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.