Narrative:

FAA inspector in the jump seat. On departure from runway 7L at las, departure told us to maintain maximum forward speed. Captain dialed in 334 KTS in IAS (vmo=340). The aircraft accelerated faster than the autoplt trim could keep up. The captain saw the airspeed get close to the barber pole and dialed in 320 IAS to pull up the nose but it wasn't enough. I thought he obviously saw how close it was to the barber pole and said 'watch it' but a moment later we got the overspd warning. He disengaged the autoplt and autothrottle and manually pulled up. After leveling briefly at 15000 ft we were cleared to FL230. Out of 17000 ft ATC issued traffic (VFR) at 17500 ft, 11:30 O'clock position at 6 mi. Shortly thereafter we got a TCASII TA followed by an RA to descend at greater than or equal 1500 FPM. Captain disengaged autoplt and throttles and pushed the nose over. He didn't bring the throttles back far enough and while I was calling out the traffic on the TCASII, we got another overspd. FAA jump seater located the traffic, I reported the RA to ATC, captain resumed the climb. Not too impressive and we made some mistakes but we did do some things right. And we both recognized it. FAA jump seater realized what we had just gone through with WX and wasn't critical. His only comment was a question if we told ATC about the RA. I learned again that we are all going to make mistakes while under pressure but we can't make the big one. Early in the trip the captain set a good tone where I could speak up.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DURING CLB AN MD80 FLC RECEIVED AN OVERSPD WARNING FOLLOWED BY A TCASII RA AND A SECOND OVERSPD IN THE RA DSCNT MANEUVER.

Narrative: FAA INSPECTOR IN THE JUMP SEAT. ON DEP FROM RWY 7L AT LAS, DEP TOLD US TO MAINTAIN MAX FORWARD SPD. CAPT DIALED IN 334 KTS IN IAS (VMO=340). THE ACFT ACCELERATED FASTER THAN THE AUTOPLT TRIM COULD KEEP UP. THE CAPT SAW THE AIRSPD GET CLOSE TO THE BARBER POLE AND DIALED IN 320 IAS TO PULL UP THE NOSE BUT IT WASN'T ENOUGH. I THOUGHT HE OBVIOUSLY SAW HOW CLOSE IT WAS TO THE BARBER POLE AND SAID 'WATCH IT' BUT A MOMENT LATER WE GOT THE OVERSPD WARNING. HE DISENGAGED THE AUTOPLT AND AUTOTHROTTLE AND MANUALLY PULLED UP. AFTER LEVELING BRIEFLY AT 15000 FT WE WERE CLRED TO FL230. OUT OF 17000 FT ATC ISSUED TFC (VFR) AT 17500 FT, 11:30 O'CLOCK POS AT 6 MI. SHORTLY THEREAFTER WE GOT A TCASII TA FOLLOWED BY AN RA TO DSND AT GREATER THAN OR EQUAL 1500 FPM. CAPT DISENGAGED AUTOPLT AND THROTTLES AND PUSHED THE NOSE OVER. HE DIDN'T BRING THE THROTTLES BACK FAR ENOUGH AND WHILE I WAS CALLING OUT THE TFC ON THE TCASII, WE GOT ANOTHER OVERSPD. FAA JUMP SEATER LOCATED THE TFC, I RPTED THE RA TO ATC, CAPT RESUMED THE CLB. NOT TOO IMPRESSIVE AND WE MADE SOME MISTAKES BUT WE DID DO SOME THINGS RIGHT. AND WE BOTH RECOGNIZED IT. FAA JUMP SEATER REALIZED WHAT WE HAD JUST GONE THROUGH WITH WX AND WASN'T CRITICAL. HIS ONLY COMMENT WAS A QUESTION IF WE TOLD ATC ABOUT THE RA. I LEARNED AGAIN THAT WE ARE ALL GOING TO MAKE MISTAKES WHILE UNDER PRESSURE BUT WE CAN'T MAKE THE BIG ONE. EARLY IN THE TRIP THE CAPT SET A GOOD TONE WHERE I COULD SPEAK UP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.