Narrative:

While returning from the concourse to the aircraft, the refueler handed me the refueling slip as he left the jetway, which was a little early considering the fuel load. I put it away with the rest of the paperwork. Later, while performing the before start checklist, it was noted that we did not have the required fuel for departure, and I forgot that I already had the fuel slip, so we assumed that the refueling was not completed. We elected to continue the checklist and come back to 'fuel quantity' when the refueler brought up the fuel slip. After reading the checklist there were some jump seat and customer service distrs that obviously broke our train of thought and we did not 'flag' the fuel as an unfinished item. During taxi, I noticed that the takeoff weight did not match the gross weight given by operations. I called operations for an explanation and was told it was due to 30 fewer people and less cargo. Since it was a 'short' taxi, I accepted the explanation without further pursuit, and we took off with a 10000 pound fuel discrepancy. We discovered the shortage during climb out and returned to anc for more fuel. Conclusions: small distrs and out of sequence items caused us to miss a fueling error while doing the 'before start checklist.' during taxi, distrs and false assumptions clouded our ability to recognize a fuel shortage. While I normally doublechk the fuel required with actual fuel, I did not do it this time. Fortunately we discovered the error soon after takeoff and the chain was broken.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF AN MD83 RETURNED TO LAND AFTER DISCOVERING THAT THEY DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT FUEL ON BOARD FOR THE TRIP DUE TO CHKLIST DISTR DURING PREFLT.

Narrative: WHILE RETURNING FROM THE CONCOURSE TO THE ACFT, THE REFUELER HANDED ME THE REFUELING SLIP AS HE LEFT THE JETWAY, WHICH WAS A LITTLE EARLY CONSIDERING THE FUEL LOAD. I PUT IT AWAY WITH THE REST OF THE PAPERWORK. LATER, WHILE PERFORMING THE BEFORE START CHKLIST, IT WAS NOTED THAT WE DID NOT HAVE THE REQUIRED FUEL FOR DEP, AND I FORGOT THAT I ALREADY HAD THE FUEL SLIP, SO WE ASSUMED THAT THE REFUELING WAS NOT COMPLETED. WE ELECTED TO CONTINUE THE CHKLIST AND COME BACK TO 'FUEL QUANTITY' WHEN THE REFUELER BROUGHT UP THE FUEL SLIP. AFTER READING THE CHKLIST THERE WERE SOME JUMP SEAT AND CUSTOMER SVC DISTRS THAT OBVIOUSLY BROKE OUR TRAIN OF THOUGHT AND WE DID NOT 'FLAG' THE FUEL AS AN UNFINISHED ITEM. DURING TAXI, I NOTICED THAT THE TKOF WT DID NOT MATCH THE GROSS WT GIVEN BY OPS. I CALLED OPS FOR AN EXPLANATION AND WAS TOLD IT WAS DUE TO 30 FEWER PEOPLE AND LESS CARGO. SINCE IT WAS A 'SHORT' TAXI, I ACCEPTED THE EXPLANATION WITHOUT FURTHER PURSUIT, AND WE TOOK OFF WITH A 10000 LB FUEL DISCREPANCY. WE DISCOVERED THE SHORTAGE DURING CLBOUT AND RETURNED TO ANC FOR MORE FUEL. CONCLUSIONS: SMALL DISTRS AND OUT OF SEQUENCE ITEMS CAUSED US TO MISS A FUELING ERROR WHILE DOING THE 'BEFORE START CHKLIST.' DURING TAXI, DISTRS AND FALSE ASSUMPTIONS CLOUDED OUR ABILITY TO RECOGNIZE A FUEL SHORTAGE. WHILE I NORMALLY DOUBLECHK THE FUEL REQUIRED WITH ACTUAL FUEL, I DID NOT DO IT THIS TIME. FORTUNATELY WE DISCOVERED THE ERROR SOON AFTER TKOF AND THE CHAIN WAS BROKEN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.