Narrative:

We were left fairly high by center and, as a new pilot on the aircraft, I was struggling to decelerate and descend simultaneously. The captain informed me that we were on GS and we should be ok on our descent. I had the airport in sight, the captain called the field, and we were cleared for the visual approach to runway 32. I had the localizer frequency tuned and idented on both sides, with the localizer needle nearly full scale right. I turned right to intercept -- although I had the airport in sight, I did not have the runway in sight. The captain told me he had the runway. A moment later the captain asked me to 'turn left, widen it out a bit.' it did not seem to make sense to me, as the localizer needle was still full scale right, but I complied. A few mins later the captain again asked me to 'take it out a bit more to the left, head towards the guard hangar.' I grew up in this area and am very familiar with the pittsburgh airport, I saw the guard hangars well to the right. I was not sure where the captain was asking me to go. Just then, the tower called, 'where are you going? What are you guys looking at up there?' I said, 'captain, you have the aircraft, I don't know where you want me to go.' the captain took the aircraft, I told tower we would be executing a missed approach, and we began the missed approach procedure. Tower was in the process of turning the airport around and we were subsequently cleared for a visual approach and landing on runway 10L. The missed approach did not occur below 1000 ft AGL. I am writing this for a few reasons. As a new hire with very little time in the aircraft, I followed the captain's commands despite the fact that I was very familiar with the area and the airport. The captain was based in another city and, although familiar with pittsburgh, we obviously did not agree on what we were seeing. We were both fatigued, and a night visual approach may not have been the best idea. We were also rushed to descend after the late handoff from center. I think that had I perhaps been a little bit more assertive this could have been prevented, but because I was new in the airplane and a little bit hesitant, I just did what I was told. Unfortunately, it went a bit too far before it was corrected. Perhaps adding a night visual approach limitation to new hire pilots with less than 100 hours in type might help the situation in the future. The captain also indicated that, should we have to explain our miss, we would tell them that, as a new hire I was 'behind the airplane.' I do not feel as though this was the case either. The aircraft was on speed and configured for maneuvering. I was correcting in the proper direction to join the localizer. I had the aircraft under control, just poor situational awareness and poor communication between crew members.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF A DC9 MISSED THE RWY ALIGNMENT DURING A VISUAL APCH AND THE TWR QUESTIONED THEIR INTENTIONS RESULTING IN A MISSED APCH.

Narrative: WE WERE LEFT FAIRLY HIGH BY CTR AND, AS A NEW PLT ON THE ACFT, I WAS STRUGGLING TO DECELERATE AND DSND SIMULTANEOUSLY. THE CAPT INFORMED ME THAT WE WERE ON GS AND WE SHOULD BE OK ON OUR DSCNT. I HAD THE ARPT IN SIGHT, THE CAPT CALLED THE FIELD, AND WE WERE CLRED FOR THE VISUAL APCH TO RWY 32. I HAD THE LOC FREQ TUNED AND IDENTED ON BOTH SIDES, WITH THE LOC NEEDLE NEARLY FULL SCALE R. I TURNED R TO INTERCEPT -- ALTHOUGH I HAD THE ARPT IN SIGHT, I DID NOT HAVE THE RWY IN SIGHT. THE CAPT TOLD ME HE HAD THE RWY. A MOMENT LATER THE CAPT ASKED ME TO 'TURN L, WIDEN IT OUT A BIT.' IT DID NOT SEEM TO MAKE SENSE TO ME, AS THE LOC NEEDLE WAS STILL FULL SCALE R, BUT I COMPLIED. A FEW MINS LATER THE CAPT AGAIN ASKED ME TO 'TAKE IT OUT A BIT MORE TO THE L, HEAD TOWARDS THE GUARD HANGAR.' I GREW UP IN THIS AREA AND AM VERY FAMILIAR WITH THE PITTSBURGH ARPT, I SAW THE GUARD HANGARS WELL TO THE R. I WAS NOT SURE WHERE THE CAPT WAS ASKING ME TO GO. JUST THEN, THE TWR CALLED, 'WHERE ARE YOU GOING? WHAT ARE YOU GUYS LOOKING AT UP THERE?' I SAID, 'CAPT, YOU HAVE THE ACFT, I DON'T KNOW WHERE YOU WANT ME TO GO.' THE CAPT TOOK THE ACFT, I TOLD TWR WE WOULD BE EXECUTING A MISSED APCH, AND WE BEGAN THE MISSED APCH PROC. TWR WAS IN THE PROCESS OF TURNING THE ARPT AROUND AND WE WERE SUBSEQUENTLY CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH AND LNDG ON RWY 10L. THE MISSED APCH DID NOT OCCUR BELOW 1000 FT AGL. I AM WRITING THIS FOR A FEW REASONS. AS A NEW HIRE WITH VERY LITTLE TIME IN THE ACFT, I FOLLOWED THE CAPT'S COMMANDS DESPITE THE FACT THAT I WAS VERY FAMILIAR WITH THE AREA AND THE ARPT. THE CAPT WAS BASED IN ANOTHER CITY AND, ALTHOUGH FAMILIAR WITH PITTSBURGH, WE OBVIOUSLY DID NOT AGREE ON WHAT WE WERE SEEING. WE WERE BOTH FATIGUED, AND A NIGHT VISUAL APCH MAY NOT HAVE BEEN THE BEST IDEA. WE WERE ALSO RUSHED TO DSND AFTER THE LATE HDOF FROM CTR. I THINK THAT HAD I PERHAPS BEEN A LITTLE BIT MORE ASSERTIVE THIS COULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED, BUT BECAUSE I WAS NEW IN THE AIRPLANE AND A LITTLE BIT HESITANT, I JUST DID WHAT I WAS TOLD. UNFORTUNATELY, IT WENT A BIT TOO FAR BEFORE IT WAS CORRECTED. PERHAPS ADDING A NIGHT VISUAL APCH LIMITATION TO NEW HIRE PLTS WITH LESS THAN 100 HRS IN TYPE MIGHT HELP THE SIT IN THE FUTURE. THE CAPT ALSO INDICATED THAT, SHOULD WE HAVE TO EXPLAIN OUR MISS, WE WOULD TELL THEM THAT, AS A NEW HIRE I WAS 'BEHIND THE AIRPLANE.' I DO NOT FEEL AS THOUGH THIS WAS THE CASE EITHER. THE ACFT WAS ON SPD AND CONFIGURED FOR MANEUVERING. I WAS CORRECTING IN THE PROPER DIRECTION TO JOIN THE LOC. I HAD THE ACFT UNDER CTL, JUST POOR SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND POOR COM BTWN CREW MEMBERS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.