Narrative:

I was the captain of air carrier flight xyz between iah and sea, which diverted into ZZZ, and subsequently flew from ZZZ into sea. While en route to sea, I had indications in the cockpit that the left wing anti-ice valve was stuck in a transitory position. Sea WX was reporting moderate rime icing in the clouds between 8000 ft and 16000 ft MSL. After consulting our QRH for the proper procedure, I determined that it would be prudent to avoid icing conditions. I used the cockpit phone and called dispatch so that my dispatcher and I could jointly determine the most prudent and safe course of action. The dispatcher conference called maintenance control who had me check circuit breakers and confirmed to the dispatcher and I that there was no way to determine the position of left wing anti-ice valve. While I was talking to dispatch the first officer was flying and communicating with ZSE. He asked for icing reports, and we were told that sea and pdx were both reporting active icing in the clouds but ZZZ was not reporting any icing. We diverted to ZZZ where my company called in contract maintenance to fix my problem. During my conversation with maintenance and dispatch, maintenance control said that they were going to wire the wing anti-ice valve in the open position and disconnect the cannon plug to it. I agreed to the plan because the temperature at ZZZ was 6 degrees C and the temperature in sea was 9 degrees C and the flight could be completed without exceeded the 10 degrees C limit. While we were on the ground in ZZZ, I went outside and watched the mechanic as he wired the valve open. I was standing under the left wing and felt the hot air blowing out of the holes under the leading edge devices. The flight to sea was uneventful and was completed without incident. Upon arrival at the gate and after I shut down #1 engine, and noticed that the left 'spar valve' was bright blue, indicating that it disagreed with the requested position of closed. I briefed the oncoming crew as to what was done as far as the wing anti-ice valve and was surprised to see that they were going to take the plane to ewr. As a crew, first officer abc wxxx and I did all the checklists, consulted with dispatch, maintenance, and ATC. The plan we followed was developed on sound basis, but the weak link was in the contract maintenance man who did the procedure. He was on a cell phone talking to air carrier maintenance control while he worked and I had to trust that he did his job right. Could we have caught the problem before we departed ZZZ? The left wing anti-ice valve was bright blue, but maintenance control had advised me that this whole problem could be just an indication problem. The valve was physically wired open, so I believed that it was in fact open. The left spar valve was wired open and should have been bright blue on the ground in geg. The 'receiving checklist' calls for checking the fuel system, which I did, but I did not notice the left spar valve was bright blue before start. I did notice the spar valve light when I shut down the engine in sea. During flight the left spar valve indication would be normal, since the fuel lever called for the valve to be open. The outgoing crew called in an air carrier mechanic and corrected the problem before departing for ewr. I only found out this information the next morning as I was checking the paperwork for the next flight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-800 WAS DISPATCHED IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH THE WRONG VALVE WIRED OPEN AND DEFERRED.

Narrative: I WAS THE CAPT OF ACR FLT XYZ BTWN IAH AND SEA, WHICH DIVERTED INTO ZZZ, AND SUBSEQUENTLY FLEW FROM ZZZ INTO SEA. WHILE ENRTE TO SEA, I HAD INDICATIONS IN THE COCKPIT THAT THE L WING ANTI-ICE VALVE WAS STUCK IN A TRANSITORY POS. SEA WX WAS RPTING MODERATE RIME ICING IN THE CLOUDS BTWN 8000 FT AND 16000 FT MSL. AFTER CONSULTING OUR QRH FOR THE PROPER PROC, I DETERMINED THAT IT WOULD BE PRUDENT TO AVOID ICING CONDITIONS. I USED THE COCKPIT PHONE AND CALLED DISPATCH SO THAT MY DISPATCHER AND I COULD JOINTLY DETERMINE THE MOST PRUDENT AND SAFE COURSE OF ACTION. THE DISPATCHER CONFERENCE CALLED MAINT CTL WHO HAD ME CHK CIRCUIT BREAKERS AND CONFIRMED TO THE DISPATCHER AND I THAT THERE WAS NO WAY TO DETERMINE THE POS OF L WING ANTI-ICE VALVE. WHILE I WAS TALKING TO DISPATCH THE FO WAS FLYING AND COMMUNICATING WITH ZSE. HE ASKED FOR ICING RPTS, AND WE WERE TOLD THAT SEA AND PDX WERE BOTH RPTING ACTIVE ICING IN THE CLOUDS BUT ZZZ WAS NOT RPTING ANY ICING. WE DIVERTED TO ZZZ WHERE MY COMPANY CALLED IN CONTRACT MAINT TO FIX MY PROB. DURING MY CONVERSATION WITH MAINT AND DISPATCH, MAINT CTL SAID THAT THEY WERE GOING TO WIRE THE WING ANTI-ICE VALVE IN THE OPEN POS AND DISCONNECT THE CANNON PLUG TO IT. I AGREED TO THE PLAN BECAUSE THE TEMP AT ZZZ WAS 6 DEGS C AND THE TEMP IN SEA WAS 9 DEGS C AND THE FLT COULD BE COMPLETED WITHOUT EXCEEDED THE 10 DEGS C LIMIT. WHILE WE WERE ON THE GND IN ZZZ, I WENT OUTSIDE AND WATCHED THE MECH AS HE WIRED THE VALVE OPEN. I WAS STANDING UNDER THE L WING AND FELT THE HOT AIR BLOWING OUT OF THE HOLES UNDER THE LEADING EDGE DEVICES. THE FLT TO SEA WAS UNEVENTFUL AND WAS COMPLETED WITHOUT INCIDENT. UPON ARR AT THE GATE AND AFTER I SHUT DOWN #1 ENG, AND NOTICED THAT THE L 'SPAR VALVE' WAS BRIGHT BLUE, INDICATING THAT IT DISAGREED WITH THE REQUESTED POS OF CLOSED. I BRIEFED THE ONCOMING CREW AS TO WHAT WAS DONE AS FAR AS THE WING ANTI-ICE VALVE AND WAS SURPRISED TO SEE THAT THEY WERE GOING TO TAKE THE PLANE TO EWR. AS A CREW, FO ABC WXXX AND I DID ALL THE CHKLISTS, CONSULTED WITH DISPATCH, MAINT, AND ATC. THE PLAN WE FOLLOWED WAS DEVELOPED ON SOUND BASIS, BUT THE WEAK LINK WAS IN THE CONTRACT MAINT MAN WHO DID THE PROC. HE WAS ON A CELL PHONE TALKING TO ACR MAINT CTL WHILE HE WORKED AND I HAD TO TRUST THAT HE DID HIS JOB RIGHT. COULD WE HAVE CAUGHT THE PROB BEFORE WE DEPARTED ZZZ? THE L WING ANTI-ICE VALVE WAS BRIGHT BLUE, BUT MAINT CTL HAD ADVISED ME THAT THIS WHOLE PROB COULD BE JUST AN INDICATION PROB. THE VALVE WAS PHYSICALLY WIRED OPEN, SO I BELIEVED THAT IT WAS IN FACT OPEN. THE L SPAR VALVE WAS WIRED OPEN AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN BRIGHT BLUE ON THE GND IN GEG. THE 'RECEIVING CHKLIST' CALLS FOR CHKING THE FUEL SYS, WHICH I DID, BUT I DID NOT NOTICE THE L SPAR VALVE WAS BRIGHT BLUE BEFORE START. I DID NOTICE THE SPAR VALVE LIGHT WHEN I SHUT DOWN THE ENG IN SEA. DURING FLT THE L SPAR VALVE INDICATION WOULD BE NORMAL, SINCE THE FUEL LEVER CALLED FOR THE VALVE TO BE OPEN. THE OUTGOING CREW CALLED IN AN ACR MECH AND CORRECTED THE PROB BEFORE DEPARTING FOR EWR. I ONLY FOUND OUT THIS INFO THE NEXT MORNING AS I WAS CHKING THE PAPERWORK FOR THE NEXT FLT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.