Narrative:

This flight took place from wmh to stl. An IFR clearance was obtained on the ground via landline from jonesboro radio. Void time was ample -- at least 15 mins. Upon completing all required tasks and checklists, proceeded to depart wmh runway 23. As takeoff power was initially applied, all system indicated normal. Proper takeoff power was set and closely monitored. As the takeoff roll proceeded, adjustments were made as necessary due to ram effects. However, despite how accurately the power settings were adjusted, the bypass system activated prematurely on engine #2 during the takeoff roll. Approaching bokias, the bypass system on engine #2 activated at intervals of 1-3 seconds. Takeoff was aborted on runway 23. A taxi back and power check were conducted. From analyzing indications encountered during departures at dfw, hot and hro, I felt it was safe to continue flts a and B with the previous indications in mind. Subsequently, for the remaining flts, there were no abnormal indications. Maintenance, and subsequent crews were advised. Nothing follows. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter states that this air carrier bought several aircraft from a defunct carrier. This particular aircraft was one of those recently acquired. Reporter further states that in the process of integrating these aircraft into the new carrier fleet, numerous aircraft were reported to have overly sensitive single redline computers. These computers function to limit itt overtemp by limiting fuel through the fuel control unit similar to a fuel topping governor. Reporter states this his company is aware of and correcting the discrepancy to the single redline computers and bringing these aircraft up to the same maintenance standard as the rest of their fleet.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR SA227 ABORTED TKOF AT WMH AFTER EXPERIENCING AN APPARENT ROLLBACK OF PWR IN THE #2 ENG.

Narrative: THIS FLT TOOK PLACE FROM WMH TO STL. AN IFR CLRNC WAS OBTAINED ON THE GND VIA LANDLINE FROM JONESBORO RADIO. VOID TIME WAS AMPLE -- AT LEAST 15 MINS. UPON COMPLETING ALL REQUIRED TASKS AND CHKLISTS, PROCEEDED TO DEPART WMH RWY 23. AS TKOF PWR WAS INITIALLY APPLIED, ALL SYS INDICATED NORMAL. PROPER TKOF PWR WAS SET AND CLOSELY MONITORED. AS THE TKOF ROLL PROCEEDED, ADJUSTMENTS WERE MADE AS NECESSARY DUE TO RAM EFFECTS. HOWEVER, DESPITE HOW ACCURATELY THE PWR SETTINGS WERE ADJUSTED, THE BYPASS SYS ACTIVATED PREMATURELY ON ENG #2 DURING THE TKOF ROLL. APCHING BOKIAS, THE BYPASS SYS ON ENG #2 ACTIVATED AT INTERVALS OF 1-3 SECONDS. TKOF WAS ABORTED ON RWY 23. A TAXI BACK AND PWR CHK WERE CONDUCTED. FROM ANALYZING INDICATIONS ENCOUNTERED DURING DEPS AT DFW, HOT AND HRO, I FELT IT WAS SAFE TO CONTINUE FLTS A AND B WITH THE PREVIOUS INDICATIONS IN MIND. SUBSEQUENTLY, FOR THE REMAINING FLTS, THERE WERE NO ABNORMAL INDICATIONS. MAINT, AND SUBSEQUENT CREWS WERE ADVISED. NOTHING FOLLOWS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATES THAT THIS ACR BOUGHT SEVERAL ACFT FROM A DEFUNCT CARRIER. THIS PARTICULAR ACFT WAS ONE OF THOSE RECENTLY ACQUIRED. RPTR FURTHER STATES THAT IN THE PROCESS OF INTEGRATING THESE ACFT INTO THE NEW CARRIER FLEET, NUMEROUS ACFT WERE RPTED TO HAVE OVERLY SENSITIVE SINGLE REDLINE COMPUTERS. THESE COMPUTERS FUNCTION TO LIMIT ITT OVERTEMP BY LIMITING FUEL THROUGH THE FUEL CTL UNIT SIMILAR TO A FUEL TOPPING GOVERNOR. RPTR STATES THIS HIS COMPANY IS AWARE OF AND CORRECTING THE DISCREPANCY TO THE SINGLE REDLINE COMPUTERS AND BRINGING THESE ACFT UP TO THE SAME MAINT STANDARD AS THE REST OF THEIR FLEET.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.