Narrative:

We arrived at bwi at about XA25 (approximately 30 mins late). We then took the crew van to the hotel and I was asleep at about XC00 with an XE45 wake up. We took the XF30 crew van from the hotel that morning to be at the airport and ready for an XG10 departure. We had an on time departure. En route, the captain discussed with me that he might have to do the landing at jfk due to the low visibility. I was restr because I had less than 100 hours in that type of aircraft (45 hours to be more precise). Once in the jfk terminal area, we were on radar vectors to ILS runway 4R. We were given a heading to intercept the localizer. Just as we were intercepting, approach control announced that the visibility was 1400 ft RVR. They asked if we could accept the approach. The captain responded that we could not. We were given holding instructions, which were to hold at ebbee (FAF) 10 mi legs, maintain 4000 ft. As we neared ebbee, approach control announced that the visibility was 1600 ft RVR then 1800 ft RVR. At this point approach control asked if we could make it from our current position. The captain replied that he thought so. I retarded the power levers and initiated a 2000 FPM rate of descent with the autoplt. At the same time, the captain extended the landing gear and said that he had the aircraft. In retrospect, I believe that the lack of rest made it difficult for me to respond to the sudden change from the PF to the PNF and to react to the now hurried approach. Due to my slow response to the situation, I missed some calls, which contributed to an unstable approach and a zero degree flap landing. Upon touchdown, the captain put the propeller controls in full reverse to decelerate rapidly, but our speed was such that we proceeded in overrunning the runway. In retrospect to this incident, I feel that fatigue was the major factor in my inability to make the sudden xfer from the PF to the PNF duties. I tried to prepare myself for this schedule that the company had given me, but in retrospect I feel it would be very difficult to ever fully adjust to such a schedule. Additionally, in hindsight, I feel that my training was inadequate in the physiology aspect. I was never taught how to recognize fatigue and furthermore, never told to relieve myself from a trip due to fatigue with no consequences. One last attributing factor, in retrospect, is that in all of my simulator training, all of my PNF duties were performed from the left seat due to being paired with another first officer. I feel that if I were paired with a captain and some scenarios were introduced where he made some mistakes on approachs which I would have to identify and correct, it would have more prepared me to deal with a problem as the one discussed in this statement. Supplemental information from acn 436820: the aircraft came to a complete stop at the end of runway 4R in the foam arrester. I notified the tower and company of the situation and then entered the cabin to assist the flight attendant. After confirming that there were no injuries, the passenger were deplaned. In retrospect I believe the crew may have been excessively fatigued caused by the scheduling of these flts. The company schedules them and we pilots try to prepare for them but the transition from day flying to night and back is hard.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SAAB 340 FLC UNABLE TO STOP WITHIN RWY CONFINES UPON LNDG AT JFK.

Narrative: WE ARRIVED AT BWI AT ABOUT XA25 (APPROX 30 MINS LATE). WE THEN TOOK THE CREW VAN TO THE HOTEL AND I WAS ASLEEP AT ABOUT XC00 WITH AN XE45 WAKE UP. WE TOOK THE XF30 CREW VAN FROM THE HOTEL THAT MORNING TO BE AT THE ARPT AND READY FOR AN XG10 DEP. WE HAD AN ON TIME DEP. ENRTE, THE CAPT DISCUSSED WITH ME THAT HE MIGHT HAVE TO DO THE LNDG AT JFK DUE TO THE LOW VISIBILITY. I WAS RESTR BECAUSE I HAD LESS THAN 100 HRS IN THAT TYPE OF ACFT (45 HRS TO BE MORE PRECISE). ONCE IN THE JFK TERMINAL AREA, WE WERE ON RADAR VECTORS TO ILS RWY 4R. WE WERE GIVEN A HEADING TO INTERCEPT THE LOC. JUST AS WE WERE INTERCEPTING, APCH CTL ANNOUNCED THAT THE VISIBILITY WAS 1400 FT RVR. THEY ASKED IF WE COULD ACCEPT THE APCH. THE CAPT RESPONDED THAT WE COULD NOT. WE WERE GIVEN HOLDING INSTRUCTIONS, WHICH WERE TO HOLD AT EBBEE (FAF) 10 MI LEGS, MAINTAIN 4000 FT. AS WE NEARED EBBEE, APCH CTL ANNOUNCED THAT THE VISIBILITY WAS 1600 FT RVR THEN 1800 FT RVR. AT THIS POINT APCH CTL ASKED IF WE COULD MAKE IT FROM OUR CURRENT POS. THE CAPT REPLIED THAT HE THOUGHT SO. I RETARDED THE PWR LEVERS AND INITIATED A 2000 FPM RATE OF DSCNT WITH THE AUTOPLT. AT THE SAME TIME, THE CAPT EXTENDED THE LNDG GEAR AND SAID THAT HE HAD THE ACFT. IN RETROSPECT, I BELIEVE THAT THE LACK OF REST MADE IT DIFFICULT FOR ME TO RESPOND TO THE SUDDEN CHANGE FROM THE PF TO THE PNF AND TO REACT TO THE NOW HURRIED APCH. DUE TO MY SLOW RESPONSE TO THE SIT, I MISSED SOME CALLS, WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO AN UNSTABLE APCH AND A ZERO DEG FLAP LNDG. UPON TOUCHDOWN, THE CAPT PUT THE PROP CTLS IN FULL REVERSE TO DECELERATE RAPIDLY, BUT OUR SPD WAS SUCH THAT WE PROCEEDED IN OVERRUNNING THE RWY. IN RETROSPECT TO THIS INCIDENT, I FEEL THAT FATIGUE WAS THE MAJOR FACTOR IN MY INABILITY TO MAKE THE SUDDEN XFER FROM THE PF TO THE PNF DUTIES. I TRIED TO PREPARE MYSELF FOR THIS SCHEDULE THAT THE COMPANY HAD GIVEN ME, BUT IN RETROSPECT I FEEL IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO EVER FULLY ADJUST TO SUCH A SCHEDULE. ADDITIONALLY, IN HINDSIGHT, I FEEL THAT MY TRAINING WAS INADEQUATE IN THE PHYSIOLOGY ASPECT. I WAS NEVER TAUGHT HOW TO RECOGNIZE FATIGUE AND FURTHERMORE, NEVER TOLD TO RELIEVE MYSELF FROM A TRIP DUE TO FATIGUE WITH NO CONSEQUENCES. ONE LAST ATTRIBUTING FACTOR, IN RETROSPECT, IS THAT IN ALL OF MY SIMULATOR TRAINING, ALL OF MY PNF DUTIES WERE PERFORMED FROM THE L SEAT DUE TO BEING PAIRED WITH ANOTHER FO. I FEEL THAT IF I WERE PAIRED WITH A CAPT AND SOME SCENARIOS WERE INTRODUCED WHERE HE MADE SOME MISTAKES ON APCHS WHICH I WOULD HAVE TO IDENT AND CORRECT, IT WOULD HAVE MORE PREPARED ME TO DEAL WITH A PROB AS THE ONE DISCUSSED IN THIS STATEMENT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 436820: THE ACFT CAME TO A COMPLETE STOP AT THE END OF RWY 4R IN THE FOAM ARRESTER. I NOTIFIED THE TWR AND COMPANY OF THE SIT AND THEN ENTERED THE CABIN TO ASSIST THE FLT ATTENDANT. AFTER CONFIRMING THAT THERE WERE NO INJURIES, THE PAX WERE DEPLANED. IN RETROSPECT I BELIEVE THE CREW MAY HAVE BEEN EXCESSIVELY FATIGUED CAUSED BY THE SCHEDULING OF THESE FLTS. THE COMPANY SCHEDULES THEM AND WE PLTS TRY TO PREPARE FOR THEM BUT THE TRANSITION FROM DAY FLYING TO NIGHT AND BACK IS HARD.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.