Narrative:

We were conducting the VOR DME runway 19 approach into mggt. It was a late night arrival with low ragged ceiling and rain. It was my first flight into mggt, the captain had been there several times. The captain was flying the approach as required by company procedures. Descent out of altitude and initial step-down crossing altitudes were flown perfectly. We promptly got to the published MDA of 5440 ft to look for the airfield, aircraft was hand flown. We calculated a vdp of 1.6 DME, there are PAPI lights to this runway. At about 2.6 DME we acquired the field and the below GS PAPI indication. Because the captain feared losing sight of the field in the ragged ceiling condition, he began a 500 FPM descent in order to maintain visual contact with the field. I immediately objected and insisted upon waiting for the correct PAPI indication. We shallowed our descent briefly while the captain stated he met the conditions in which to descend below calculated vdp. We were uncomfortably close to the tops of buildings and a large tower in the approach path. Once acquiring the correct PAPI (on GS) lights we landed without incident. Our company's operations specifications clearly do not allow an early descent in a situation like this. Contributing factors to this near accident: 1) misunderstanding by captain of far 121.651 and company operation specifications, 2) night conditions and fatigue, 3) poor WX/visibility, 4) high terrain/challenging non-precision approach, 5) stress and language barrier of operating in a foreign country, and 6) relative inexperience to this airport by crew.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B757 PIC DSNDS BELOW THE PUBLISHED MDA PRIOR TO THE CALCULATED VDP AT MGGT, FO.

Narrative: WE WERE CONDUCTING THE VOR DME RWY 19 APCH INTO MGGT. IT WAS A LATE NIGHT ARR WITH LOW RAGGED CEILING AND RAIN. IT WAS MY FIRST FLT INTO MGGT, THE CAPT HAD BEEN THERE SEVERAL TIMES. THE CAPT WAS FLYING THE APCH AS REQUIRED BY COMPANY PROCS. DSCNT OUT OF ALT AND INITIAL STEP-DOWN XING ALTS WERE FLOWN PERFECTLY. WE PROMPTLY GOT TO THE PUBLISHED MDA OF 5440 FT TO LOOK FOR THE AIRFIELD, ACFT WAS HAND FLOWN. WE CALCULATED A VDP OF 1.6 DME, THERE ARE PAPI LIGHTS TO THIS RWY. AT ABOUT 2.6 DME WE ACQUIRED THE FIELD AND THE BELOW GS PAPI INDICATION. BECAUSE THE CAPT FEARED LOSING SIGHT OF THE FIELD IN THE RAGGED CEILING CONDITION, HE BEGAN A 500 FPM DSCNT IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN VISUAL CONTACT WITH THE FIELD. I IMMEDIATELY OBJECTED AND INSISTED UPON WAITING FOR THE CORRECT PAPI INDICATION. WE SHALLOWED OUR DSCNT BRIEFLY WHILE THE CAPT STATED HE MET THE CONDITIONS IN WHICH TO DSND BELOW CALCULATED VDP. WE WERE UNCOMFORTABLY CLOSE TO THE TOPS OF BUILDINGS AND A LARGE TWR IN THE APCH PATH. ONCE ACQUIRING THE CORRECT PAPI (ON GS) LIGHTS WE LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. OUR COMPANY'S OPS SPECS CLRLY DO NOT ALLOW AN EARLY DSCNT IN A SIT LIKE THIS. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THIS NEAR ACCIDENT: 1) MISUNDERSTANDING BY CAPT OF FAR 121.651 AND COMPANY OP SPECS, 2) NIGHT CONDITIONS AND FATIGUE, 3) POOR WX/VISIBILITY, 4) HIGH TERRAIN/CHALLENGING NON-PRECISION APCH, 5) STRESS AND LANGUAGE BARRIER OF OPERATING IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY, AND 6) RELATIVE INEXPERIENCE TO THIS ARPT BY CREW.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.