Narrative:

On a scheduled flight from mia to ccs. Upon arrival into the ccs area, we were held high and slow. We were held to 200 KIAS maximum within 40 mi of the airport. We were cleared for a visual approach to runway 27 with a reported surface wind of 270 degrees at 10 KTS, with a short turn in to base leg. At 1800 ft MSL I noticed that the aircraft FMC was showing wind of 080 degrees at 21 KTS. After turning final, I realized that we were high and closing rapidly with the runway. I manually took control of the aircraft, called for full flaps and increased my rate of descent. I crossed the threshold at approximately 75 ft (runway is 12000 ft). At 20 ft I closed the throttles at this point. The aircraft was light and it continued to float like I have never experienced before. After floating excessively long, I lowered the nose and forced the mains to make contact. The aircraft did not respond to brake applications normally, but reverse was working and the aircraft was decelerating. The anti-skid system was releasing more than normal due to the tires skidding on the rubber deposits on last 3000 ft of runway. Smoke came off the tires, so the tower dispatched a fire truck in case we needed assistance. We turned off at the end without incident. Immediately after clearing the runway we noticed the windsock was sticking straight out to the west, indicating that we were cleared to land with a tailwind in excess of 10 KTS. Contributing factors: PIC has approximately 300 hours in type and sic approximately 200 hours in type. We were held high, turned onto a short final, and cleared to land with a tailwind. Heavy rubber deposits on the runway compromised the aircraft's braking action. Language barrier played a small part due to having instructions repeated and taking away valuable time to get the aircraft down earlier. In retrospect, I should have given myself more time by calling for an extended downwind to configure the aircraft for a normal landing. I feel that we are reluctant to ask because we feel that we will alter the traffic flow or it is sometimes difficult to get the point across in a strange language environment. And finally, I should have initiated a go around when it was obvious that I was high. The reason I elected not to do so early in the approach was based on 2 things: I had 12000 ft of runway and a (I thought) 10 KT headwind. I had flown the aircraft in and out of short runways for 3 months prior and I was very confident of its ability to get on the ground and stop in very short distances. Combine the tailwind and reduced brake effectiveness and such was not the case.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR FLC LANDS WITH TAILWIND IN EXCESS OF 10 KTS, RESULTING IN LONG LNDG AND ROLLOUT, EXACERBATED BY RUBBER DEPOSITS ON RWY.

Narrative: ON A SCHEDULED FLT FROM MIA TO CCS. UPON ARR INTO THE CCS AREA, WE WERE HELD HIGH AND SLOW. WE WERE HELD TO 200 KIAS MAX WITHIN 40 MI OF THE ARPT. WE WERE CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 27 WITH A RPTED SURFACE WIND OF 270 DEGS AT 10 KTS, WITH A SHORT TURN IN TO BASE LEG. AT 1800 FT MSL I NOTICED THAT THE ACFT FMC WAS SHOWING WIND OF 080 DEGS AT 21 KTS. AFTER TURNING FINAL, I REALIZED THAT WE WERE HIGH AND CLOSING RAPIDLY WITH THE RWY. I MANUALLY TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT, CALLED FOR FULL FLAPS AND INCREASED MY RATE OF DSCNT. I CROSSED THE THRESHOLD AT APPROX 75 FT (RWY IS 12000 FT). AT 20 FT I CLOSED THE THROTTLES AT THIS POINT. THE ACFT WAS LIGHT AND IT CONTINUED TO FLOAT LIKE I HAVE NEVER EXPERIENCED BEFORE. AFTER FLOATING EXCESSIVELY LONG, I LOWERED THE NOSE AND FORCED THE MAINS TO MAKE CONTACT. THE ACFT DID NOT RESPOND TO BRAKE APPLICATIONS NORMALLY, BUT REVERSE WAS WORKING AND THE ACFT WAS DECELERATING. THE ANTI-SKID SYS WAS RELEASING MORE THAN NORMAL DUE TO THE TIRES SKIDDING ON THE RUBBER DEPOSITS ON LAST 3000 FT OF RWY. SMOKE CAME OFF THE TIRES, SO THE TWR DISPATCHED A FIRE TRUCK IN CASE WE NEEDED ASSISTANCE. WE TURNED OFF AT THE END WITHOUT INCIDENT. IMMEDIATELY AFTER CLRING THE RWY WE NOTICED THE WINDSOCK WAS STICKING STRAIGHT OUT TO THE W, INDICATING THAT WE WERE CLRED TO LAND WITH A TAILWIND IN EXCESS OF 10 KTS. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: PIC HAS APPROX 300 HRS IN TYPE AND SIC APPROX 200 HRS IN TYPE. WE WERE HELD HIGH, TURNED ONTO A SHORT FINAL, AND CLRED TO LAND WITH A TAILWIND. HVY RUBBER DEPOSITS ON THE RWY COMPROMISED THE ACFT'S BRAKING ACTION. LANGUAGE BARRIER PLAYED A SMALL PART DUE TO HAVING INSTRUCTIONS REPEATED AND TAKING AWAY VALUABLE TIME TO GET THE ACFT DOWN EARLIER. IN RETROSPECT, I SHOULD HAVE GIVEN MYSELF MORE TIME BY CALLING FOR AN EXTENDED DOWNWIND TO CONFIGURE THE ACFT FOR A NORMAL LNDG. I FEEL THAT WE ARE RELUCTANT TO ASK BECAUSE WE FEEL THAT WE WILL ALTER THE TFC FLOW OR IT IS SOMETIMES DIFFICULT TO GET THE POINT ACROSS IN A STRANGE LANGUAGE ENVIRONMENT. AND FINALLY, I SHOULD HAVE INITIATED A GAR WHEN IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT I WAS HIGH. THE REASON I ELECTED NOT TO DO SO EARLY IN THE APCH WAS BASED ON 2 THINGS: I HAD 12000 FT OF RWY AND A (I THOUGHT) 10 KT HEADWIND. I HAD FLOWN THE ACFT IN AND OUT OF SHORT RWYS FOR 3 MONTHS PRIOR AND I WAS VERY CONFIDENT OF ITS ABILITY TO GET ON THE GND AND STOP IN VERY SHORT DISTANCES. COMBINE THE TAILWIND AND REDUCED BRAKE EFFECTIVENESS AND SUCH WAS NOT THE CASE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.