Narrative:

In the afternoon I was PIC of a scheduled 121 passenger carrying operation flying mco-pns. While performing preflight duties, my first officer and I observed radar returns in the pns area indicating convective activity. Upon reviewing the minimum fuel on the dispatch release, we discovered that the dispatcher was releasing us with only 100 pounds of contingency fuel and no alternate fuel. The taf did not dictate (legally) an alternate, even though it did indicate convective activity in the area. A check of nearby mob's taf did indicate that visibility would require the filing of an alternate for flts with that airport as the destination. When I called the dispatcher, his first concern was bumping passenger. As I continued to discuss the WX he continued discussing the passenger. I then requested the burn to pfn, which I considered the nearest practical alternate which is approved by my carrier. When he manipulated his computer and informed me of the burn, he also indicated a reluctance to change the dispatch accordingly. I informed him that I wasn't going without enough fuel to get to pfn and that I would inform the local operations personnel of the necessary changes. At the runway threshold, the tower informed us that our dispatch wanted to talk with us. We delayed takeoff and contacted them. The dispatcher said the pns taf had been amended and wanted to know how much fuel we had. Since we had enough fuel to reach pfn if a diversion became necessary, he concurred that we could safely conduct the flight. Upon reaching pns, the convective activity was on the field and a line was forming that prevented us from circumventing the WX so as to come in after the WX passed, that is without burning our alternate fuel and placing ourselves in a situation where we were committed to only ont outcome -- landing at pns. We diverted to pfn where we obtained more fuel, got a new release and proceeded to pns, albeit by a circuitous route to avoid the WX. Had I not used my authority/authorized as PIC, one of several outcomes could have occurred: 1) assuming a takeoff 30 seconds earlier (prior to dispatch contact), we would have had to choose between a diversion prior to entering a scenario where we could have to burn into our 45 min reserve, possible diversion to a military field or other non approved alternate or attempting a landing in unsuitable WX conditions. 2) assuming the contact we had, and under the concept that once the aircraft moves, the flight can continue, then a crew could have elected to take off (which I would not do) or return to the gate for more fuel. I am concerned that a dispatch release was generated where apparently the dispatcher did not compare the taf to the actual WX conditions. Our dispatch requirements do not require this comparison. It is only a matter of time till one of our flts gets into trouble with the current arrangement. I am also concerned that some of our dispatchers put productivity ahead of safety. Safety must be paramount, with productivity second. This is not the first time I have seen this problem. Apparently my carrier has either a quality control problem or safety is not first here.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN EMBRAER 120 FLC HAD TO UTILIZE THE CAPT'S AUTH TO CONVINCE DISPATCHER OF NEED FOR ALTERNATE FUEL.

Narrative: IN THE AFTERNOON I WAS PIC OF A SCHEDULED 121 PAX CARRYING OP FLYING MCO-PNS. WHILE PERFORMING PREFLT DUTIES, MY FO AND I OBSERVED RADAR RETURNS IN THE PNS AREA INDICATING CONVECTIVE ACTIVITY. UPON REVIEWING THE MINIMUM FUEL ON THE DISPATCH RELEASE, WE DISCOVERED THAT THE DISPATCHER WAS RELEASING US WITH ONLY 100 LBS OF CONTINGENCY FUEL AND NO ALTERNATE FUEL. THE TAF DID NOT DICTATE (LEGALLY) AN ALTERNATE, EVEN THOUGH IT DID INDICATE CONVECTIVE ACTIVITY IN THE AREA. A CHK OF NEARBY MOB'S TAF DID INDICATE THAT VISIBILITY WOULD REQUIRE THE FILING OF AN ALTERNATE FOR FLTS WITH THAT ARPT AS THE DEST. WHEN I CALLED THE DISPATCHER, HIS FIRST CONCERN WAS BUMPING PAX. AS I CONTINUED TO DISCUSS THE WX HE CONTINUED DISCUSSING THE PAX. I THEN REQUESTED THE BURN TO PFN, WHICH I CONSIDERED THE NEAREST PRACTICAL ALTERNATE WHICH IS APPROVED BY MY CARRIER. WHEN HE MANIPULATED HIS COMPUTER AND INFORMED ME OF THE BURN, HE ALSO INDICATED A RELUCTANCE TO CHANGE THE DISPATCH ACCORDINGLY. I INFORMED HIM THAT I WASN'T GOING WITHOUT ENOUGH FUEL TO GET TO PFN AND THAT I WOULD INFORM THE LCL OPS PERSONNEL OF THE NECESSARY CHANGES. AT THE RWY THRESHOLD, THE TWR INFORMED US THAT OUR DISPATCH WANTED TO TALK WITH US. WE DELAYED TKOF AND CONTACTED THEM. THE DISPATCHER SAID THE PNS TAF HAD BEEN AMENDED AND WANTED TO KNOW HOW MUCH FUEL WE HAD. SINCE WE HAD ENOUGH FUEL TO REACH PFN IF A DIVERSION BECAME NECESSARY, HE CONCURRED THAT WE COULD SAFELY CONDUCT THE FLT. UPON REACHING PNS, THE CONVECTIVE ACTIVITY WAS ON THE FIELD AND A LINE WAS FORMING THAT PREVENTED US FROM CIRCUMVENTING THE WX SO AS TO COME IN AFTER THE WX PASSED, THAT IS WITHOUT BURNING OUR ALTERNATE FUEL AND PLACING OURSELVES IN A SIT WHERE WE WERE COMMITTED TO ONLY ONT OUTCOME -- LNDG AT PNS. WE DIVERTED TO PFN WHERE WE OBTAINED MORE FUEL, GOT A NEW RELEASE AND PROCEEDED TO PNS, ALBEIT BY A CIRCUITOUS RTE TO AVOID THE WX. HAD I NOT USED MY AUTH AS PIC, ONE OF SEVERAL OUTCOMES COULD HAVE OCCURRED: 1) ASSUMING A TKOF 30 SECONDS EARLIER (PRIOR TO DISPATCH CONTACT), WE WOULD HAVE HAD TO CHOOSE BTWN A DIVERSION PRIOR TO ENTERING A SCENARIO WHERE WE COULD HAVE TO BURN INTO OUR 45 MIN RESERVE, POSSIBLE DIVERSION TO A MIL FIELD OR OTHER NON APPROVED ALTERNATE OR ATTEMPTING A LNDG IN UNSUITABLE WX CONDITIONS. 2) ASSUMING THE CONTACT WE HAD, AND UNDER THE CONCEPT THAT ONCE THE ACFT MOVES, THE FLT CAN CONTINUE, THEN A CREW COULD HAVE ELECTED TO TAKE OFF (WHICH I WOULD NOT DO) OR RETURN TO THE GATE FOR MORE FUEL. I AM CONCERNED THAT A DISPATCH RELEASE WAS GENERATED WHERE APPARENTLY THE DISPATCHER DID NOT COMPARE THE TAF TO THE ACTUAL WX CONDITIONS. OUR DISPATCH REQUIREMENTS DO NOT REQUIRE THIS COMPARISON. IT IS ONLY A MATTER OF TIME TILL ONE OF OUR FLTS GETS INTO TROUBLE WITH THE CURRENT ARRANGEMENT. I AM ALSO CONCERNED THAT SOME OF OUR DISPATCHERS PUT PRODUCTIVITY AHEAD OF SAFETY. SAFETY MUST BE PARAMOUNT, WITH PRODUCTIVITY SECOND. THIS IS NOT THE FIRST TIME I HAVE SEEN THIS PROB. APPARENTLY MY CARRIER HAS EITHER A QUALITY CTL PROB OR SAFETY IS NOT FIRST HERE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.