Narrative:

I have been a line check airman for my airline for 12 1/2 yrs. On this flight I was giving IOE to a new hire with no previous jet experience. It was our first leg together, and his first leg since simulation training. We thoroughly briefed our visual approach to runway 12 at bna, which is served by a VOR approach (no electronic GS). We discussed appropriate power setting for our flaps 40 degree approach and landing. We discussed flare, use of PAPI lighting system, touchdown technique, etc. Approach was well flown from 1000 ft, at which point we were fully configured, and on speed. WX at time was wind 090 degrees at 8 KTS, good visibility (6 mi in haze). We acquired runway 6 mi out. All indications were perfectly normal until 150 ft AGL, at which point our airspeed dropped 3-4 KTS below target. I commanded 'add power.' first officer added a small amount of power. I again commanded 'add power,' at which point first officer added only a slight amount of power. At the same time he relaxed back pressure on the yoke, slowing the aircraft nose to drop. At this point I took controls, adding a lot of power and attempting to flare the aircraft. Our full airplane (landing weight 137500 pounds) hit hard on the main gear and bounced. I effected a recovery and continued the landing rollout. On arrival at gate, we inspected the aircraft and discovered that the tailskid was heavily damaged. An additional area of lower fuselage forward of the tailskid was also damaged. I believe that the first officer's previous flying experience in light aircraft and turboprops did not sufficiently prepare him for the kind of situation he encountered, where the jet's inertia and 'back side of the power curve' situation required an assertive power increase and flare effort as the nose began to drop. Also, I believe the geometry of the B737-800 is sufficiently different from previous B737 models (it is considerably longer and more prone to tail strikes) that training should include mandatory landing and takeoff experience in the -800 simulator. As a line check airman, I would also make a point in the future of discussing some of the basic differences between jets and turboprops regarding landing technique, for students whose backgnd does not include jet aircraft experience. While I was mentally prepared to take control (as I always am during a new student's IOE), the unexpected relaxation of back pressure worsened the situation too quickly for me to avoid the outcome.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-800 HARD LNDG BDA WITH ACFT DAMAGE.

Narrative: I HAVE BEEN A LINE CHK AIRMAN FOR MY AIRLINE FOR 12 1/2 YRS. ON THIS FLT I WAS GIVING IOE TO A NEW HIRE WITH NO PREVIOUS JET EXPERIENCE. IT WAS OUR FIRST LEG TOGETHER, AND HIS FIRST LEG SINCE SIMULATION TRAINING. WE THOROUGHLY BRIEFED OUR VISUAL APCH TO RWY 12 AT BNA, WHICH IS SERVED BY A VOR APCH (NO ELECTRONIC GS). WE DISCUSSED APPROPRIATE PWR SETTING FOR OUR FLAPS 40 DEG APCH AND LNDG. WE DISCUSSED FLARE, USE OF PAPI LIGHTING SYS, TOUCHDOWN TECHNIQUE, ETC. APCH WAS WELL FLOWN FROM 1000 FT, AT WHICH POINT WE WERE FULLY CONFIGURED, AND ON SPD. WX AT TIME WAS WIND 090 DEGS AT 8 KTS, GOOD VISIBILITY (6 MI IN HAZE). WE ACQUIRED RWY 6 MI OUT. ALL INDICATIONS WERE PERFECTLY NORMAL UNTIL 150 FT AGL, AT WHICH POINT OUR AIRSPD DROPPED 3-4 KTS BELOW TARGET. I COMMANDED 'ADD PWR.' FO ADDED A SMALL AMOUNT OF PWR. I AGAIN COMMANDED 'ADD PWR,' AT WHICH POINT FO ADDED ONLY A SLIGHT AMOUNT OF PWR. AT THE SAME TIME HE RELAXED BACK PRESSURE ON THE YOKE, SLOWING THE ACFT NOSE TO DROP. AT THIS POINT I TOOK CTLS, ADDING A LOT OF PWR AND ATTEMPTING TO FLARE THE ACFT. OUR FULL AIRPLANE (LNDG WT 137500 LBS) HIT HARD ON THE MAIN GEAR AND BOUNCED. I EFFECTED A RECOVERY AND CONTINUED THE LNDG ROLLOUT. ON ARR AT GATE, WE INSPECTED THE ACFT AND DISCOVERED THAT THE TAILSKID WAS HEAVILY DAMAGED. AN ADDITIONAL AREA OF LOWER FUSELAGE FORWARD OF THE TAILSKID WAS ALSO DAMAGED. I BELIEVE THAT THE FO'S PREVIOUS FLYING EXPERIENCE IN LIGHT ACFT AND TURBOPROPS DID NOT SUFFICIENTLY PREPARE HIM FOR THE KIND OF SIT HE ENCOUNTERED, WHERE THE JET'S INERTIA AND 'BACK SIDE OF THE PWR CURVE' SIT REQUIRED AN ASSERTIVE PWR INCREASE AND FLARE EFFORT AS THE NOSE BEGAN TO DROP. ALSO, I BELIEVE THE GEOMETRY OF THE B737-800 IS SUFFICIENTLY DIFFERENT FROM PREVIOUS B737 MODELS (IT IS CONSIDERABLY LONGER AND MORE PRONE TO TAIL STRIKES) THAT TRAINING SHOULD INCLUDE MANDATORY LNDG AND TKOF EXPERIENCE IN THE -800 SIMULATOR. AS A LINE CHK AIRMAN, I WOULD ALSO MAKE A POINT IN THE FUTURE OF DISCUSSING SOME OF THE BASIC DIFFERENCES BTWN JETS AND TURBOPROPS REGARDING LNDG TECHNIQUE, FOR STUDENTS WHOSE BACKGND DOES NOT INCLUDE JET ACFT EXPERIENCE. WHILE I WAS MENTALLY PREPARED TO TAKE CTL (AS I ALWAYS AM DURING A NEW STUDENT'S IOE), THE UNEXPECTED RELAXATION OF BACK PRESSURE WORSENED THE SIT TOO QUICKLY FOR ME TO AVOID THE OUTCOME.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.