Narrative:

I was riding in the cockpit of a B757-200, flight stl-sna when during descent for an ILS approach I noticed the crew having difficulty executing a short descent to intercept the GS. The captain appeared to select flch, flight level change, after the first officer had selected a higher altitude in the autoplt altitude select window. The result was throttle advancement and an autoplt climb. By now we were full scale above the GS and the captain finally disconnected the autoflt system. He now dove toward the GS and the airspeed increased to about 230 KTS. It appeared from my position that we had exceeded this flap speed and were unstabilized for the rest of the approach including vref +20-25 KTS over the threshold on a short runway. The crew didn't say much during taxi-in or engine shutdown. The captain made a remark about his recovery and the first officer appeared to be pulling a printed copy of the flight profile from the ACARS printer. After deplaning I attempted to call the B757 fleet manager and discuss that which I witnessed. I am a former B767 check airman. The B757 fleet manager was unavailable so I called the director of flying safety and reported the events in case he felt an inspection was in order. I turned the issue over to the safety director and proceeded to my intended meeting. Apparently the first officer called the B757 standards manager upon reaching the hotel, and disclosed the event. The captain did not make a log entry as was his responsibility. I believe I did my duty as a manager in notifying the director of safety. The company then had 1 hour to decide if an aircraft inspection was necessary.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757 CAPT MADE UNSTABILIZED APCH AND HAD A FLAP OVERSPD.

Narrative: I WAS RIDING IN THE COCKPIT OF A B757-200, FLT STL-SNA WHEN DURING DSCNT FOR AN ILS APCH I NOTICED THE CREW HAVING DIFFICULTY EXECUTING A SHORT DSCNT TO INTERCEPT THE GS. THE CAPT APPEARED TO SELECT FLCH, FLT LEVEL CHANGE, AFTER THE FO HAD SELECTED A HIGHER ALT IN THE AUTOPLT ALT SELECT WINDOW. THE RESULT WAS THROTTLE ADVANCEMENT AND AN AUTOPLT CLB. BY NOW WE WERE FULL SCALE ABOVE THE GS AND THE CAPT FINALLY DISCONNECTED THE AUTOFLT SYS. HE NOW DOVE TOWARD THE GS AND THE AIRSPD INCREASED TO ABOUT 230 KTS. IT APPEARED FROM MY POS THAT WE HAD EXCEEDED THIS FLAP SPD AND WERE UNSTABILIZED FOR THE REST OF THE APCH INCLUDING VREF +20-25 KTS OVER THE THRESHOLD ON A SHORT RWY. THE CREW DIDN'T SAY MUCH DURING TAXI-IN OR ENG SHUTDOWN. THE CAPT MADE A REMARK ABOUT HIS RECOVERY AND THE FO APPEARED TO BE PULLING A PRINTED COPY OF THE FLT PROFILE FROM THE ACARS PRINTER. AFTER DEPLANING I ATTEMPTED TO CALL THE B757 FLEET MGR AND DISCUSS THAT WHICH I WITNESSED. I AM A FORMER B767 CHK AIRMAN. THE B757 FLEET MGR WAS UNAVAILABLE SO I CALLED THE DIRECTOR OF FLYING SAFETY AND RPTED THE EVENTS IN CASE HE FELT AN INSPECTION WAS IN ORDER. I TURNED THE ISSUE OVER TO THE SAFETY DIRECTOR AND PROCEEDED TO MY INTENDED MEETING. APPARENTLY THE FO CALLED THE B757 STANDARDS MGR UPON REACHING THE HOTEL, AND DISCLOSED THE EVENT. THE CAPT DID NOT MAKE A LOG ENTRY AS WAS HIS RESPONSIBILITY. I BELIEVE I DID MY DUTY AS A MGR IN NOTIFYING THE DIRECTOR OF SAFETY. THE COMPANY THEN HAD 1 HR TO DECIDE IF AN ACFT INSPECTION WAS NECESSARY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.